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ARTICLES
BETWEEN DIALOGUE AND DECREE:
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
NATIONAL COURTS
ROBERT

B.

AHDIEH*

Recent years have seen dramatic growth in the number of internationaltribunals at
work across the globe, from the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization
and the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, to the Claims Resolution
Tribunal for Dormant Claims in Switzerland and the International Criminal Court.
With this development has come both increasedopportunity for interaction between
national and internationalcourts and increasedoccasionfor conflict. Such friction
was evident in the recent decision in Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, in
which an arbitralpanel constituted under the North American Free Trade Agreement found a Mississippi jury trial to have been "the antithesis of due process."
Much of the interactionof courts across nationalborders-includingthe citation of
foreign legal authority, transnational coordination of complex litigation, and the
enforcement of foreign judgments-has been analyzed through the metaphor of
"dialogue." As suggested by the Loewen case, however, there is a growing pattern
of interaction between international tribunals and national courts for which dialogue is an ill-suited analogy. Contrary to conventional expectations of incapacity
and restraintin internationaladjudication,recent interactionsbetween international
tribunals and domestic courts incorporatea significant dimension of "review" in
both a literal and a figurative sense. Although such review is not appellate in
nature, it shares with appellate review some potential to effectuate its mandate
without the consent of the court subject to review. This dimension of "power"further distinguishes emerging cases of international review from transnational dialogue. Standing between the hierarchy of appellate review and the comity of
judicial dialogue, Loewen and similar occasionsfor internationalengagement with
nationalcourts representa distinct pattern of judicial interaction,one I develop and
detail as "dialectical review."
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grateful to my colleagues David Bederman, Anita Bernstein, Bill Buzbee, Marc Miller, and
Robert Schapiro for their sage counsel and unfailing patience. Many thanks also to Alex
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Coe, Chip Brower, Bill Dodge, Ken Doroshow, Lee Epstein, Tom Ginsburg, Oona
Hathaway, Larry Helfer, Ronnie Kann, John Orth, Kal Raustiala, Mark Rosen, AnneMarie Slaughter, Paul Stephan, Alec Stone Sweet, Michael Van Alstine, Todd Weiler, Bert
Westbrook, Keith Whittington, attendees of the Association of American Law Schools's
Program on Intersystemic Adjudication and the International Law Association's session on
NAFTA Chapter 11-Reflections on Law Making and Breaking, and workshop participants at the University of Connecticut School of Law, for their varied assistance and
encouragement. The Emory Law School library staff, the New York University Law
Review editorial board, and my research assistants, finally, have been instrumental in
bringing this Article to fruition.
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Defined broadly as a hybrid of appellate review and dialogue, the nature of dialectical review can be elaborated by examining other hybrid judicial interactionsfederal habeas review of state criminalconvictions and appellate courts' use of dicta
as a signaling device to lower courts. In each of these cases, a form of dialectical
review serves as a mechanism of legal innovation. In the face of acceleratingtrends
of globalization,a pattern of dialectical review between internationaland national
courts can help to facilitate the emergence, evolution, and internalization of universal norms of due process. The present analysis thus offers international and
domesticjudges, as well as policymakers, a framework for understandingandfacilitating beneficial judicial interaction in an ever-shrinking world.
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INTRODUCTION

By any standard of measurement, the trial involving O'Keefe and
Loewen was a disgrace.... By any standard of evaluation, the trial

judge failed to afford Loewen the process that was due. 1

In recent years, a wave of international judicialization has washed
over the globe. 2 Whether permanent or ad hoc, human rights oriented

or commercial, international or quasi-international, such tribunals
have multiplied exponentially. The collective jurisdictional reach of
international tribunals has also expanded, both by design and through
gradual accretions of judicial authority. 3 Unsurprisingly, the incidence
1 Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
119 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003). Publicly released docuINVESTMENT 675, 702,
ments on all North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) disputes are available
online at http://www.naftalaw.org.
2 See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of
Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675, 677-79 (2003) (noting array of new international tribunals formed in recent years); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 370-73 (1997)
(describing growing transnational interaction among judges and increased citation to foreign and international sources); see also Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free
Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 13-14 (Thomas M.
Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996) (acknowledging growing community of courts around
globe). It bears noting at the outset that the reference to "international tribunals" herein is
intended to be broadly descriptive. For purposes of the immediate analysis, it is not necessary to differentiate "international" tribunals from "transnational" or "supranational"
ones. Nor is it necessary to draw a fine line between tribunals, courts, and arbitral bodies.
3 See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REV.
429, 430, 436-37 (2003) (noting recent "flurry of judicialization" in which diverse international tribunals have emerged).
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and extent of transnational judicial interaction-including citation of

foreign decisions, negotiated divisions of judicial responsibility in
complex cross-border litigation, and the enforcement of foreign judgments-has also grown.
Much of this interaction has been explored both descriptively and
normatively through the metaphor of "dialogue."'4 The characterization of transnational judicial interaction as dialogue is hardly surprising, given an understanding of international relations as shaped by
"passive virtues" of a sort, including respect for national sovereignty

and heavy reliance on diplomacy. However, a growing pattern of
transnational interactions among courts challenge the adequacy of the
dialogic metaphor. In these cases, the relevant judicial engagement
incorporates a strong dimension of judicial "review" and at least a
threat of meaningful international "power."' 5
In Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States,6 an ad hoc tribunal convened under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) subjected the judgments and procedures of the
Mississippi courts to a searching review.7 In doing so, the tribunal
threatened to impose a massive damages award on the ultimate "deep
4 See, e.g., Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 323-27, 358-62, 373-87 (describing
dialogue between European Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR)); Harold H. Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2371
(1991) (proffering that "institutional dialogue" is important characteristic of transnational
public law litigation); Martinez, supra note 3, at 434 (advocating antiparochial pattern of
dialogue between courts).
5 See infra Parts II.B & IV.B.1.

6 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 675. For more on the Loewen case, see generally

William S. Dodge, InternationalDecision, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (2004).
7 Specifically, the tribunal considered claims of "denial of justice," discriminatory
treatment, and indirect expropriation, based on the Mississippi litigation of a civil claim
against the Loewen Group. During that trial, repeated suggestions of racism in the
Loewen Group's management, irrelevant references to the wealth of its founder (particularly to his yacht), and even an analogy of the Loewen Group's business practices to the
Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor were permitted. See Jake A. Baccari, The Loewen
Claim: A Creative Use of NAFTA's Chapter 11, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 465,

468-69 (2003) (describing plaintiff's emphasis on defendant's race, wealth, and nationality); Michael I. Krauss, NAFTA Meets the American Torts Process: O'Keefe v. Loewen, 9
GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 77 (2000) (noting plaintiff's analogy of the Loewen Group's
actions to Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor); see also Stefan Matiation, Arbitration with
Two Twists: Loewen v. United States and Free Trade Commission Intervention in NAFTA
Chapter11 Disputes, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 451,455 (2003). This collective pattern of
misconduct at trial contributed to a jury's award of $500 million in compensatory and punitive damages-the largest damage award in Mississippi history-on contracts worth less
than $5 million. See Baccari, supra, at 468-69 (describing types of damages awarded to
plaintiff). Furthermore, the Loewen Group insisted that it was unable to appeal this
shocking verdict because of its inability to post the $625 million supersedeas bond that
Mississippi law required to stay performance pending appeal-a requirement the
Mississippi courts could waive for good cause, but would not. See Matiation, supra, at 456
(noting trial court's rejection of Loewen Group's motion to post reduced bond amount of
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pocket," one capable of placing meaningful pressure on recalcitrant
courts-the U.S. government. This prospect of a significant award

against the federal government meant that the tribunal's review and
critique of the Mississippi courts had real potential to influence those
courts, regardless of their immediate receptivity to a dialogue

regarding their compliance with international norms of due process.
The pattern of international review of national courts exemplified
by Loewen is a far cry from the "dialogue" manifest in constitutional
courts' citation of one another and in the transnational management
of cross-border litigation.8 As suggested above, this divergence begins
with the international tribunal's close and critical review of the judg-

ment and procedures of the national court for consistency with due
process, non-discrimination, and substantive requirements of international law. Such searching review is not without precedent. Denial of

justice claims-which rest on a national court's violation of international legal norms-have a long pedigree, even if the courts of the
developed world have rarely been the subject of such review. 9 In
recent years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have engaged in some analogous
review, and shades of an international review of national courts also
can be found in decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 10 Yet, instances of such
review have been rare."1
$125 million); see also Baccari, supra, at 469-70 (citing Mississippi courts' failure to waive
or reduce bond requirement among grounds for Chapter 11 claim).
8 It is interesting to note, in this vein, that Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, among the most enthusiastic judicial advocates of
conventional judicial dialogue, in which courts pay greater heed to foreign decisions, see,
e.g., Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise ParentsDo Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children":
Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence,79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633
(2004); see also Emily Bazelon, A Bold Stroke, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2004, at 30, 32-33,
has expressed consternation about a recent Chapter 11 decision, see Adam Liptak, Review
of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, § 1, at 20, in
which the tribunal assessed the potential for a denial of justice in the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's dispensation of an appeal by a Canadian real estate company, see
Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M. 85, 109-15,
9I126-156 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.naftalaw.org; infra
notes 397-413 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Part V. The claims of interest herein are thus unprecedented because they
include denial of justice claims against highly developed countries, and not only developing
or underdeveloped countries. See Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 531, 537-38 (2002) (discussing novelty of
rnuintripO
NAFTA's investor-state claim mechanism between twn dpveloponn
10 See infra Part VI.B.
11 Even if Chapter 11 review was simply a replication of the pattern of supranational
review in Europe, it would represent an interesting case study because of its application to
the United States, a nation traditionally resistant to international judicialization. Given
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Even where it has occurred, international review of national
courts commonly has not been coupled with any meaningful capacity
of the international tribunal to effectuate its judgment without the
consent and cooperation of the relevant national court. By contrast,
notwithstanding Chapter 11 tribunals' lack of formal authority over
national courts, they enjoy just such power. This power arises from
the prospect of a substantial damage award to a private litigant, who
can readily enforce it against federal authorities. 12 Given this institutional design, Chapter 11 tribunals would appear to enjoy a greater
capacity than most international courts to exercise power in their
interactions with national courts. 13 Chapter 11 consequently
manifests some equipoise of judicial power, in which neither judicial
interlocutor can afford to ignore the other.
If dimensions of review and power make Chapter 11 review and
similar interactions between international tribunals and national
courts more than dialogue, those interactions still do not amount to
appellate review. Some alternative paradigm for the design and operation of the growing pattern of international review in Chapter 11 and
similar investment agreements, as well as in certain decisions of the
ECJ and the ECHR, and even potentially in the work of the ICJ and
the WTO, is therefore necessary. By way of response, I offer a model
of "dialectical review"-a pattern of judicial review, yet one with dialogue at its core. Consistent with classical usage, such dialectical
review might be said to rest on a recurrent engagement of international and national courts, advancing toward a synthesis of shared
norms of due process.
The basic character of dialectical review can be found in its incorporation of distinct elements of dialogue and appellate review. It is a
hybrid pattern of judicial interaction, with values of horizontal comity
operating alongside elements of vertical hierarchy. This broad pattern
can be further elucidated by reference to cases of hybrid judicial interaction outside Chapter 11. I offer two potential analogies: First, I
analogize the Chapter 11 interaction of international and national
courts to historical patterns of federal habeas corpus review of state
criminal convictions. As explored by Robert Cover and Alex
Aleinikoff, the interaction of federal and state courts in habeas review
has much to offer to our understanding of the growing pattern of
this "innovation" of Chapter 11, the analysis herein proceeds with a particular orientation
to U.S. court interactions with international tribunals.
12 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
1135, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter
NAFTA] (outlining remedies available under Chapter 11).
13 See infra Parts IV.A.1 & B.1.a.
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international-national court interaction in the world today.1 4 Second,
I draw parallels to appellate courts' use of dicta as a signaling device

to other institutions, in forms explored by Alexander Bickel, Guido
15
Calabresi, and Neal Katyal.
This Article's analysis of Chapter 11 and potential domestic anal-

ogies points to dialectical review as a distinct form of judicial interaction inadequately captured within available paradigms. Such review
begins with an interaction of international and national courts to
which each brings a distinct set of perspectives. Each enjoys some
capacity to press its views on the other but suffers from an inability to
impose its will. Each can force the other to listen but not necessarily
to act. Given as much, there arises a recurrent pattern of dialectical
engagement, critique, and counsel, from which learning and innovation can emerge. The beginning of such a pattern can already be discerned in the Chapter 11 context, and perhaps in the interaction of
other international tribunals and national courts. Hope for such
engagement might thus be found in the receptive rejoinder of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to the ICJ's recent decision in
16
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.
14See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 648 (1981) (describing opportunities for redundant litigation of norms of constitutional criminal procedure because of concurrent federal
and state competency); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1036 (1977) (outlining Warren
Court's approach to reforming criminal procedure through dialogue between state and federal courts). Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have explored a similar pattern in the habeas
review of capital cases using a rubric of "interactive federalism" and stressed the need for
each court to reflect on its role in the system. See Ronald F. Wright & Marc Miller, In
Your Court: State JudicialFederalism in Capital Cases, 18 URB. LAW. 659, 660 (1986); see
also id. at 693-94 (offering cases in which state courts grappled with their relationship with
federal courts). The present analysis is an attempt to engage in analogous reflection on the
place of national courts and international tribunals in an emerging international judicial
order.
15 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITCS 69-71, 197-98 (1962) (identifying various mechanisms of

restraint by Supreme Court as important tools in Court's pursuit of its constitutional mission); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 101-19 (1982)

(suggesting that courts can use threat of judicial revision of statutes and sunset language to
induce legislative reconsideration of anachronistic laws); Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105
HARV. L. REV. 80, 104 (1991) (suggesting importance of legislative "second-look" at
hastily passed legislation in face of constitutional questions); Neal K. Katyal, Judges As
Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1711 (1998) ("The combination of 'narrow holding +
advicegiving dicta' enjoys a natural advantage over a broad holding in terms of democratic
self-rule, flexibility, popular accountability, and adantabilitv").
16 (Mex. v. U.S.) 43 I.L.M. 581 (Mar. 31, 2004). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals granted an indefinite stay of execution and a hearing on Torres's Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations claims, following the International Court of Justice's (ICJ)
ruling in Avena. Torres v. Oklahoma (Torres II), No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May
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The following Part introduces the subject with a description of
the nature of Chapter 11 and its application in Loewen. Part II considers appellate review and dialogue as alternative paradigms of judicial interaction and suggests the present incompatibility of
international review of national courts with either model. Part III
explores the desirable ends of a regime of international review of
national courts. Drawing on the habeas and dicta analogies, I suggest
the particular utility of international review as a source of innovation
in the development of legal norms.
Part IV offers a synthesis. Drawing on the respective elements of
appeal and dialogue in the international review of national courts,
together with the proposed role for such review in fostering innovation, I outline the model of dialectical review. After identifying three
core characteristics of such review, I consider their manifestation in
the design and operation of Chapter 11 review, both confirming the
applicability of the model I propose and helping to flesh out its details.
Part V completes the articulation of the paradigm of dialectical review
under Chapter 11, positing the development of international norms of
due process as an appropriate end of the international review of
national courts. Finally, Part VI concludes with some consideration of
the future of dialectical review, both under Chapter 11 and similar
investment agreements, and in a growing array of other interactions
among international tribunals and national courts. In the years ahead,
sometimes jarring occasions for intersystemic judicial review-and a
resulting need for effective models of such interaction-can be
expected to grow.
I
WHEN FREE TRADE MET MISSISSIPPI

In several recent international arbitrations, ad hoc tribunals convened under Chapter 11 of NAFTA have had occasion to review the
judgments and the procedural course of litigation in the domestic
courts of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 17 Most significantly,
the Chapter 11 tribunal in Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States had
occasion to consider the quality of due process provided in a
13, 2004) (order granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing);
see Oklahoma Court Halts Execution, AUGUSTA CHRON., May 14, 2004, at A14; S. Lynne
Walker, Mexican Man's Death Penalty Lifted: World Court Swayed Oklahoma Execution,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 14, 2004, at A3; see also infra notes 556-58 and accompanying text.
17 On NAFTA, see generally Patricia I. Hansen, Judicializationand Globalizationin the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 489 (2003) (describing NAFTA's
various provisions for international adjudication and recent cases under those provisions).
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Mississippi trial. Its conclusions were not generous: "By any standard
of measurement, the trial involving O'Keefe and Loewen was a dis-

grace. .... By any standard of evaluation, the trial judge failed to
afford Loewen the process that was due."'1 8 The award of $400 million
in punitive damages against the Canadian corporation was subject to
particular criticism: "The total award (even the award of compensatory damages) appears to be grossly disproportionate to the damage
suffered by O'Keefe."' 19 Moreover, the highly irregular process by

which judge and jury reached that award was "the antithesis of due
20
process."
The NAFTA signatory states-the United States, Canada, and
Mexico-included Chapter 11 to protect the interests of investors

from each state who direct their investments into the other signatory
states.2 1 To this end, Chapter 11 enumerates a set of party obligations

vis-A-vis such investors, including non-discrimination obligations of
national treatment (Article 1102) and most-favored-nation treatment

(Article 1103), provision of the minimum standard of treatment
required by international law (Article 1105),22 and protection against

24
direct or indirect expropriation (Article 1110),23 among others.
Such obligations begin with the federal authorities of each signatory
state, who are responsible for compliance with Chapter 11.25 By way
of the law of state responsibility, however, these obligations ultimately
apply to all state actors within the signatory state, from the President
of the United States to the Registrar of Vital Records in New York
City and from the U.S. Supreme Court to the Traffic Violations
26
Bureau of the State of New York.
Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
675, 702,
119 (NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at
http://www.naftalaw.org. The tribunal continued: "There was a gross failure on the part of
the trial judge to afford the due process due to Loewen in protecting it from the tactics
employed by O'Keefe and its counsel." Id. at 695, 87.
19 Id. at 700, 113.
20 Id. at 703, 1 122.
21 See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protectionsand the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 40-41 (2003) (outlining Chapter 11 provisions designed to
protect foreign investors).
22 See NAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 1102-1107, at 639-40.
23 See id. art. 1110, at 641.
24 See, e.g., id. art. 1106, at 640 (prohibiting use of performance requirements by
NAFTA signatories).
'2 See id. art. 105, at 298 (prescribing responsibility of state parties for implementation
of NAFTA).
26 See id. art. 1108 §l(a), at 640 (referencing application of NAFTA obligations to subnational authorities).
18

INVESTMENT
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To enforce these obligations, Chapter 11 goes on to establish an
investor-state arbitration mechanism, unique among developed econ-

omies, by which an aggrieved foreign investor can bring a claim
against the relevant federal authority, be it the United States, Canada,
or Mexico. 27 Under these provisions, following waiver of any local
judicial remedies that might be available, 28 investors can seek establishment of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal to adjudicate any asserted violation of their rights under Chapter 11.29 Upon creation, a tribunal
enjoys wide jurisdiction to receive evidence and conduct hearings
regarding the investor's Chapter 11 claims. 30 Ultimately, it is author-

ized to adjudicate those claims through an enforceable award of monetary damages against the relevant state party. 31 Notably, however,
the enforcement of Chapter 11 awards through national courts, as well

as potential petitions for review or annulment of those awards, may
offer national courts of the relevant state party some opportunity to
critique and even stymie the decrees of Chapter 11 tribunals, 32 laying
the foundation for some pattern of interaction and exchange.
The treatment of the Loewen Group, a Canadian corporation, in
the Mississippi courts would appear to be a textbook case of the conduct that Chapter 11 was designed to address. 33 The Loewen Group's
Chapter 11 claims arose from the litigation of a civil suit against the

company in Mississippi state court. In the Loewen Group's view, the
"introduction of extensive anti-Canadian ... testimony and counsel

comments" during the trial violated the non-discrimination require27 See id. arts. 1116-1117, at 642-43; see also Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M. 85, 103 1 95 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available
at http://www.naftalaw.org; Been & Beauvais, supra note 21, at 44-46. Chapter 11 is
unprecedented in its multilateral character and in its inclusion of multiple developedcountry parties. The array of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) entered into prior to
Chapter 11, and on which the latter was based, involved only two parties, one of whom was
invariably a developing country, unlikely to have investment opportunities in the partner
state.
28 See William S. Dodge, National Courts and InternationalArbitration: Exhaustion of
Remedies and Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HAST. INT'L & CoMP. L.
REV. 357, 370-71 (2000) (explaining that foreign investors must waive their rights to
domestic court).
29 See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1121, at 643.
30 See id. arts. 1133-1134, at 646.
31 See id. arts. 1135-1136, at 646.
32 See infra Part IV.B.1.
33 See Ren6e L. Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice
System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 258-60 (describing rulings by
Mississippi judge in Loewen case that seemingly demonstrate prejudice against foreign corporation); see also William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors Under
NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 565 (2002) (describing plaintiff counsel's
efforts to stir anti-Canadian sentiment among jurors).
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ments of Articles 1102 and 1105 of NAFTA. 34 The Loewen Group
also argued that plaintiff's counsel had stoked racial and class biases,
without intervention by the trial judge. 35 Implications that the

Loewen Group engaged in policies harmful to African Americans and
repeated references to its founder's ownership of a large yacht were
36
cited as examples.
Given the limited monetary value of the underlying contract and

antitrust claims brought against the company, the Loewen Group
argued further that the jury's $400 million punitive damage award, as
well as its massive emotional-distress award, constituted both a

"denial of justice" under international law and a failure to accord fair
and equitable treatment. 37 As such, it violated the minimum standard
of treatment prescribed by Article 1105.38 On the same grounds, the

Loewen Group challenged the flawed process by which the jury
arrived at, and the court approved, the damages award. 39 A further
violation of the minimum standard of treatment, the Loewen Group
argued, arose from the unwillingness of the trial and appellate courts
to waive the standard appeal bond requirement of 125 %, which would

have required a $625 million bond in this case. This refusal, the
Loewen Group suggested, essentially prevented it from appealing the
40
deeply flawed trial court judgment.
Taking up these claims, the Loewen tribunal first held that
Chapter 11 and its strictures were fully applicable to the actions, deci34 Notice of Claim, Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
49, 139 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998), at http://www.naftalaw.org. At its extreme, the
Loewen Group's business practices were compared to the Japanese bombing of Pearl
Harbor. See id. at 37-38, 103.
35 See id. at 20-25,
53-69.
36 See id. at 20-25, 28-29,
53-69, 78.
37 "Denial of justice" is the paradigmatic international claim of judicial wrongdoing in
violation of international law. See Lerner, supra note 33, at 250-51; see also infra Part V.
38 See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 675, 706,

137 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://

www.naftalaw.org.
39 Mississippi law requires a bifurcated trial procedure in which the jury first determines liability and compensatory damages and then considers whether to award punitive
damages. After the jury erroneously returned punitive damages in the first phase, Judge
Graves denied Loewen's motion for a mistrial, reduced the initial award from $260 million
to $100 million, and then directed that the trial enter the second stage. How $160 million
of the initial award was identified as punitive damages remains a mystery. See Loewen, 4 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT at 695-97,

88-97.

40 Id. at 678, 6. The Loewen Group further asserted that the discriminatory nature of
the trial violated Article 1102's national treatment requirement. Finally, it argued that all
of the foregoing constituted an indirect form of expropriation in violation of Article 1110
of NAFTA. See id. at 683, 39; see also Lerner, supra note 33, at 258-60.
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sions, and procedures of judicial institutions. 41 With that jurisdictional
bar brushed aside, the tribunal found little to dispute in Loewen's substantive claims. In the tribunal's assessment, basic standards of due
42
process were not met in the Mississippi trial, or even approximated.
Consequently, the minimum standard of treatment required by international law had been denied. Likewise, the tribunal found the proceeding to have been infected by gross discrimination. 43 As the
Tribunal summarized its analysis:
Having read the transcript and having considered the submissions of
the parties with respect to the conduct of the trial, we have reached
the firm conclusion that the conduct of the trial by the trial judge
was so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of justice amounting
to manifest injustice as that expression is understood in international law.44
Notwithstanding this harsh critique, the Loewen Group's claim
for damages ultimately was denied on what many saw as technical-or
41 See Loewen Group v. United States, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, IT 39-60 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org; see also Been & Beauvais, supra note
21, at 79-83; Lerner, supra note 33, at 234. In essence, the Loewen tribunal rejected U.S.
conceptions of judicial exceptionalism. See Paul B. Stephan, Redistributive LitigationJudicialInnovation, Private Expectations, and the Shadow of InternationalLaw, 88 VA. L.
REV. 789, 834-36 (2002) (noting that body of expropriation law as exemplified in most
investment treaties does not distinguish between judicial and other governmental action).
This conclusion may have been unavoidable, given the capacity of governments otherwise
to direct controversial decisions through the courts and thereby insulate them from
Chapter 11 review. It was also in line with most states' resistance to any distinction among
state actors. Even the United States was ill-positioned to argue otherwise, given its past
assertion of just this position in cases in which it was the petitioner. See Guillermo A.
Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11,
28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 380 n.79 (2003) (giving example of U.S. State Department position
that BIT prohibitions on expropriations apply to any state measure, regardless of form);
see also Lerner, supra note 33, at 261-63 (asserting that United States has repeatedly
endorsed view that denials of justice include manifestly unjust judicial decisions). The tribunal's decision was also in accord with an important line of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (holding that actions of state judicial
authorities constitute actions of state government for purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment). It is not surprising, then, that the United States came to concede this point.
See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to International
Law, 96 AM. J. INrr'L L. 706, 708 (2002) ("The United States accepts the Tribunal's ruling
that 'conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of the State under
international law, whether the organ be legislative, executive or judicial, whatever position
it holds in the organisation of the State.'").
42 See Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 702,
119 ("By any standard of measurement, the trial . . . was a disgrace."); id. at 706, 137 (trial did not meet international
standard of "fair and equitable treatment").
43 See Todd Weiler, Dodging Bullets: A Quick Synopsis of the NAFTA Award in
Loewen & The Loewen Group v. U.S.A. 6-7 (July 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the New York University Law Review).
44 Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENrr at 687
54.
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at least non-meritorious-grounds.

First, the tribunal held that

Loewen's post-bankruptcy reorganization as a U.S. corporation, and
consequent loss of Canadian nationality, deprived it of standing to
proceed under Chapter 11. 45 Additionally, the tribunal found that
Loewen could not prevail, given its failure to pursue all available
opportunities to challenge the trial court judgment in the national
courts.

46

While these grounds allowed the United States to "dodge the
bullet" of Chapter 11 liability in Loewen, 47 their technical and perhaps
fortuitous nature offers little reason to believe that liability for U.S.
judicial conduct will not be imposed in the future. Loewen was not
the first Chapter 11 case in which U.S. courts were subject to review,
and similar claims continue to be proffered.4 8 In fact, they are likely
to proliferate for a number of reasons. 49 First, the statutory bases for
such review are multiplying as the number of international agree-

ments, including Chapter 11-like provisions, grows.50
45 See id. at 730,

Second,

238-240.
See id. at 708, 710, 711, 714-24, $ 143, 151, 154, 172-217 (applying finality principle); see also Weiler, supra note 43, at 8. While a party seeking international review
normally must exhaust local remedies, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §713 cmt. f & n.5 (1986); Dodge, supra note
28, at 361, Chapter 11 waives the local remedies rule, see Dodge, supra note 33, at 567.
Nonetheless, the Loewen tribunal concluded that where the relevant claim is directed to a
judicial institution, that decision must have been challenged through the legal system in its
entirety. The tribunal thus identified a "finality" requirement for challenges to judicial
action under Chapter 11, under which there could be no substantive violation of international law by a judicial body-no "denial of justice"-until the domestic legal process had
been permitted to run its course. See Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 685-86, 707-11,
$$ 48-50, 142-156; Murphy, supra note 41, at 707-09; see also Counter-Memorial of the
United States of America, Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
107-14 (2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org. As for the Loewen Group's other claims, the
tribunal rejected its discrimination claim based on a failure to submit evidence that the
treatment it received was inferior to that of every defendant in the Mississippi courts, see
Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 707, 140, and its expropriation claim, based on its
failure to establish (because of the lack of finality) a denial of justice. See id. at 707, 141.
47 See Weiler, supra note 43, at 1.
48 See infra notes 394-424 and accompanying text (describing Mondev and Azinian
arbitrations); see also Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3,
129
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2004) (implying criticism of "rather technical grounds" of decision in several Mexican judgments against Chapter 11 claimant), at http://www.naftalaw.
org; Post-Hearing Brief of Claimant, International Thunderbird Gaming Co. v. Mexico, at
14-17 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2004), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
49 See Martinez, supra note 3, at 430.
50 Although provisions for investor-state arbitration existed before Chapter 11 in an
array of BITs. see Hansen. suora note 17. at 499. NAFTA included the first such agreement
between two developed economies. Canada, unlike other investment agreement partners
of the United States, directs substantial foreign direct investment into the country. See
Legum, supra note 9, at 537. The United States has primarily concluded BITs with countries such as Albania, Cameroon, Estonia, and Georgia. See Int'l Ctr. for the Settlement of
46
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through such agreements, the relevant international law claim
directed to judicial wrongs-assertion of a "denial of justice"-now is
grounded more explicitly in positive law, making violations easier to
identify and assert. 51 Third, more claims can be expected because
Chapter 11 and similar agreements grant private investors the ability
Inv. Disputes, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1996: Chronological and Country Data,
at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/united-states.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). As
the number of BITs, as well as free trade agreements with investment protections, to which
the United States is a party has grown, the counterparties have come to include a growing
number of countries with some-even if still limited-capacity for direct investment in the
United States. Recent free trade agreements with Jordan, Singapore, Chile, and Australia
thus are potential sources of investment inflows. See United States-Australia Free Trade
Agreement, May 18, 2004, at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/
AustraliaFTA/FinalText/SectionIndex.html; Chile-United States Free Trade
Agreement, June 6, 2004, at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_.Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/
FinalTexts/Section_Index.html; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6,
2003, at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FFA/SectionIndex.
html; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, at http://ww.ustr.gov/
Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/SectionIndex.html. Consequently, they are vehicles
for Chapter 11-type claims against the United States as well. Cf Courtney C. Kirkman,
Note, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Methanex v. United States and the Narrowing Scope
of NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 343,343, 346 (2002) (noting growth in
international investment treaties and debate over vague meaning of fair and equitable
treatment in BITs).
The inclusion of investment protections, an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, and provisions pointing to the creation of an appellate tribunal in the recently signed
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement suggest
continuing growth in the extent of investment arbitration, including review of national
courts. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
Aug. 5, 2004, annex 10-F, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/DR-CAFTA/
DR-CAFTAFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html; see also infra note 523 and accompanying
text. Most dramatically increasing the potential reach of investor-state arbitration,
including its potential application to national courts, are the pending negotiations to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Doha Round negotiations of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Should investment protections be included in either
final agreement (investment protection is among the so-called "Singapore Issues" being
considered for inclusion in both agreements, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 124-26 (2003))-or in an
ensuing round of FTAA agreements or WTO negotiations-the opportunity for judicial
impingement on investor rights can be expected to increase dramatically. The incidence of
international review of national courts can be expected to rise with it.
51 See Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty-U.S. Litigation in the Mirrorof International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 639-40 (2002) (suggesting relevant strength of norms
articulated in positive law). Historically, denial of justice claims-claims of judicial wrongdoing-were grounded in customary international law. See Detlev F. Vagts, Minimum
Standard, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed.,
1985) (describing minimum standard of treatment generally developed in customary international law rather than treaties). As such, denial of justice claims were difficult to identify
and make out, and the number of relevant decisions consequently was limited. See Dodge,
supra note 33, at 570. With the rise of the BITs, NAFTA, and related free trade agreements, such claims-now a product of positive law-are seemingly more accessible.
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to bring claims themselves, rather than having to rely on their country
of citizenship to espouse their claims. Finally, the general growth of

international trade and investment can be expected to contribute to
an increase in opportunities for objection to, or challenge of, national
52
judicial conduct.
As I will suggest below, moreover, the growing pattern of inter-

national review of national courts is unique neither to Chapter 11 nor
to the protection of foreign investment generally. 5 3 Under a variety of
52 Cf Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1497-98
(1991) (noting growing importance of international trade in U.S. economy and resulting
increase in extent of international litigation); Molly W. Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of InternationalJudicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using TransnationalDiscovery and Breard Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 591, 634-35 (2001) (noting growing
number of international tribunals and resulting increase in prospect of conflict between
international and national courts). A final reason to expect growth in denial of justice
claims might be the prominence they have gained through the Loewen litigation.
A pattern of growth in Chapter 11-type review of national courts, of course, is not
inevitable. In fact, it could well be stymied by some of the very concerns of sovereignty
and judicial independence that I will describe herein. If Chapter 11 and other investmentreview mechanisms do not develop in a careful and sensitive fashion, there is every reason
to fear a backlash against Chapter 11 and similar review, as discussed below. See infra Part
VI.A.2. This would reduce the likelihood that Chapter 11-style provisions will actually be
included in the growing number of trade and investment agreements. This may already be
evident in state resistance to the inclusion of investment protections in both the FTAA and
Doha Round negotiations. See, e.g., David A. Gantz, The United States and the Expansion
of Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Participantor Observer?, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
LAW 381, 403 (1997) (noting that most South American states oppose binding arbitration
under FTAA); Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
223, 224 (2001) (suggesting Canadian leadership will oppose investment protections in
FTAA); Bruce Stokes, Column, Fists Across the Water on Trade, NAT'L J. CONG. DAILY,
Nov. 18, 1999 (quoting U.S. diplomat, who asked, "If a couple dozen industrial countries
couldn't agree on investment rules, how will 135 nations, mostly from the Third World,
agree?") at http://nationaljournal.com/cgi-bin/ifetch4?ENG+ALL-_-CONGRESS+7-crOl
99+1119140-DBSCORE+256+15+12876+F+16+79+11+%22Bruce+Stokes%22.
An even
more telling possibility is suggested by the presence of substantive investment rules in the
free trade agreement recently concluded between the United States and Australia, but the
replacement of a mandatory investor-state dispute settlement process, as in Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, with adjudication requiring the consent of both state parties. See U.S.-Australia
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 50, art. 11.16. The investment provisions of the U.S.Australia agreement can be found in Chapter 11 while the dispute settlement provisions
are in Chapter 21. Id. arts. 11.1-11.17, 21.2-21.15.
53 See infra Part VI.B. It is also important to note again that the review of national
courts by international tribunals is itself not a new phenomenon. Rather, international
claims of denial of justice date back centuries. Most recently, a series of international
claims commissions were formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to
adjudicate disputes arising in the aftermath of the expropriation or collapse of international commercial projects in developing countries. These commissions litigated a significant number of denial of justice and other claims directed to national courts. See RICHARD
13. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 5,

25 (1983). Such claims were almost universally directed to national courts in developing
and underdeveloped countries, however, as distinct from the present-day claims against the
United States and other industrialized nations. See Legum, supra note 9, at 537-38. Even
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international agreements, national courts have occasionally been, and
increasingly are, subject to external review. The U.S. experience with
such review dates at least to 1874, when an international tribunal constituted under the Treaty of Washington of 1871 reviewed, and repudiated, several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 54 Most recently,

the application of procedural default rules in U.S. criminal trials of
55
foreign nationals has been challenged by the ICJ.
Other national courts are even more familiar with such review.
Most significantly, the ECJ and the ECHR have progressively devel-

oped what is now a conventional practice of reviewing European
national court judgments. 56 Yet Chapter 11 involves an arguably
stronger pattern of review of national courts, in at least some respects,
than what has occurred to date in the interaction of other international tribunals and national courts. It is also significant, of course,
that Chapter 11 is applicable to the United States, which has shown
substantially less receptivity to international review than the nations
of Europe. Loewen thus represents an important measure of the

long-term prospects of international review of national courts. 57

claims against less-developed countries all but disappeared over the last century, as the
claims commission process fell into substantial disuse. See infra Part V.
54 See, e.g., 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3902-03, 3911-12,

3920-22 (1898) (describing arbitral decisions); see also infra note 544 and accompanying
text. In fact, an even earlier mechanism of international review of U.S. courts came with
the Jay Treaty of 1794, under which bilateral arbitration commissions were formed to adjudicate disputes between U.S. and British parties following the American Revolution,
including several disputes previously heard in the U.S. courts. See Curtis A. Bradley, InternationalDelegations,the StructuralConstitution,and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1557, 1559 n.7 (2003) (describing concerns with arbitration commissions formed under Jay
Treaty); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the OriginalUnderstanding,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2081 (1999) ("British claimants could
appeal to the commission from American courts and were not bound by the rules of evidence that obtained there.").
55 See infra notes 545-58 and accompanying text.
56 1 elaborate on the international review of national courts in the case of the European
courts, the ICJ, and the Prize Cases below. See infra Part VI.B.
57 Anne-Marie Slaughter predicts that the ultimate reach of NAFTA will extend
beyond its drafters' intentions. Just as the European Union has emerged as a legal system
more extensive than European diplomats imagined at the outset-largely through the
interaction of national courts with the ECJ-Chapter 11 may serve as an impetus for a
greater American union as well. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER

66-67 (2004).
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II
BETWEEN HIERARCHY AND COMITY: THE NATURE OF
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF NATIONAL COURTS

The international review of national court judgments and procedures represents a relatively unfamiliar pattern of interaction among
judicial institutions. Chapter 11 review of the Mississippi trial court's
oversight of the litigation against the Loewen Group, and the trial
court's and Mississippi Supreme Court's refusal to waive or reduce the
Mississippi appeal bond requirement, does not easily fit into conventional categories of court-to-court relations. Loewen thus calls attention to the need for better appreciation of such interaction, definition
of its ultimate goals, the development of institutional forms that are
consistent both with those goals and with a commitment to national
sovereignty and judicial autonomy. How should we understand such
interaction? How is it best designed, and how best conducted? What
exactly, in blunt terms, is going on here?
In assessing how international review of national courts, 58 under
Chapter 11 and otherwise, is best understood, designed, and conducted, two alternative paradigms of judicial interaction offer themselves as possible models. The first pattern-appellate review-might
be said to be the most familiar pattern of interaction among domestic
courts. The second-judicial dialogue-is the most common characterization of transnational interactions among courts. The nature and
potential relevance of each alternative is considered in turn.
A.

The Hierarchy of Appellate Review

I identify four core characteristics of "appellate" review. First,
and perhaps foremost, is the authority of an appellate court to undo
the determinations of law, and sometimes even the findings of fact,
reached by the court subject to review. 59 Following naturally from
this phenomenon is the binding nature of that review. 60 Minimally,
the judgment of an appellate court binds the trial court in the case at
bar. More expansively, decisions on appeal consequently have some
58 Chapter 11 review extends to domestic tribunals generally. References to "national
courts" herein consequently encompass both federal and state courts, including the array
of adjudicatory bodies that come within the auspices of state judiciaries. This definitional
point calls attention to a necessary point of clarification: The particulars of the analysis
herein are directed to the interaction of U.S. courts with Chapter 11 and other international tribunals. The model articulated also has application to the other NAFTA states and
beyond. For ease of analysis and discussion, however. I exolain the model with reference
to the U.S. courts.
59 See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976) (describing role of

appellate review in correcting errors made at trial).
60 See id. at 2-3.
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formal or informal stare decisis effect, binding lower courts in future
cases as well. 61 The pattern of review characteristic of the appellate

interaction of courts, moreover, is largely unidirectional. With
notable exceptions, appellate judgments are not, in the ordinary case,
subject to substantive critique in a trial court. Finally, appellate
review is constrained in its reach yet expansive in its depth. Appellate
review is rarely de novo.62 Factual findings are subject to an exceedingly deferential standard of review, if they are subject to review at

all. 63 As to questions of law, however, courts of appeal possess relatively plenary powers of review and reversal. 64
The basic purposes of appellate review are in line with these characteristics. Appellate review is commonly described as serving two

primary functions: First, appellate review is an effective mechanism of
error correction. 65 Second, appellate review enhances consistency

both within and across relevant jurisdictions. 66 Following naturally
61 See RUSSELL F. MOORE, STARE DECISIS: SOME TRENDS IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 34 (1958). Judgments ordinarily do not bind the issuing
court itself, which is free to alter its own decision. See Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare
Decisis: DistinguishingCommon-Law, Constitutional,and Statutory Cases, 8 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 277, 278 (2004) ("In the common-law context ... the court has a relatively low
barrier for overturning2 itself.").
62 See 5 AM. JUR. D Appellate Review § 662 (1995).
63 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that federal appellate courts shall set aside
only clearly erroneous findings of fact).
64 See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (holding that questions of
law should be addressed anew by appellate courts); see also 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 06.04(1) (3d ed. 1999).
65 See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL

CASES 3 (1941).
Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Precedentand Prediction: The Forward-LookingAspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38-41, 76-77 (1994) (noting importance
of jurisprudential consistency). Carrington characterizes these functions as review for correctness and institutional review. See CARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 2. They have also
been described as resolving concrete disputes and providing guidance for future cases. See
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured ConstitutionalSteps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 298 (1996) (arguing
that U.S. Supreme Court's avoidance doctrine prioritizes resolution of concrete disputes
and downplays Court's "important function of providing guidance on federal constitutional
questions").
Additional functions of appeal have been identified, but these are best understood as
subsumed within the functions mentioned above. See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN
APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS 18-19 (1983) (other purposes of appeal include protection against outside interference by allowing judicial system
to correct itself, provision of psychological relief for losing party, and "doing justice"); W.

66

MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 4 (1992) (describing functions of "control systems" in adjudication); Philip B.
Kurland, Jurisdictionof the United States Supreme Court: Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL

L. REV. 616, 618 (1974) (three functions of appellate review include error correction, consistency, and lawmaking). Dramatically different conceptions of the appellate relationship
also have been offered. See generally Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice:
Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 673 (1994) (applying principal-agent model to U.S. Supreme Court's relationship
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from these dual purposes, it might be said that appeal serves some
legitimization function by enhancing confidence in the judicial
system.6 7 Efforts to introduce appellate mechanisms into international trade-dispute settlement, for example, have been framed in just
68
these terms.
Collectively, the various characteristics and functions of appellate
review enumerated above suggest that some gradation of judicial
authority is central to the nature of appellate review. Appellate
courts sit in a relationship of superiority to rather than parity with the
courts subject to their review. 69 An appellate system of review, as
such, is one defined by hierarchy. In slightly different terms, appellate
courts enjoy some meaningful power over the courts subject to their
70
review.
Is Chapter 11 review of national courts a form of appeal? It does
have some unidirectional character, given that any domestic "review"
that follows on the Chapter 11 process is either limited in scope or
arises in the context of a new fact pattern. 7 1 It also exhibits some of
the complex mix of broad and narrow authority in appellate review.
Most importantly, as I will outline below, Chapter 11 tribunals possess
to federal appeals courts). Finally, Martin Shapiro offers what is perhaps the broadest
array of possible functions of appellate review. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 49-56 (1981) (mentioning "allow[ing] the loser to
accept his loss without having to acknowledge it publicly," "ensuring against the venality,
prejudice, and/or ignorance of trial court judges," facilitating "an independent flow of
information to the top on the field performance of administrative subordinates," ensuring
that lower courts "are following rules or laws or policies of social control acceptable to the
regime," and "sort[ing] out unresolved issues of policy and mov[ing] them toward the top
for decision" among possible functions of appellate review).
67 See CARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 2.
68 This includes the introduction of an "Appellate Body" into the GATT's dispute settlement procedures, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional
Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 480 (1994), proposals to include an
appellate mechanism in the investment dispute procedures of the FTAA, see Valerie
Hughes, Essay on John C. Thomure, Jr.'s Presentation, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
685, 695 (1997), and the formation of a negotiating group under the recently signed
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement to draft provisions for an investment dispute appeals mechanism, see infra note 523.
69 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court,the Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of the "JudicialPower," 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 967 (2000) ("[J]udges
of the lower, or 'inferior,' federal courts are viewed by the Court, and even view themselves, as subordinates who must defer to 'judicial superiors."'); Caminker, supra note 66,
at 41-42; Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioninga Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1,
53 (2003) ("Common lawyers are accustomed to great weight being given higher court
precedent in lower courts."); see also Bhagwat, supra, at 982-83 (suggesting that Supreme
Court has hierarchical view of anoellate process).
70 See Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the FederalJudiciary: A
HierarchicalPerspective, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 143, 143-49 (2003) (discussing appellate
courts' use of review power to control decisionmaking in lower courts).
71 See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
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a certain degree of power, similar to that possessed by appellate
courts but unlike that of many international tribunals. 72 Yet Chapter
11 review deviates from the pattern of appellate review in too many
73
respects to be characterized fairly in that fashion.
Although somewhat unidirectional, Chapter 11 review is con-

strained by an important dimension of bidirectionality. This bidirectionality is manifested in the prospect of national review of the
tribunal's award upon enforcement or petition for review or annulment, as outlined below,7 4 as well as the ability of national courts to
critique and even reject the Chapter 11 tribunal's view in future decisions. The power of Chapter 11, moreover, is far less than that of a
court of appeals. 7 5 Chapter 11 tribunals do not have the ability to

"reverse" national court decisions 76 nor are their awards formally
binding on national courts in the same or future cases. 77 Finally, recalling the purposes of appellate review, Chapter 11 review does not
appear to be designed to serve as a mechanism of error correction 78 or
79
jurisprudential consistency.

72 See infra Part II.B.
73 See Azinian v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 14 ICSID REV. 538, 568,
99
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1999) ("The possibility of holding a State internationally liable
for judicial decisions does not, however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of
the national court decisions as though the international jurisdiction seized has plenary
appellate jurisdiction. This is not true generally, and it is not true for NAFTA."), available
at http://www.naftalaw.org.
74 See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
75 Other differences with appellate review might also be noted, including the application of a different body of law by Chapter 11 tribunals and national courts, Chapter 11
tribunals' lack of directive authority vis-A-vis national courts, and the completely independent origins and financing of Chapter 11 and national court adjudication processes.
76 See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT

675, 731,

242 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://

www.naftalaw.org; Azinian, 14 ICSID REV. at 568, 99; Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M. 85, 110, T 129 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002),
available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
77 Rather than a hierarchical relationship, the interaction of Chapter 11 tribunals with
national courts appears more in line with that of independent courts. Cf. William W.
Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary
Exploration, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 729, 756 (2003) (describing challenges arising from lack of
hierarchy in international judicial order). Chapter 11 tribunals are not subject to any law
of the case arising from the national adjudication; rather, they apply a distinct body of law
and authority.
78 Cf.James M. Fischer, Discretion and Politics: Ruminations on the Recent Presidential
Election and the Role of Discretion in the Florida PresidentialElection Recount, 69 U. CIN.
L. REV. 807, 815-17 (2001) (describing lower court "discretion" as restraining appellate
review). The limitation of Chapter 11 remedies to money damages directed at federal
authorities appears ill-suited to error correction. See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1135, at
646 (noting available remedies under Chapter 11).
79 Molly Warren Lien's vertical model of "integrative comity" comes close to the relationship of Chapter 11 tribunals and national courts but remains a doctrine of comity and
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Given the seeming inconsistency of Chapter 11 with appellate
review, it should come as little surprise that Chapter 11 panels have
repeatedly rejected any conception of themselves as courts of
appeal. 80 They have explicitly done so, in fact, at nearly every oppor-

tunity. In Loewen, the panel could "find nothing in NAFTA to justify
the exercise by this Tribunal of an appellate function parallel to that
which belongs to the courts of the host nation. ' 81 Likewise, in
Mondev v. United States, the panel held that "it is not the function of
'82
NAFTA tribunals to act as courts of appeal.
Yet widespread dismay over Chapter l's perceived creation of
an international court of appeals persists. 83 If the Chapter 11 panels
are to be believed, such concerns can be put aside. Is it possible, however, that the lady doth protest too much?
B.

Judicial Dialogue and Transnational Comity

If a paradigm of appellate review is too strong to capture the
interaction of Chapter 11 tribunals with national courts, perhaps judithus does not incorporate the dimension of power that is present in Chapter 11 review. See
infra Part II.B; see also Lien, supra note 52, at 639 (proposing that where United States has
consented to jurisdiction of international tribunal and courts receive decision from that
tribunal, "American courts should accord a high degree of comity, deference, and respect
for that court and should generally aid it in protection of its jurisdiction and enforcement
of its judgments unless to do so would violate a clear and express constitutional or statutory prohibition under U.S. law"); id. at 648.
Mirjan Damaska famously has characterized common law regimes as systems of coordinate adjudication, by contrast with the hierarchical adjudicatory system of civil law jurisdictions. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 18-28 (1986). See generally Mirjan R.
Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure,84 YALE L.J. 480
(1975) (developing theory of coordinate and hierarchical systems). I characterize the U.S.
system as hierarchical in a different sense, however, focusing not on the adjudicatory
system as a whole, but on the relationship of appellate and trial courts within it. Cf Sarah
K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 409, 452
n.254 (2003) (arguing that, while Mirjan Damaska situates U.S. system as operating under
"coordinate" model, functioning of U.S. Supreme Court is in fact more "hierarchical").
80 See Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 731 $ 242; Azinian, 14 ICSID REV. at 568,
99; Mondev, 42 I.L.M. at 109, 126; cf Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581, 598, 37 (2004). The United States claimed that Mexico's submission
in Avena was inadmissible because Mexico sought to have the ICJ function as a court of
criminal appeal. Id.
81 Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 731, 242; see also Azinian, 14 ICSID REV. at
568, %99.
82 42 I.L.M. at 109, 126.
83 See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES:

BAN-

i (2001) (claiming cornorate investors are using Chaoter 11 as
appeal of domestic judicial decisions), at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.pdf;
Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 1, 2002) (criticizing Chapter 11 review for disruption of American jury verdicts), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript-td.html.
KRUPTING DEMOCRACY
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cial "dialogue," the standard-form model used to capture the interac84
tion of courts across national borders, offers a closer approximation.
Articulated most thoroughly by Anne-Marie Slaughter, 85 the dialogic

notion of judicial interaction has been offered as a prism through
which transnational judicial interactions-such as national court referrals of European law issues to the ECJ,86 New York and British bank-

ruptcy judges' extended colloquy over jurisdictional and merits issues
in the dissolution of the Maxwell Communication Corporation, 87 and,

more conventionally, national courts' deference to the jurisdiction of
foreign tribunals and enforcement of those tribunals' judgments-can
be understood and analyzed.8 8 In essence, the dialogic metaphor

posits a symbiotic relationship among autonomous judicial institutions. Grounded in a sense of "judicial comity," 89 it arises where
84

In fact, various domestic interactions among courts might also be characterized in

dialogic terms. See Caminker, supra note 66, at 54-55; Jay Tidmarsh, A Dialogic Defense
of Alden, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161, 1163, 1167 (2000) (proposing dialogic model of
relationship between state and federal courts). Various doctrines of U.S. federal-state
court relations, from the rules of abstention to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, might then
be measured by the extent to which they facilitate or discourage domestic judicial dialogue.
85 See, e.g., Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 709-11 (1998) [hereinafter Slaughter, Court to Court] (developing
theory of "judicial comity"). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) [hereinafter Slaughter, Typology]
(describing importance of transjudicial communication to formation of international rule
of law). Besides the strong orientation to the metaphor of dialogue in the study of transnational judicial interaction, the latter literature is also characterized by an emphasis on the
treatment of international decisions in national courts. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS

(Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996);

Alford, supra note 2. Less attention has been given to the treatment of national decisions
by international tribunals. But see Pippa Tubman, National Jurisprudencein International

Tribunals, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS,

supra, at 107. This

"top-down" inquiry is the emphasis of the present analysis.
86 See Slaughter, Typology, supra note 85, at 101.
87 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191,
213-15 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Community of Courts] (describing creation of "private insolvency treaty" by U.S. and English judges); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization,40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1114 (2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Judicial Globalization] (noting extensive discussions between judicially appointed administrators to
resolve issues surrounding liquidation).
88 See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 3, at 465-68 (identifying judicial dialogue as new paradigm reconciling overlap in authority that theories focused on hierarchical judicial enforcement or pure national sovereignty commonly overlook).
89 See Slaughter, Court to Court, supra note 85, at 711 ("Comity requires more than
consultation born of intellectual curiosity. It expresses an appreciation of different assignments and a global allocation of judicial responsibility, sharpened by the realization that
the performance of one court's function increasingly requires cooperation with others.");
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,supra note 87, at 1112 (describing "judicial comity" as
"deference not to foreign law or foreign national interests, but specifically to foreign
courts"); see also Lien, supra note 52, at 593-94 ("A common definition of comity, a word
derived from the simple Sanskrit verb for 'he smiles,' is that it refers to the informal and
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courts actively engage and cooperate with one another. Such dialogue, Slaughter suggests, can help promote acceptance of reciprocal
international obligations, encourage the cross-fertilization of ideas
and innovations, enhance the legitimacy of individual decisions, and
foster patterns of collective deliberation. 90
While a precise dissection of judicial dialogue is beyond the scope

of this Article, several core characteristics capture much of the transnational judicial interaction that the dialogic view seeks to describe. 9 1
To begin with, intersystemic judicial dialogue is ordinarily prospective
rather than retrospective. 92 In judicial dialogue, a court does not seek
to critique the prior decision of another. Rather, its orientation is to
some future decision or norm. The borrowing that takes place among
voluntary recognition that the courts of one nation accord to the judicial decisions of
another."); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1991)
("Comity has been defined variously as the basis of international law, a rule of international law, a synonym for private international law, a rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns, a moral necessity, expediency,
reciprocity or 'considerations of high international politics concerned with maintaining
amicable and workable relationships between nations."'); cf. Somportex Ltd. v. Phila.
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) ("Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or obligation.
Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own
laws.").
90 See Slaughter, Typology, supra note 85, at 116-19. I would argue that the dialogic
model of judicial relations has been applied to a wider variety of interactions than warranted. It has thus come to encompass interactions that have little in common with one
another. Slaughter has spoken of a gradation from horizontal to vertical dialogue. See id.
at 103-11. Horizontal dialogue captures the tendency of national courts, in particular constitutional courts, to look to one another's decisions in similar or related cases. See id. at
103-06. The South African Constitutional Court has engaged actively in such dialogue.
See Slaughter, Community of Courts, supra note 87, at 195. Even the U.S. Supreme Court
has made recent moves in this direction. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573
(2003). Vertical dialogue, by contrast, has been invoked to reference the complex interactions of the ECJ and the ECHR with the national courts of Europe. See Slaughter,
Typology, supra note 85, at 106-11 (describing European national courts' referral of
European law issues to ECJ under Article 177 of Treaty of Rome and enforcement of
ECHR decisions as domestic law). In particular, Slaughter considers the ECJ's extended
colloquy with the German Constitutional Court emblematic of this pattern. See id. at 100.
The analysis herein is intended to challenge the capacity of the paradigm-or metaphorof dialogue to encompass this broad array of interactions. Rather, I will suggest that the
patterns of interaction which Slaughter characterizes as vertical dialogue encompass elements of dialogue, but also aspects of direct review. They demand, as such, some alternative construct for their appreciation. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
91 Given the wide breadth that has been given to the dialogic metaphor, see supra note
90, no enumeration of features is likely to capture all its forms. Instead. I focus on what I
consider the true pattern of judicial dialogue-what Slaughter terms "horizontal" dialogue.
See Slaughter, Typology, supra note 85, at 103.
92 Cf. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW
26-27 (1969) (suggesting potential prospective function of judicial decisions).
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constitutional courts is a prime example. 93 In such cases, courts
94
engage one another in the explication of new jurisprudential norms.
The explicit negotiation among courts involved in the resolution of
multinational litigation or transnational business matters, as in the
insolvency proceedings of the Maxwell Communication Corporation,
reveals a similarly prospective orientation. 95 In these cases, courts
engage one another, not to the end of assessing one another's past
decisions or norms, but with an eye to resolving new questions or
dilemmas. Stated slightly differently, judicial dialogue does not
involve the "review"-in a judicial sense-of one court's decision by
another. Given a prospective orientation, past determinations of a
court are not the focus of judicial dialogue. 96 The focus of judicial
dialogue is instead on the implications for forthcoming decisions.
A second important characteristic of judicial dialogue-and a
point of contrast with appellate review-is its bidirectionality.
Neither side is privileged in its contribution to a judicial dialogue.
European courts may borrow from U.S. courts in one case, while U.S.
courts borrow from their European counterparts in another. By contrast, the appeals process involves one court consistently engaging in
review while the other is consistently subject to it. This does not mean
that every dialogue invariably incorporates multiple voices. Rather, in
any given case, only one side may be heard. Even over an array of
cases, one court may be more active in the dialogue. At a minimum,
however, dialogue must exclude any barrier to the participation of
both judicial parties, should they choose to participate.
Finally, judicial dialogue is characterized-unlike appeal-by
some dimension of voluntariness. 97 When the South African
Constitutional Court draws on the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the German Constitutional Court, or the ECHR, 98 and, at least
93 See Slaughter, JudicialGlobalization, supra note 87, at 1116-19 (citing examples of
South African, British, and U.S. national courts looking to decisions of foreign courts for
guidance).
94 The U.S. Supreme Court essentially did just this in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573,
576-77, a decision that other constitutional courts, faced with related questions of sexual
preference, can be expected to consider, cite, and discuss in turn.
95 See Slaughter, Community of Courts, supra note 87, at 213-15.
96 It bears restating that others might enumerate a distinct set of characteristics to
describe judicial dialogue. For purposes of the present analysis, however, it is enough to
argue that the core characteristics I set out capture most of what is commonly intended by
references to judicial dialogue.
97 See Martinez, supra note 3, at 467 (noting voluntary communication among courts).
98 See Slaughter, Community of Courts, supra note 87, at 195; Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, supra note 87, at 1116. In fact, the South African court even has had occasion to cite decisions of the California Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. See id. Among other cases, the South African court looked to foreign and
international jurisprudence in its landmark decision on the death penalty. See State v.
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nominally, even when lower national courts in Europe refer cases to
the ECJ,99 they do so voluntarily. 10 0 Such voluntary, discretionary
engagement would seem to be a sine qua non of any conception of

dialogue. 101 This voluntariness suggests the limited role of judicial
power in the dialogic interaction of courts. True dialogue does not
depend on, and is arguably inconsistent with, the assertion or exercise

of power between the relevant judicial bodies. Neither court enjoys
authority over the other; hence, their engagement is a dialogue rather
than a monologue.
Given its transnational application, dialogue offers itself as a

promising framework for understanding Chapter 11 and similar international review of national courts. I will suggest, in fact, that there is
an important dialogic dimension to Chapter 11, given its prospectivity
and bidirectionality-the first and second characteristics described
above. On the whole, however, Chapter 11 and analogous forms of
international review of national courts are difficult to reconcile with
the collective character of dialogue, and particularly with the third
characteristic of voluntariness. Chapter 11 review is not grounded pri-

marily in judicial comity. Chapter 11 and analogous mechanisms of
international review involve a dimension of power more in line with
appellate review than with dialogue. 10 2 Even the prospectivity and
bidirectionality of Chapter 11 review are limited in important ways.
Makwanyane & Another, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC). The court does so, moreover, based
on constitutional provision-grounded, perhaps, in the country's long pariah status-for
the review of international and foreign case law. See Slaughter, Community of Courts,
supra note 87, at 201 n.48.
99 See CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1, art. 234. The "preliminary reference" procedure, by which
European national courts refer questions to the ECJ, is voluntary for all courts other than
those of last resort. See id. Even the high courts of Europe's member states enjoy some
scope of interpretation in determining whether to submit a preliminary reference. See
infra note 586 and accompanying text.
100 See Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing InternationalLaw, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript on file with the New York University Law Review) ("[C]ourts engage in
this comparative dialogue not out of a sense of legal obligation.").
101 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "dialogue" as "[a] conversation carried on
between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk together." 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 601 (2d ed. 1989).
102 To similar effect, Karen Alter has rejected a characterization of the interactions of
European institutions, including national courts and the ECJ, as dialogue. See KAREN J.
ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 38 (2001). Instead, she posits a pattern of "doctrinal
negotiation":
A dialogue implies two or more actors talking to each other, using reason to
reach a mutually accepted outcome. The notion of a dialogue implies that the
outcome reached is the best reasoned outcome, the one that convinces all
sides. A negotiation, on the other hand, implies competing interests where
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As to the initial element of prospectivity, under Chapter 11 and

similar international regimes, the relevant international tribunal is
focused on review-in an appellate sense of the word-of the national
court's judgment and procedure.10 3 The international tribunal

engages in such review with reference to a particular case brought
before it by the aggrieved litigant from the national court proceeding. 10 4 In Loewen, for example, the magnitude of the damages
award imposed by the court (by way of the jury) was a focus of

review.10 5 The tribunal also considered the court's refusal to sustain
specific objections and order specific jury instructions and the courts'
discretionary judgments regarding a variety of other trial issues. 10 6 In
such an analysis, 10 7 the international tribunal is not engaged in what
can fairly be characterized as a dialogue. Instead, it is explicitly considering and critiquing the national court's substantive judgments and

procedural determinations. 108 Its analysis is not primarily prospective,

parties recognize that they may not be able to have it as they most like it.
Negotiations usually lead to compromises that take into account the power of
the negotiating parties, the conflicting interests of the different actors, and the
intensity of those interests.
Id. In essence, Alter's "negotiation" acknowledges the pattern described herein, in which
no party to the relevant interaction enjoys complete autonomy. Compare id. with infra
Part IV.A.1.
103 In Loewen, thus, the "claim of injury [was] based upon judicial action in a particular
case." Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 675, 708, 1 143 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://
www.naftalaw.org; see also id. 161 (noting "judicial violation of international law"). Similarly, in Mondev, "the measure challenged [was] that of a local court." Mondev Int'l Ltd.
v. United States, Award, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M. 85, 103, 1 97 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.naftalaw.org. To related effect, Slaughter has
spoken of the growing occasion for judges to evaluate the "independence and quality of
fellow judges of other nations." SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 86.
104 This distinguishes the "review" of Chapter 11 from that of a forum non conveniens
determination, in which the court makes a generalized assessment of the subject judicial
system. Cf Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 708, 1 143. While also likely to offend
the latter, such broad review raises an entirely different set of concerns than does the
Chapter 11 review of a previously adjudicated case.
105 See id. at 685, 698-700, 702, $ 46, 104-114, 122.
106 See id. at 685, 693-95, IT 47, 78-87.
107 In Mondev, described in greater detail below, see infra notes 397-413 and accompanying text, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's asserted rationale for official
immunity was subject to review, see Mondev, 42 I.L.M. at 112, 139.
108 A separate question concerns the constitutionality of such review under U.S. law.
See A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L.
877, 891-92 (2000) (arguing that Article III of U.S. Constitution precludes United States
from entering into treaties allowing review of federal court decisions by international tribunals, and that principles of constitutional federalism do not allow federal government to
subject state courts to international judicial review). There have been previous incidents of
international tribunals undermining decisions of U.S. courts, including the Supreme Court,
but even those cases involved limited review of the Loewen variety. See, e.g., Martinez,
supra note 3, at 473 (noting international commission created by United States and Britain
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even if, as I will argue, its conclusions ultimately are. The charge of
the Chapter 11 tribunal is to review the decision of the national court.
At least from the latter's perspective, this is more than a dialogue.
Bidirectionality is also relatively constrained in Chapter 11 and
similar review. As I describe below, such bidirectionality does exist;
Chapter 11 tribunals review decisions of national courts, but national
courts may subsequently review the arbitral award. A general backand-forth may emerge across cases as national courts respond to prior
Chapter 11 reviews of their decisions and Chapter 11 tribunals
respond in turn. In this respect, Chapter 11 and analogous international review of national courts exhibits some dialogic character. The
response of national courts to Chapter 11 review, however, is distinct
from bidirectional dialogue as described above. It is not parallel. As
such, it is unlike the reciprocal borrowing amongst constitutional
courts or U.S. and British courts' negotiation of the Maxwell bankruptcy. 10 9 Chapter 11 tribunals' interaction with national courts is
more in the nature of seriatim, rather than parallel, interactions.
The ultimate obstacle to squeezing Chapter 11 and similar international review of national courts into the rubric of judicial dialogue is
the important place of power in any judicial exchange under Chapter
11 and its analogues. 110 It is worth pausing to consider this feature, as
it represents the most important innovation of Chapter 11 review of
national courts. In what sense does Chapter 11 review involve the
exercise of power? We have already established that the power of
Chapter 11 is not that of hierarchical appeal. To understand the
power of Chapter 11 more fully, one might begin with the contrast
between Chapter 11 review and the engagement of courts in dialogue.
following Civil War, which reviewed and reversed several Supreme Court decisions, as well
as U.S. courts' enforcement of international arbitration agreements); see also supra note 54
and accompanying text.
109 See Slaughter, Community of Courts, supra note 87, at 213-16; Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, supra note 87, at 1116-19.
110 Eric Posner and John Yoo recently have argued that more powerful international
tribunals-as defined by greater independence and jurisdiction to hear individual claims,
among other features-are actually less effective institutions of international adjudication.
See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A Theory of InternationalAdjudication, 91 CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on file with the New York University Law Review).
Others have challenged their analysis directly. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Of States, Bargains, and Judges: The Limited Role of Dependence in
InternationalAdjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2005), available at http://
law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/helfer.html. It is unclear how Chapter 11 and similar review
.....
r y. F
-,"c'
-t.- ,- .. .
would fit within Pnner and Ynn', tunnino,, p th ,
purposes, it is sufficient to note that the features of Chapter l's institutional design, which
I characterize as introducing a dimension of power, enhance the relative autonomy of
Chapter 11 tribunals in their interaction with national courts. Whether this is ultimately
more or less effective-in Posner and Yoo's terms-is a question for another day.
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Dialogic courts do not stand in a position of authority vis-A-vis
one another. In citing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court or the
ECHR, the South African Constitutional Court is not acting out of
any sense of obligation. The same can be said of courts deferring to
the jurisdiction of a foreign court, or enforcing that court's prior judgment. They do so not because of any mandate held by their counterpart-because of its power-but out of a sense of comity or respect.
Even vertical judicial interactions may lack a significant dimension of power. The historical relationship between the ICJ and U.S.
courts may be one example. The ICJ is not completely without persuasive influence in its relations with U.S. courts.'
In the aftermath
of the ICJ's recent decision in Avena, national courts-including state
courts-have exhibited some broad sense of obligation to at least
acknowledge the Court's interpretation of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and its critique of the application of the procedural default rule to asserted violations of the Convention. 112 While I
will suggest below that Avena may signify the stirrings of a power
dynamic in ICJ relations with national courts,11 3 as it has historically
functioned, the ICJ's diffuse influence is different in kind from the
manifestation of power that emerges from the design and practice of
Chapter 11 review of national courts." 4 The rare occasion on which
meaningful political pressure may follow from a decision of the ICJ
does not alter this conclusion. Such pressure is more in the nature of
political, rather than judicial, pressure.
I would argue that two features of Chapter 11 and similar regimes
may contribute to a strengthened dynamic of power in Chapter 11
review of national courts. First is the use of investor-state mechanisms
by which individual litigants bring claims directly against national
authorities. 1 5 Eliminating the requirement of espousal, through
111 See, e.g., Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on
Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

27, 108 (1999) (arguing that by publicly criticizing U.S. commitment to Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, ICJ placed U.S. citizens traveling abroad at risk of reciprocal treatment, potentially creating incentive for American courts to "introduce transjudicial communication by being responsive to the holdings of the World Court").
112 See infra notes 556-58 and accompanying text.
113 See id.
114 See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1238-39

(2004) (suggesting generally limited power of international tribunals). In their recent
work, Ginsburg and McAdams offer an alternative theory of the power of international
tribunals, complementary to, but distinct from, the theory of power in Chapter 11 that I
offer herein. See generally Ginsburg & McAdams, supra.
115 See Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J.

527, 536 (2003) (describing private right of action against national governments under
Chapter 11 and its potential impact); see also Jos6 E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers:
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which individual claims were historically adjudicated in international
fora only if taken up by the home state of the aggrieved party,
increases the volume of cases before Chapter 11 and similar tribunals.
Such an increase offers international judicial actors greater opportunity to speak to, and to influence, national adjudication. Direct access
also eliminates the role of political commitments in filtering out sensitive cases before they reach the tribunal. 11 6 Such cases might include
those requiring international review of national courts-the cases of
interest herein. In this sense, international tribunals open to individual claims might be said to enjoy greater relative control over their
docket. Non-espoused claims also may enhance the power of Chapter
11 tribunals by encouraging the emergence of domestic constituencies
committed to effectuating tribunal decrees. 117 Those constituencies
can be expected to pursue that goal without the political constraints of
amicable foreign relations, which might preclude state action to
enforce an international judgment even if they permitted the case to
proceed at the outset.
This suggests the somewhat counterintuitive second source of
power in the institutional design of Chapter 11. By offering monetary
damages as the relevant remedy, rather than injunctive or other direct
forms of relief, Chapter 11 dramatically enhances the potential for
enforcement of remedial decrees and hence increases the power of
Chapter 11 tribunals. By relying on a regime of liability rules of a
sort-rather than property rules-Chapter 11 essentially manages to
create an effective mechanism of internationaljudicial power. 1 18 By
(Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 415 (2003) (noting rarity of "commitment to dispute settlement" manifest in Chapter 11). In the terms offered by Keohane,

Moravcsik, and Slaughter, the power of Chapter 11 review arises from its combined elements of independence, access, and embeddedness. See Robert 0. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT'L ORG. 457, 458 (2000).
These features come together to create a high degree of delegation, with resulting enhancement of the power of Chapter 11 and similar tribunals. See id. at 486.
116 See Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case
Study, 54 INT'L ORG. 519, 543 (2000); Karen J. Alter, The European Union's Legal System
and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?, 54 INT'L ORG. 489, 517 (2000). For example,
early in the development of the European legal community, political concerns caused the
European Commission, as well as member states themselves, to be hesitant about pursuing
claims against member states. The European legal system consequently remained ineffective at compelling compliance with European law until the development of the direct effect
doctrine, which allowed individual litigants to raise European law issues before the
national courts. See ALTER, supra note 102, at 11-16 (noting that original European legal
system was ineffective at compelling compliance with European law and that scholars and
judges attribute increased effectiveness to direct effect dnctrini")
117 See Keohane et al., supra note 115, at 477.
118 See Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for ConstitutionalRights: The Case of Mass
Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REv. 755 (2004) (suggesting potential benefits of liability rules
over property rules in constitutional jurisprudence); see also Guido Calabresi & A.
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contrast with directive judgments of the ICJ, for example, monetary
liability is difficult for state respondents to resist. 119 Such relief
requires no legislation, regulation, or other domestic reform. It simply

requires payment.
Such a payment obligation is especially likely to be met under the

Chapter 11 regime because it is directed not to the offending national
court or other subnational entity, but rather to the ultimate deep

20
pocket-the federal authorities of the relevant NAFTA state party.
Hence, the role of comity in international relations is turned on its
head, with the state entity most sensitive to amicable foreign relations
charged with the liability for any Chapter 11 award. Lest even federal
authorities waver in their commitment to their foreign obligations, the
efficacy of a Chapter 11 award, and hence the power of the issuing
tribunal, is further enhanced by the relatively ready enforceability of

the award in the national courts of the state faced with the payment

obligation. 121 Given the private invocation of Chapter 11 dispute settlement and the monetary nature of any resulting judgment, if a liable

state party refuses to comply with a Chapter 11 judgment, the private
claimant can be expected to take any and all measures necessary to
enforce it.122
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972) (arguing that transaction costs and difficulty of assessing damages affect choice between property and liability rules).
119 Cf Stephan, supra note 51, at 640 ("[W]here international law rests on explicit commitment, including acceptance of an enforcement process that operates independently of
the state subject to the law, we need to take notice."). I will argue below that the interaction of international tribunals and national courts explored herein is analogous to the
Warren Court-era interaction of federal and state courts on habeas review, as elucidated
by Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff. See infra Part III.B.1. Notably, Cover and
Aleinikoff cite the Warren Court's failure to invoke equitable remedies in its criminal procedure jurisprudence, as distinct from its reapportionment and civil rights decisions, as one
of the critical catalysts behind the non-traditional pattern of intersystemic judicial interaction they observe in habeas review. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1039-40.
120 See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1136, at 646.
121 Such enforcement is not automatic, see Abbott, supra note 116, at 537, but is easier
to accomplish than would be enforcement of any form of injunctive relief, with the likely
need for some form of legislative or regulatory intervention.
122 Given the continuing failure of Canada and Mexico to join the ICSID Convention,
Chapter 11 awards are enforced in national courts, under the terms of the New York Convention. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An
Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381,
1441, 1443 (2003). While the latter allows some room for national tribunals to resist
enforcement, primarily on grounds of public policy, the New York Convention ordinarily
leads to enforcement of challenged international arbitral awards. See id. at 1443; see also
Abbott, supra note 116, at 537. The New York Convention, of course, is the common
name for the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. On the Convention generally, see
Alford, supra note 2, at 700-04.
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International review under Chapter 11 therefore suggests a
12 3
capacity for, if not necessarily the overt assertion of, judicial power.

Such power is limited, even by comparison with the constrained power
of domestic courts. Compared to traditional international adjudica-

tion, however, Chapter 11 tribunals possess meaningful judicial power.
As outlined, however, the power of Chapter 11 tribunals operates
between courts and executive or legislative bodies. Such inter-branch
engagement among international courts and national executive and
legislative agencies is notable, 124 but is different in kind from the
assertion of power among judicial institutions. The capacity of
Chapter 11 tribunals to assert power, however, ultimately extends to
national courts as well. While I explore this power dynamic between
Chapter 11 tribunals and national courts in greater detail below, its
125
essence lies in two factors.

First, Chapter 11 awards have the capacity to undo certain types
of national judicial decisions, including any award of exemplary or
punitive damages and any denial of the liability of a federal government entity. 126 Second, and perhaps more importantly, by directing
its damage awards against the federal government, Chapter 11 creates

an institutional mechanism for putting pressure on national courts,
whether at the federal or state level. 1 27 Had the Loewen Group succeeded in winning its $750 million claim against the federal governAdmittedly, a pattern of engagement grounded in national review upon enforcement
(or petition for annulment or revision) has the potential to produce an odd dynamic, with
national courts potentially reviewing the decision of an international tribunal, which itself
reviewed the decision of a national court. This peculiarity would be especially pronounced
where the national court charged to review the international award is either the same court
that the international tribunal reviewed or is inferior to that court. In the latter dynamic, a
lower national court is indirectly called to review the decision of its hierarchical superior.
Shades of this occurred in the Kobler case, described infra, in which an Austrian trial court
was forced to review the decisions of an Austrian high court. See Case C-224/01, Gerhard
Kobler v. Republik Osterreich, 41 C.M.L.R. 813 (2004); see also infra notes 598-603 and
accompanying text.
123 With an eye to the dimensions of power in Chapter 11 review of national courts,
Anne-Marie Slaughter has classified Chapter 11 as a form of "enforcement network." See
SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 21, 145. In broader terms, Slaughter sees Chapter 11 as part
of an emerging pattern of vertical government networks, in which supranational authorities
act in tandem with national authorities to effectuate policy ends. The former, in essence,
"borrow" authority from the latter. See id. at 20-21.
124 This pattern is a significant worry for many. It is not, however, the issue of interest
herein.
125 See infra Parts IV.A.1 & B.1.a.
126 See infra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
127 In Part IV.B.1.a, I suggest several possible mechanisms of such pressure, including
statutorily authorized enforcement of NAFTA's provisions by the executive branch, judicial or legislative steps to eliminate or curtail the complete diversity rule in cases involving
aliens, and federal efforts to secure state or local indemnification of Chapter 11 awards.
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ment, various pressures on the Mississippi authorities, including the
12
courts, might have been predicted.
Given the manifestation of power in Chapter 11 review of

national courts, the recurrent engagement of judicial systems can
hardly be said to be voluntary. National courts do not face Chapter 11
review by way of a voluntary dialogue. Rather, such review is forced
upon them. 129 Unlike the dialogic interactions noted above, Chapter

11 review of national courts does not arise from the consent of the
relevant judicial participants. 130 At the conclusion of such review,

moreover, Chapter 11 tribunals enjoy some meaningful capacity to
achieve desired results without the cooperation of the counterpart

national court. Such power distinguishes Chapter 11 review from
most conventional mechanisms of international judicial review, which

128 This is not to deny that the imposition of Chapter 11 awards arising from state- or
municipal-court malfeasance on the federal government, as opposed to the offending jurisdiction, if not the court itself, also limits Chapter 11 power in important respects. If imposition of liability on the state or local court were possible, Chapter 11 might be even
stronger. By creating a mechanism of effective pressure, however, an award issued against
the federal government offers its own dimensions of power, as suggested above and
described in greater detail below.
In fact, federal liability may be preferable in at least one respect. As I will suggest
below, the efficacy of Chapter 11 review of national courts as a source of judicial innovation depends on the emergence of a regularized pattern of cases. See infra Part IV.A.3.
Absent a certain volume of decisions, Chapter 11 will be far more limited in its impact.
Because of its orientation to federal authorities, however, it is not necessary that Chapter
11 review of national courts occur with the frequency of ordinary appeal if such review is to
influence court behavior generally. The direction of Chapter 11 awards to federal authorities may enhance their influence and cause their effects to be felt more widely than if they
had been directed to any single state or local jurisdiction. Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 69, at
985-86 (suggesting that U.S. Supreme Court enjoys meaningful power over lower courts,
notwithstanding limited occurrences of review); Caminker, supra note 66, at 80-81 (same);
Tidmarsh, supra note 84, at 1163 (arguing that federal-state dialogue does not require participation of each system in every case: "it is enough that the court has the opportunity to
comment over a range of cases"). Even if the federal authorities do not expressly disseminate the lessons of a Chapter 11 judgment, greater public exposure of an award against the
federal government might be expected to facilitate that end.
129 Of course, such review arises out of the voluntary accession to NAFTA or other
relevant international agreements. Yet such generalized consent is distinct from the consensual nature of judicial dialogue, a case-specific election to engage another court.
130 Cf. Reem Bahdi, Globalizationof Judgment Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of
International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 555, 558 (2002)
("[C]ourts speak to each other across jurisdictions not because they have to but because
they want to."). That jurisprudential notions of dialogue have some origins in Alexander
Bickel's conception of the passive virtues, see Stephen L. Carter, ConstitutionalImproprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 357, 378-79 (1990), would seem to confirm the difficulty of reconciling Chapter l's
relatively proactive review with a purely dialogic vision of judicial action.
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are obliged to rely on dialogue with national courts for their efficacy
3
and success.' '

Chapter 11 review of national courts thus sits uneasily with conventional assumptions of the limited authority of international institutions, and of courts in particular. It is not simply another case of
transnational judicial dialogue, given elements incompatible with a
model of interaction grounded in voluntary exchange and a spirit of

comity. It borrows from appellate review some capacity to undo the
effects of the relevant national court decision, even if not to reverse it,
131 Examples of judicial institutions that engage in close judicial review of the judgment
or procedures of a foreign court or have some meaningful capacity to pursue desired policy
outcomes without the consent and cooperation of the court subject to review can be
offered. See also infra Part VI.B. Chapter 11 is relatively unique in combining both elements. Hence its exploration herein.
As for engagement in close review, I have previously mentioned the sometimes harsh
review of forum non conveniens inquiries. See supra note 104. Besides its lack of case
specificity, however, such review involves a limited assertion of power, because the relevant ends do not encompass the application of any resulting judgment to the subject judicial system. The ICJ's gentle admonishment of the U.S. Supreme Court in the LaGrand
case, with its suggestion that the Court could have done more to effectuate the ICJ's provisional measures, also might be noted: "[I]t would have been open to the Supreme Court,
as one of its members urged, to grant a preliminary stay, which would have given it 'time to
consider, after briefing from all interested parties, the jurisdictional and international legal
issues involved.'" LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, at 508 1 114 (citing Federal
Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 113 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
Again, however, the element of power is absent. See infra notes 554-55 and accompanying
text. A similar case of "review" might be found in the ECJ's encouragement of lower
national courts in Europe to disregard directives from their national high courts not to
submit questions of European law to the ECJ. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at
310; see, e.g., Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978
E.C.R. 629 (counseling lower Italian court to apply European law rather than Italian constitutional rule, notwithstanding earlier directive from Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)
to refer any such conflict to ICC). Besides the indirect nature of such review, the power at
work in this case remains limited. See infra notes 590-94 and accompanying text
(exploring pattern of interaction of ECJ and European national courts).
Perhaps the closest parallel to the invasive review of Chapter 11 comes in decisions
regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments. Here, one might even identify some
degree of effective "power"-the capacity to prevent enforcement. Such review is worthy
of further study. It is at least clear, however, that the power dynamic arising in the
enforcement of foreign judgments is a less active (and perhaps less invasive) one than that
of Chapter 11.
What about courts that have meaningful power but do not engage in national court
review? The best example of this pattern, notably, is another international trade court.
The dispute settlement panels of the WTO, as well as its Appellate Body, wield tremendous power. They are more than able to create effective incentives to achieve their desired
ends. The WTO dispute settlement process, however, as well as that of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before it, have had little occasion to interact with
national courts. Rather, WTO review is conventionally directed to the executive and legislative branches of the WTO member states, As with the ICJ, however, there is no institutional bar to the emergence of such review of national courts in the future. See infra notes
559-63 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial interactions under GATT and WTO
regimes).
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and some resulting influence on national court decisions. In its retrospective orientation-its review of the prior national court decisionit operates in a unidirectional pattern and exhibits some degree of
hierarchy. Moreover, as in appellate review, Chapter 11 tribunals
enjoy significant authority within a narrow scope of jurisdiction.
Most importantly, Chapter 11 review of national courts exhibits a
dimension of power echoing the relationship between appellate and
trial courts. It does not arise from the voluntary consent of the court
subjected to review. Effectuation of the ultimate judgment, moreover, may occur even absent the cooperation of the court reviewed.
While Chapter 11 review of national courts consequently
amounts to something more than judicial dialogue, it remains something less than a true appeal. For it exhibits important dialogic features as well. Chapter 11 decrees are not binding on national courts in
any formal sense. Furthermore, though not bidirectional in a purely
dialogic sense, there is some inevitable back-and-forth among Chapter
11 tribunals and national courts, both within and across cases. I will
suggest below that Chapter 11 review also has some prospective
dimension, coupled with the retrospective character of its substantive
analysis. Like judicial dialogue, it is oriented to norm development, at
least as much as error correction.
Most importantly, as suggested above and explored in greater
detail below, the power of Chapter 11 and similar international review
is limited in scope. 132 It is characterized by a distribution of power in
which each judicial body enjoys some autonomous capacity to effectuate its will, but not unlimited capacity to do so. Within this dynamic,
some pattern of exchange-of discourse-remains essential.
Chapter 11 review of national courts, then, has some hybrid
quality, exhibiting important features of both appellate review and
judicial dialogue. 133 While the appropriate effectuation and particular
characteristics of Chapter 11 and analogous review of national courts,
given its hybrid nature, requires greater consideration,13 4 it is useful to
first consider the ends of such review. What benefits might international review of national courts, in institutional forms such as Chapter
11, have to offer?
132 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.1.a.
133 See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, at 660-61 (describing similarly mixed nature of
federal-state court interaction on habeas review of capital sentences). Frank Cross has
posited legal interaction as defined by either hierarchy or dialogue. See Frank B. Cross,
Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1308
(1999). The present analysis posits something in the middle.
134 See infra Part IV.A.
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III
JUDICIAL INNOVATION AND THE ENDS
OF INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

It becomes clear from the foregoing that Chapter 11 review of
national courts incorporates elements of appellate review as alteredand limited-by elements of intersysteic judicial dialogue. Yet this
descriptive view of Chapter 11 and similar international review of
national courts points to a normative inquiry: What is the function of
international review of national courts? More specifically, what is the
function of the hybrid pattern of judicial interaction evident in
Chapter 11?
At a minimum, the hybrid nature of such review suggests that it is
not exclusively directed to the appellate ends of correcting error or
achieving consistency of law. 135 On the face of Chapter 11, one might
alternatively point to monetary relief for individual investors as the
primary end of such review. The limitations of Chapter 11, howeverthe infrequency of review, the relatively forgiving standard of conduct
mandated by Chapter 11, the deferential approach of tribunals in the
application of even that low standard of conduct, and the limited size
of awards in cases that have proceeded to judgment-undermine a
reading of Chapter 11 review of national courts as serving primarily to
provide monetary relief to injured investors.
Robert Cover, looking to another case of judicial interaction
shaped by similar hybrid features-federal habeas review of state

criminal convictions-offered innovation as an important function of
what he termed "jurisdictional redundancy."' 136 I would suggest the
135 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
136 See Cover, supra note 14, at 673 (noting that when multiple bodies generate norms,
likelihood that at least one of them will attempt innovation increases); see also id. at
662-65 (describing role of redundancy in facilitating change); Katyal, supra note 15, at
1720 (describing role of courts in "education"). Multiple sources of norm articulation,
essentially, can limit the cost of error by any given judicial institution. See Cover, supra
note 14, at 673. Thus, jurisdictional redundancy "makes it more likely that at least one
such center will attempt any given, plausible innovation." Id. Cover's reference to innovation is somewhat distinct from the present concept, however, as it is oriented more to the
array of state voices that are heard in a system of polycentric norm articulation-the
familiar notion of experimentalism in federal systems, see id. at 673-74, while the pattern
of judicial interaction I develop herein emphasizes vertical exchange between judicial systems as the driver of innovation. The pattern of interaction between international tribunals and national courts is thus distinct from the "percolation" of issues in the U.S. courts
of appeal before their resolution by the Supreme Court. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1409,
1444-45 (1999). Among international and national courts, we have no ultimate adjudicator, but simply an ongoing exchange among near equals. As such, I offer a less determinate, and deterministic, pattern of interaction than that of the U.S. federal court system.
My model does parallel the percolation notion, however, insofar as the relevant exchange
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same ends for the redundancy created by international review of

national courts. 137 In the face of judicial resistance to efficient innovation, such review can serve to encourage beneficial legal transition and
138
reform-the emergence and evolution of legal norms.

After outlining the potential importance of some mechanism of
judicial review to ensure an efficient pace of judicial innovation, this
Part explores other cases of judicial interaction standing between dialogue and appeal. Specifically, I suggest how analogous patterns of
federal habeas review of state courts and appellate courts' use of dicta

as a signal to lower courts may serve to facilitate judicial innovation. I
conclude by offering a rough picture of the interaction of international
tribunals and national courts under Chapter 11, pointing to the
various ways in which that interaction may encourage desirable innovation and norm internalization.
A.

The Ends and Means of Judicial Innovation

International review of national courts may have a valuable role
to play in fostering innovation both in national judicial systems and in
the development of international norms generally. Oona Hathaway
has argued that legal norms may exhibit multiple forms of "path
serves to detail the context surrounding broad principles. See Ann Althouse, Saying What
Rights Are-In and Out of Context, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 929, 932 (describing how Supreme
Court allows lower courts to apply and define law to create context reflecting social and
political climate of country).
137 Cover refers to a pattern of "sequential redundancy." See Cover, supra note 14, at
673.
138 A few words of clarification are in order. I do not dispute that protection of the
rights of individual foreign investors represented the primary goal of Chapter l's authors
and signatories. I would argue, however, that the goal of jurisprudential evolution-by
means of intersystemic judicial dialogue-has come to enjoy at least equal billing with
investor protection in Chapter l's actual implementation. Of course, the relevant legal
innovation under Chapter 11 ultimately serves the goal of protecting individual investors.
Innovation by way of the pattern of interaction that I propose aspires to an evolution of
investor rights over time, however, rather than their imposition in any immediate case. In
the litigation of individual cases, thus, my proposal potentially alters outcomes. This tension is hardly unique; it is simply a new manifestation of the perennial tug-of-war between
a court's role in achieving justice in the case before it and its obligation to ensure doctrinal
consistency and coherence. See Alicia Juarrero-Roqu6, Fail-Safe Versus Safe-Fail: Suggestions Toward An Evolutionary Model of Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1766-67 (1991).
The emergence of this tension in the jurisprudence of Chapter 11 tribunals is significant,
however, for its transmutation of international norm development-the evolution and
innovation of international norms of due process-from a secondary benefit of Chapter 11
review of national courts into a primary goal of Chapter 11. While perhaps not intended as
such by Chapter l's authors-and surely not by NAFTA's member states-in the hands
of Chapter 11 tribunals, such review may be a mechanism of lawmaking as much as one of
dispute resolution. But see generally Stephan, supra note 51 (critiquing broad conception
of U.S. litigation as serving ends beyond interests of parties, and reading Chapter 11 to
eschew such broad aspirations).
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dependence"-patterns of development in which present decisions
continue to be shaped by past decisions, regardless of their actual
wisdom or, in the modern parlance, efficiency. 139 Drawing on socialscience and evolutionary-biology literatures, Hathaway identifies mul-

tiple sources of path dependence in the law.' 40 Given these tendencies, the capacity of law-and courts in particular-for innovation
142
may be limited.141 Others echo this concern.
The general conception of common law jurisprudence as a vehicle
of progressive legal evolution, as articulated in the familiar law and

economics notion of an efficient common law, posits a countervailing
139 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (positing pattern of path dependence-or "lock-in"-of law); cf. Katyal, supra note 15, at 1714 (noting

inflexibility of binding judicial decisions).
140 See Hathaway, supra note 139, at 606-08.
141 See id. at 650. In line with what Hathaway terms "increasing returns path dependence," I previously have considered the potential for network externalities to produce
patterns of lock-in, or inertia, in the law. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and
Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the InternationalOrder, 53 EMORY L.J. 691,
721-24 (2004) [hereinafter Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market] (describing network
effects barriers to efficient evolution in standardized contract terms); see also Robert B.
Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S.CAL. L. REV.
215, 227-28 (2004) [hereinafter Ahdieh, Law's Signal] (suggesting potential role of law in
overcoming network obstacles to efficient development of securities market structures);
Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation
of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 317-20 (2003) [hereinafter Ahdieh,
Making Markets] (identifying network effects in securities markets and resulting resistance
to emergence of strong markets).
142 See Clayton P. Gillette, The Path Dependence of the Law, in THE PATH OF LAW AND
ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 247-48 (Steven J.
Burton ed., 2000) (noting Holmes's doubts that law and legal patterns would change, even
if social conditions indicate that current laws are inefficient or outmoded); Sophie Harnay
& Alain Marciano, JudicialConformity Versus Dissidence: An Economic Analysis of Judicial Precedent, 23 INT'L REV. L.& ECON. 405, 416 (2004) (suggesting that "adoption externalities" in legal market results in doctrinal stability); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (arguing that innovation in law is limited due to
ties to history and tradition, such that legal rules "simply persist[ I from blind imitation of
the past"); Frederick Schauer, Legal Development and the Problem of Systemic Transition,
13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 261, 272-73 (2003) (describing path dependence of legal
system brought about by uniform training of lawyers); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs
of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 853 (2002) (examining transaction costs of legal
reform); see also Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent
and IntrajudicialCommunication, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 755, 757 (2002) (proposing model
of judicial decisionmaking that explains stability of legal rules and standards); cf Robert
D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 296 (1996) (suggesting circumstances in
which courts will be relatively more daring): Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 173, 176 (2002) (arguing that constitutional
doctrines are essentially settled and constitutional cases litigated today are merely applying
existing doctrines to new facts).
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tendency. 143 These claims of efficiency have come into increasing
question in recent years. 144 At a broad level, however, the prospect of
an inadequate rate of innovation is not inconsistent with the gradual
development of the law. Hathaway and others do not claim that judicially defined norms cannot evolve; rather, they suggest that they may

not evolve in an efficient fashion.

45

From the perspective of evolutionary biology, one of the disciplines that Hathaway employs in modeling legal innovation and

change, deviation from patterns of path dependence-of judicial
"lock-in"-will ordinarily come in episodic phases or at "critical junctures."'1 46 During these periods, substantial doctrinal change may
occur before the altered norms are again locked in. 1 47 Yet it remains
unclear what might prompt such "punctuations '1 48 in otherwise stable

norms. Even if the pattern of legal transition is not episodic but is
continuous (if still constrained), how is it effectuated in the face of the
path dependence of law?
While various potential triggers might be suggested, including the
obvious influence of legislative and social change, one might look to

other courts as a particularly promising source of episodic-and even
general-legal transition.1 49 This prospect is rooted in the common
enterprise in which judicial institutions are engaged. 150 Given the fact
143 See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1993) ("[F]lexibility and capacity for
growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law."); Richard
A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 253 (1980)
(noting arguments of common law efficiency); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects
in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 822 (1998) (describing conditions in which
common law and legislation are more or less susceptible to stasis); Hathaway, supra note
139, at 631, 635-36 (describing claim of common law efficiency).
144 See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 87-93
(1999) (summarizing recent legal scholarship criticizing analogy between markets and
common law).
145 See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027, 2030-39 (2001) (summarizing
recent scholarship on efficiency of norm evolution).
146 See Hathaway, supra note 139, at 641-42 (defining "critical juncture" as "burst"
phase of institutional change, followed by period of stability).
147 See id. at 641-45.
148 See id. at 643 (defining "punctuations" as periods of sudden change that interrupt
long periods of stability).
149 See Koch, supra note 69, at 4-5, 17; Schapiro, supra note 136, at 1444; Waters, supra
note 100, at 47-48; cf Juarrero-Roqud, supra note 138, at 1769 (suggesting role of sequential judicial redundancy in encouraging innovation). Other authors have noted the role of
extrinsic judicial institutions in triggering judicial innovation, but without particular
emphasis. See, e.g., Harnay & Marciano, supra note 142, at 418 (referring to role of appellate courts in fomenting innovation); Hathaway, supra note 139, at 641, 643.
150 See Slaughter, Community of Courts, supra note 87, at 194 ("Common principles and
an awareness of a common enterprise will help make simple participation in transnational
litigation into an engine of common identity and community."). Of course, this flags the
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that they are engaged in a common enterprise, judges may find the
decisions of fellow judges to be a particularly attractive source of new

ideas. Perhaps even more importantly, decisions of other courts may
enhance the confidence of any given court in its pursuit of innovative
doctrinal choices. 151 This possibility may explain the reliance of

domestic courts on non-binding authority from other courts within the
same national jurisdiction. 152 State supreme courts in the United
States regularly look to other state supreme courts in making doc153
trinal shifts, as do the federal courts of appeal.

Significant doctrinal evolution, and perhaps any substantial doctrinal reassessment, however, may require courts to look beyond their
national borders. Similar patterns of path dependence may constrain

other courts within a common jurisdiction. 154 Foreign and international tribunals, by contrast, may start with a different framework and
adopt distinct approaches (even if constrained by their own patterns

of path dependence).155 They may consequently be better positioned

other side of the same coin: Courts may look to one another given a common set of biases
and rational preferences for doctrines that enhance judicial authority.
151 See Bhagwat, supra note 69, at 1006-09 (describing how Supreme Court could benefit from looking to practical experience gained by lower courts in implementing Supreme
Court doctrines); Keohane et al., supra note 115, at 484.
152 The recurrent critique of courts' citation of foreign decisions also acknowledges the
role of such citation as a mechanism of change. U.S. decisions cannot justify the relevant
holding, goes the standard dissent, so the offending majority must turn to foreign cases
instead. See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari) ("In any event, Justice Breyer has only added another foreign court to his list
while still failing to ground support for this theory in any decision by an American court.").
153 Cross-citation between state and federal courts, among federal district courts, and
other permutations of precedent-borrowing also might be offered. Additionally, it bears
noting that I do not wish to suggest that direct review cannot serve as a valuable means of
legal innovation. See David Frisch, ContractualChoice of Law and the PrudentialFoundations of Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 75 (2003) (arguing that appellate review
provides means by which law can evolve to reflect changing needs of society). But see
Juarrero-Roqud, supra note 138, at 1772 (suggesting limitations of hierarchical review as
source of innovation). Such innovation, however, is less likely to offer especially distinct
perspectives.
154 Cf. Juarrero-Roqud, supra note 138, at 1772 (suggesting judicial redundancy internal
to judicial system may not be adequate spur to innovation). If Evan Caminker is correct
that lower courts utilize elements of a proxy model in their decisionmaking, attempting to
predict how an appellate court would decide a given issue, see Caminker, supra note 66, at
55, then external sources of jurisprudence are clearly necessary for desirable innovation.
155 John Orth has identified transplantation of judicial authority between common law
and civil law jurisdictions as a source of innovation. See John V. Orth, The Secret Sources
of Judicial Power, 50 LOYOLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with the
New York University Law Review). Paul Stephan, by contrast, has suggested that extrinsic
judicial review may actually function to constrain innovation. See Stephan, supra note 41,
at 792.
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to offer a domestic court the alternative perspectives necessary to pro156
mote, or even to suggest the possibility of, innovation.
As between foreign and international tribunals, finally, international tribunals may be particularly suited to encouraging jurisprudential change in domestic courts. 157 In Chapter 11 and similar cases, the
direct and explicit review that takes place, together with the presence
of some degree of power in the hands of the international tribunal,
ensures that the latter will be heard by the national court. 158 Foreign
tribunals, on the other hand, are more easily ignored.
B.

Hybrid Judicial Interaction and the
Means of Innovation

International review of national courts may be an effective catalyst of judicial innovation. To better appreciate this role, one might
consider other examples of judicial interaction standing between
appellate review and dialogue. Two cases of such hybrid interaction
are emphasized herein. The first is the domestic case of federal
habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions. The second is
appellate courts' affirmative (rather than incidental or inadvertent)
use of dicta as a signaling device. These patterns of interaction suggest ways in which courts in a position of balanced power may help to
encourage shared innovation.
1.

The Innovation of Habeas Corpus

Writing of the criminal procedure jurisprudence of the Warren
Court some twenty-five years ago, Robert Cover and Alexander
'159
Aleinikoff observed a pattern they termed "dialectical federalism.
Within this model, lower federal courts and state courts charged with
the adjudication of constitutional norms of criminal procedure-the
state courts by way of their general police power and the federal
courts through their habeas jurisdiction to review state criminal con156 International and foreign courts may be particularly capable of inciting "punctuated"
change. Cf Hathaway, supra note 139, at 643. In the terms used by Harnay and Marciano,
extra-jurisdictional courts may not be constrained by the same potential professional costs
and sanctions. Cf Harnay & Marciano, supra note 142, at 409. From a network economics
perspective, a competing jurisprudential network may break the dominant network's pattern of lock-in by displacing the status-quo equilibrium. See Ahdieh, Between Mandate
and Market, supra note 141, at 749-50.
157 Cf Keohane et al., supra note 115, at 479-80 (suggesting that transnational tribunals
have even greater capacity to encourage innovation than international tribunals).
158 See infra Part IV.A.1.
159 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1046-68. For another application of Cover
and Aleinikoff's premises to international tribunals, see Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 285, 349-53 (1999).
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victions-engaged in a pattern of recurrent interaction akin to the
international review of national courts explored herein. 160 In the case

of habeas review, as analyzed by Cover and Aleinikoff, neither court
enjoyed complete autonomy to implement its own jurisprudential
vision.' 61 Nor were they completely constrained by their counter-

part. 162 Given this dynamic, Cover and Aleinikoff suggested, the judicial interaction of habeas review functioned to encourage beneficial
evolution in constitutional criminal procedure.

As an example, Cover and Aleinikoff explore the jurisprudence
that followed Mempa v. Rhay, in which the Supreme Court held that

petitioners facing revocation of probation and the potential for reimposition of a suspended sentence should have the benefit of counsel
at their revocation hearing. 163 Soon after the Mempa decision, a split
emerged among the federal courts of appeals as to how far to extend

the Supreme Court's holding, with several circuits initially adopting a
narrow view of the Court's decision.) 64 In Hewett v. North
Carolina,165 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became
the first circuit court to extend Mempa's reach. 16 6 In Hewett, the
court held that the Sixth Amendment required that counsel be provided at all probation-revocation hearings, regardless of whether a
new sentence is imposed. 167 Hewett thus emerged as the primary
articulation of a broad reading of Mempa, just as state courts began to
160 See infra notes 214-22 and accompanying text. The writ of habeas corpus permits
post-conviction review of allegedly unlawful detention. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra
L. Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 51 (2004). Both intrasystemic and intersystemic opportunities for post-conviction review exist. A state criminal conviction may thus
be subject, following the completion of direct appellate review, to both state post-conviction review for asserted violations of federal or state constitutional protections---claims of
ineffective counsel, lack of competency to stand trial, and violation of evidentiary rules,
among others-and ensuing habeas review in federal district court for federal constitutional claims. See Benjamin Vetter, Comment, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-conviction
Access to DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 595 (2004). Although the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have overseen a dramatic transformation-and contraction-of federal
habeas review of state criminal convictions, its essential form persists.
161 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1050-51 (describing utopian vision of federal courts and pragmatic vision of state courts).
162 See id. at 1052-54. I elaborate on this balanced pattern of interaction below. See
infra Part IV.A.1.
163 389 U.S. 128 (1967). See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1054-55 (describing
decision in Mempa v. Rhay).
164 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1055-56 (describing court of appeals decisions interpreting reach of Mempa).
165 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
166 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1056 ("The Fourth Circuit [in Hewett]
provided the first careful enlargement of Mempa v. Rhay.").
167 See Hewett, 415 F.2d at 1325.
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undertake their own consideration of the right to counsel in the con168
text of parole and probation-revocation hearings.
Faced with the decision in Hewett, state courts took varied

approaches. Most significantly for present purposes, notwithstanding
Hewett's lack of binding effect as to any state court, and least of all
those outside the Fourth Circuit, the state courts almost universally
addressed Hewett and framed their decisions as joining in or dissenting from its reading of Mempa. 169 The New York Court of
Appeals carefully considered Hewett, along with other relevant fed170
eral and state decisions, and chose to adopt Hewett's interpretation.
The Pennsylvania courts also adopted Hewett's expansive reading of
Mempa, notably rejecting contrary Third Circuit authority. 17' The

Maryland Court of Appeals, on the other hand, carefully considered

172
Hewett, but declined to overrule its prior decision in Knight v. State,

where it had limited Mempa to its facts-probation proceedings
73
involving sentence imposition.

Most interesting was the development of relevant doctrine in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. 17 4 Citing an earlier decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 175 the Wisconsin court

invalidated some existing state practices in probation and parole revocation in the aftermath of Mempa. 176 The court held, however, that

there was a right to counsel only for sentence imposition, limiting
Mempa to its facts and rejecting Hewett.17 7 Shortly after the

Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision, the Seventh Circuit held in
Gunsolus v. Gagnon

78

that counsel was required in all probation-rev-

ocation hearings. In support of its holding, the Seventh Circuit relied
168 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1056 ("Hewett served as the paradigm for a
broad reading of Mempa.").
169 See id. at 1056-58 (describing state courts' engagement with Hewett).
170 People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 267 N.E.2d 238, 240-41 (N.Y. 1971); see also
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1056-57.
171 See Commonwealth ex reL Rambeau v. Rundle, 314 A.2d 842 (Pa. 1973); see also
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1057 (describing Pennsylvania's acceptance of
"expansive reading of the principles of Mempa v. Rhay").
172 255 A.2d 441, 446 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971).
173 See Dugas v. State, 277 A.2d 620, 621 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971).
174 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1057-58 (describing Wisconsin court's
extension of doctrine first to juvenile revocation of probation proceedings and later to all
revocation of probation proceedings).
175 See Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933
(1971).
176 See State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 185 N.W.2d 306, 315 (Wis. 1971).
177 See id. at 310.

178 See Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1971), affd in part and rev'd in
part sub nor, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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on Hewett, along with other cases that had followed

it.179

Faced with

Gunsolus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its stance, adopting

the decision of the Seventh Circuit' 80 in a spirit of "voluntary acquiescence." 18

Such acquiescence, the court suggested, was essential to

the "harmonious ordering of federal-state court relations.'

82

The jurisprudence surrounding Hewett also suggests the bidirectionality of the federal-state influence in habeas and, by analogy, in

the international-national court interaction of Chapter 11 and similar
international regimes. Having set a dialectical pattern of interaction
in motion with Hewett, the Fourth Circuit returned to the issue of pro183
bation revocation two years later in Bearden v. South Carolina.
With particular reference to the obstacles to a broad right to counsel
identified by state courts in the intervening years, the Fourth Circuit
elected to narrow its original decision. With an enhanced apprecia-

tion of state court concerns, it articulated a compromise position
between its broad standard in Hewett and an interpretation of Mempa

as limited to its facts. 184
In the presence of habeas' balanced dynamic of judicial power, as
Cover and Aleinikoff describe, and as I elaborate below, each court
must develop an appreciation of the distinct values and norms of the

other. "[T]here are incentives for each court system to acknowledge
and, if possible, satisfy some of the more reasonable demands of the
other."'185 Since neither party in such a system can disregard the interests of the other, they must instead exhibit flexibility and identify
paths of compromise. 186 In the jurisprudence surrounding Mempa,
179 See id. at 421-22.
180 See State ex rel. Bernal v. Hershman, 196 N.W.2d 721, 723-24 (Wis. 1972); Oestrich
v. State, 198 N.W.2d 664, 665 (Wis. 1972).
181 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1059 ("Although the majority of the
Wisconsin court retreated to the requirements of Scarpelli, they did not characterize their
prior position as having been compelled by the Seventh Circuit.").
182 Id. at 1058-59. Notably, the Wisconsin court later would describe its decision as
based "not 'on the basis of an independent judgment or policy,"' but on the nature of the
federal-state relationship under the habeas regime. Id. at 1059 (quoting State ex rel. Cresci
v. Schmidt, 215 N.W.2d 361, 365-67 (Wis. 1974)).
183 443 F.2d 1090, 1094 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 972 (1972).
184 See id. at 1092-93; see also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1059-60 (quoting
from Bearden). Walter Murphy offers Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955), as another
example of intersystemic judicial dialogue. See Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on
Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1017, 1021 (1959).
185 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1053; see also id. at 1048 (noting impact of
institutional design that creates "areas of overlap in which neither system can claim total
sovereignty").
186 In the alternative, the relevant courts might attempt-with ill consequences for
both-to ignore one another. A prime example of this is the lack of interaction between
federal and tribal court systems in the United States. See Frank Pommersheim, Coyote
Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections From the Edge of the Prairie,31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 439,
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the courts were obliged to acknowledge one another and adopt an
approach of creative analysis and experimentation. This dynamic in
habeas jurisprudence contributed to the emergence and evolution of

core features of modern constitutional due process, including aspects
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.1 7 This suggests the significant potential for innovation in a balanced regime of intersystemic judicial
interaction.
2.

The Signals of Appellate Dicta
An understanding of habeas review as creating a pattern of

dynamic exchange points logically to the second case of hybrid judicial
interaction explored herein-appellate courts' use of dicta as a sig-

naling device to lower courts. The power exhibited in habeas review,
as in the international review of national courts, is not hierarchical,
but shared. As such, it includes a significant expressive, rhetorical, or

discursive dimension. The resulting innovation of habeas corpus
review-and of international review of national courts, I would

argue-occurs when the respective courts talk to each other. 18 8 The
hybrid judicial interaction arising from the use of dicta and similar
mechanisms of judicial communication may thus help to confirm and
clarify the role of international review of national courts in encouraging judicial innovation.
While less obvious an analogy than habeas corpus review, the use

of dicta in the interaction of superior and inferior courts within the
same system can also be compared to the interaction of international
459-60 (1999) (noting federal courts' lack of deference to tribal courts, and arguing that
tribal courts should use their opinions to educate federal courts regarding basic tribal law
and values); see also infra note 255.
187 Habeas cases contributing to constitutional norms of criminal procedure included
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), which held that Fifth Amendment protections
were not terminated or suspended following a prisoner's consultation with counsel, Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), which defined attachment and waiver of right to counsel,
and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which outlined a broad right to counsel in
criminal proceedings, among others.
188 Such advisory means of legal innovation may be especially appropriate, given the
relevant audience of Chapter 11 and similar review. In some sense, Chapter 11 review of
national courts speaks more to the absent party-in-interest-the national court-than to
the actual parties to the claim. As such, we have a different dynamic than in Martin
Shapiro's triad of two parties plus a third-party adjudicator. See SHAPIRO, supra note 66,
at 1 (describing triad model of adjudication); see also Ted L. Stein, Jurisprudence and
Jurists' Prudence: The Iranian-Forum Clause Decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 32 (1984). Instead, the subject national court is a fourth participant in
the process of dialectical review. For that court, the dicta of dialectical review is likely to
be as effective as any formal holding, and may actually be more effective.
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tribunals with national courts. 189 Like the interaction of international

tribunals with national courts, appellate courts' use of dicta incorporates dimensions of both appellate hierarchy and dialogic comity.
Unlike the operative holding of a decision, dicta is not binding on trial

courts within the jurisdiction of the relevant appellate court. 190 Where
the appellate court speaks to issues beyond the legal questions
presented, trial courts subsequently faced with those issues are not
bound by the extramural pronouncements of the appellate court. On
the other hand, those pronouncements are hardly irrelevant to a trial
court whose decisions ultimately will be subject to the review of that
same court of appeal. Rather than the random prognostications of an
outside observer, dicta constitutes highly predictive statements of
what an appellate court might do when actually faced with the question addressed. 9 1 It is in this sense that dicta constitutes something
less than a binding appellate decree, but something more than mere
dialogic pronouncements.

The assertions of tribunals in the collateral review of habeas petitions, or upon Chapter 11 review, echo this intermediate form. As
with appellate dicta, the pronouncements of federal courts on habeas
189 "Dicta" has been defined as "[o]pinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the specific case before the court" or "[e]xpressions in court's
opinion which go beyond the facts before court and therefore are individual views of the
author of the opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent." BLACK'S
LAW DICrnONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990).

190 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821). The Court stated:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion,
are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are
used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for
decision.
Id.
191 See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 11I, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2026-27 (1994)
(suggesting that power of dicta derives in part from difficulty in distinguishing it from precedential holdings); Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH.
L. REV. 769, 784, 796 (1999) (describing power of dicta, along continuum); Matthew T.
King, Towards a PracticalConvergence: The Dynamic Uses of Judicial Advice in United
States Federal Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 63 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 703, 716-17 (2002); see also Caminker, supra note 66, at 46-48 (describing dicta as
source of predictive data); Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37
Hous. L. REV. 1395, 1418-20 (2000) (describing lower courts' treatment of dicta as controlling authority). Kannan suggests an understanding of dicta as a form of "guidance."
See Kannan, supra, at 796 ("The key word here is 'guidance.' Dicta can suggest a path and
provide reinforcement if the court goes down that path."). Dicta thus can be understood

to have a strongly prospective orientation. It is, in some sense, a window into the future.
See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmty. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 699 n.12
(1995) (referring to TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-85 & n.30 (1978), as foreshadowing
decision); Kannan, supra, at 794-95; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 155-56,

402 (1986) (suggesting role of judicial decisions in warning of impending changes in law).
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review are not binding on state courts, just as the decisions of Chapter
11 tribunals are not binding on state and federal courts. They offer,
however, useful guidance on the potential treatment of future cases by

the reviewing courts. As such, they warrant close attention, respect,
and even deference. 192 Because of its capacity to call attention to dis-

tinct perspectives without imposing them, dicta may help to encourage
193
fruitful innovation.

Somewhat analogously, international review of national courts
calls to mind the power of what Alexander Bickel termed the "passive
virtues. '194 Bickel famously opined that the Supreme Court should
96
95
utilize various discretionary mechanisms' and justiciability rules'
to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions. 97 Through such
restraint, the Court can allow issues to ripen and thereby permit rele-

vant constitutional questions to come into focus.' 98 The Court's
restrained engagement will thus encourage the other branches and the
public to engage the issue more fully. 199 Within this scheme, the

apparent weakness of the Court becomes a form of strength, as it fos192 As suggested by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: "[Tihis court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright
holdings." Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996). Lower courts' generalized deference to dicta, however, does not precisely track the power behind the interactive pattern of judicial engagement I describe herein, as it rests more on the predictive
power of dicta than its analytical force. See Maltz, supra note 191, at 1418-20 (stating that
justification for lower courts' use of dicta is that dicta is most reliable predictor of Court's
likely holding).
193 See Kannan, supra note 191, at 792, 794. A similar pattern might be posited in the
publication of dissenting opinions to the decisions of collegial courts. Such dissents, of
course, do not bind lower courts. On the other hand, they offer useful data to lower courts
regarding future jurisprudential developments, the potential limits of the majority's
holding, and avenues of future analysis and argument. Dissents, as such, may represent
important mechanisms of dialectical communication.
194 See BICKEL, supra note 15, at 187-88 ("Even when it is ultimately constrained to
yield to necessity... the Court can exert immense influence.... [I]t need not abandon its
concomitant role of 'teacher to the citizenry' . . . . [Tjhe Court can explain the principle
that is in play and praise it, and thus also guard its integrity."). Bickel's analysis, along with
that of Calabresi and Katyal, described below, offer useful lessons for international tribunals in the pursuit of fruitful innovation, but deviate from the analogy of Chapter 11 review
to the use of dicta, in that their theories were articulated as mechanisms of inter- rather
than intra-branch communication.
195 See Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 726 (2000).
196 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1835 (2001).
197 See Cooper & Berman, supra note 195, at 725-27.
198

See id. at 727.

199 See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J.
1567, 1586 (1985) (describing Bickel's conception of advantages of permitting Court to
postpone decisions).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

BETWEEN DIALOGUE AND DECREE

December 20041

2075

ters productive dialogue and ultimately enhances public acceptance of
2°°
a role for the Court as arbiter of constitutional disputes.
20 1
The inevitable limits of international review of national courts
might similarly be construed as a source of judicial empowerment.
Such limitations may serve to enhance fruitful dialogue by preventing
its untimely foreclosure. This view may explain the holdings against
liability in Loewen and in another recent Chapter 11 decision,
Mondev. 202 In those cases, the Chapter 11 tribunals may have
declined to impose liability and to correct any error in the particular
case before them, in favor of a greater focus on sustaining a progressive dialogue with the U.S. courts, and thereby encouraging
innovation.
More proactive mechanisms of judicial communication can also
be suggested. 20 3 Further evidence of the capacity of Chapter 11 and
similar review of national courts to encourage innovation and to foster
a means for such innovation might be found in the second-look doctrine of Judge Guido Calabresi.204 The second-look doctrine developed by Calabresi encourages judges to return constitutionally suspect
legislation to the legislature for further review "with the eyes of the

people on

''

it. 205

If a court makes a decision when the legislature's

intent is unclear, Calabresi argues, it runs the risk of either validating
an infringement of rights that the legislature did not intend or striking
down a law where the state interest appears minimal but actually is
quite significant. 20 6 From these risks arise the benefits of returning
legislation for a "second look." Again, Calabresi's second-look doctrine might be said to capture the spirit of Loewen, which encouraged
200 See Cooper & Berman, supra note 195, at 727. More generally, Bickel's analysis is
relevant to the present case, given its acknowledgement of the non-traditional mechanisms
by which courts may exercise their authority. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 15, at 188.
201 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 397-413 and accompanying text (describing Mondev decision); cf
Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-DialogicAbstention by the
InternationalCourt of Justice, 18 MicH. J. INT'L L. 399, 405-06 (1997) (describing utility of

prudential abstention in functioning of ICJ).
203 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures,and

Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 57-60 (1998) (suggesting benefits of active judicial engagement). As a general category, dicta is relatively active in nature. See King, supra note 191,
at 716-17. This is what Sunstein essentially acknowledges in his shift in emphasis from
"passive virtues" to "decisional minimalism."

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A

TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT

3-5

(1999).

204 See Martinez, supra note 3, at 455 ("'[Slecond-look' doctrines ...

serve the purpose

of engaging the political branches in dialogue and reconsideration of the issues in
question.").
205 Calabresi, supra note 15, at 104.
206 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 742 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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innovation through aggressive review and critique of the relevant
20 7
national court but left any imposition of liability to another day.

Neal Katyal's various forms of judicial advicegiving-most
closely resembling the basic use of dicta with which we began but
intended by Katyal for executive and legislative listeners-are similarly suggestive of the ways in which international review of national
courts may help to encourage innovation. 20 8 In his exemplification
and demarcation approaches, for example, a court either strikes down

a legislative act while suggesting a constitutional means to the same
ends, or upholds an act while counseling the legislature that more
restrictive statutes will not pass constitutional muster.209 These
approaches suggest the latent powers of an international tribunal, as
under Chapter 11, to further doctrinal innovation. 210 Katyal's pattern
of self-alienation, by which a court denies its jurisdiction to resolve a
constitutional question but nonetheless offers its interpretation of
it,211 similarly suggests the potential for judicial institutions to contribute to innovation in constitutional discourse even where their
formal authority is limited. 212 This readily echoes the dynamic of
2 13
international review of national courts.
207 See supra Part I.
208 Katyal offers judicial advicegiving as an alternative, yet constitutionally permissible,
approach to judicial review. See Katyal, supra note 15, at 1715-16. Among the categories
of advicegiving that Katyal identifies are clarification, self-alienation, personification,
exemplification, demarcation, prescription, education, and moralization. See id. at
1716-20. Tom Ginsburg has similarly described Korean and Taiwanese courts' use of
various signals to guide executive authorities. See Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 763, 775, 792 (2002). The provision of such advice, Ginsburg suggests, was possible given its grounding in Confucian traditions of a central political role for learned counselors. See id. at 795. Wright and Miller, finally, explore the use of such techniques in the
interaction of state and federal courts in criminal procedure, including cases in which state
courts articulated their objection to relevant federal law but proceeded to issue judgments
in accord with it. See Wright & Miller, supra note 14, at 688-89.
209 See Katyal, supra note 15, at 1718-19.
210 Cf. id. at 1718-19. Several of Robert Keeton's techniques of prospective judicial
action also offer useful lessons for the operation of intersystemic adjudication as a source
of innovation. See KEETON, supra note 92, at 27-30. Michael Dorf, meanwhile, has suggested an important role for "conscious asides" by courts. See Dorf, supra note 191, at
2006-07.
211 See Katyal, supra note 15, at 1717.
212 See id. at 1736-37.
213 A characterization of international review of national courts as rhetorical in natureakin to dicta-should not be taken to deny its efficacy as a mechanism of innovation. Cf
Ahdieh, Law's Signal, supra note 141, at 259-61 (suggesting capacity of non-binding
speech to influence behaviors and outcomes). As I elaborate below, international review
may effectuate desired results without the consent or cooperation of the subject national
court. See infra Parts IV.A.1 & B.1. Further, it offers a credible threat of future review.
See infra Parts IV.A.3 & B.1.c. Judge Calabresi's concurring opinion in United States v.
Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466-69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring), suggests the power of
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When analogized to habeas review, to the appellate use of dicta,

and to the types of judicial action emphasized by Bickel, Calabresi,
and Katyal, the potential of Chapter 11 as a mechanism of innovation
becomes apparent. Hybrid judicial interactions in which neither court
enjoys complete autonomy can be attractive sources of creativity and
change. By utilizing such interactions effectively, legal systems may
overcome patterns of path dependence and achieve efficient innova-

tion in legal norms.
C.

The Innovation of Chapter 11 Review

If judicial innovation can be identified as an important institutional need and hybrid judicial interactions as an effective tool for
meeting that need, what can be said of the particular operation of

Chapter 11 as a mechanism of innovation? I consider this issue in
three phases. First, I describe the rough pattern of intersystemic adjudication that one might envision under Chapter 11. I then posit the
quite distinct understanding of judicial process-and particularly judi-

cial review-on which this pattern rests. Finally, I consider the extent
to which the innovation that follows from the international review of

national courts under Chapter 11 and similar regimes constitutes true
learning-an internalization of new legal norms-and not simply

error correction by another name.
this combination. See Michael Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73, 82-83 (2000). In Then, Calabresi joined the majority's conclusion that sentencing disparities dictated by the federal Sentencing Guidelines had not
been shown to violate the guarantee of equal protection, notwithstanding their disproportionate impact on African Americans, since no intentional animus had been shown. See
Then, 56 F.3d at 466-67. He went on to say, however, that the Sentencing Guidelines
could not thereafter be defended on such grounds. Rather, Congress and the Sentencing
Commission were now on notice of the Guidelines' disparate impact, such that their continued failure to remedy the disparities might no longer meet constitutional muster. See id.
at 468-69. Katyal describes a similar dynamic under the rubric of "penalization":
Penalization is a judicial attempt to make sure that the political branches heed
advice. Because advice is not binding, courts that dispense it run the risk that
it will be disregarded-a particularly unattractive outcome when courts use
advicegiving in lieu of judicial review. Penalization techniques use judicial
warnings to make clear that if the political bodies do not heed the judicial
advice, a court will hold their "foot-dragging" . . . against them. These cautions
work as judicial fuses: If political actors do not listen, then the judicial time
bomb will explode and the court will strike down the act.
Katyal, supra note 15, at 1721 (citation omitted). Paul Carrese likewise notes the "moderating" effect of judicial action, even without any mechanism of formal reversal. See PAUL
0. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND THE RISE OF
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 3 (2003); see also id. at 263 (describing "cloaking" power of judiciary);

Ahdieh, Law's Signal, supra note 141, at 261.
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The Interaction of National Courts and International Tribunals in
Chapter 11

If the role of international review of national courts as a mechanism of innovation is grounded in its expressive character, how is such
a rhetorical function actually operationalized? The cases of habeas
review and judicial dicta described above suggest some pattern of conversational exchange between relevant tribunals. 214 The desired innovation, in this view, arises from a succession of cases in which each
court recurringly returns to a common theme. With each decision,
each tribunal articulates or rearticulates its perspective, as shaped by
the most recent decision of its counterpart. It is this repeated pattern
of experimentation, learning, and growth based on a common disapproaches and the ulticourse that furthers the development of new
2 15
norms.
doctrinal
new
of
mate emergence
In Chapter 11 review, this process is initially set in motion with
the Chapter 11 tribunal's review of a particular national decision and
embedded legal rule. In subsequent cases, the national courts, faced
with the same question of law but now with the benefit of the analysis

of the Chapter 11 tribunal, may elect to adopt the view of the Chapter
11 tribunal, hold to their prior decision, or adopt some intermediate

214 The primarily rhetorical relationship of international and national courts described
above also helps to distinguish the judicial power at work in that relationship from conventional appellate power. The decrees of appellate courts can be expected to restrain lower
courts, without particular regard to the quality or extent of their reasoning. Cursory
unpublished dispositions by U.S. courts of appeal and summary reversals by the Supreme
Court are quite efficacious, notwithstanding their lack of analysis. On the other hand,
unconvincing or summary analysis is unlikely to meet the threshold for deference by tribunals petitioned to enforce a foreign judgment or asked to adopt a judgment consistent with
that of a foreign tribunal. Compelling analysis and argument is thus essential to any relationship patterned along the lines described herein. See generally Dorf, supra note 191
(suggesting importance of rationale as basis for respect of judicial decisions); Wright &
Miller, supra note 14, at 690 ("Where state and federal courts disagree, the true power of
the state court lies in persuasive argument."). The rhetorical nature of the relationship
between international and national courts also affirms the prospective orientation of their
interaction. Cf King, supra note 191, at 715. Rather than being directed primarily to the
retroactive review of a past decision, dicta and similar judicial pronouncements are
designed to offer counsel for future cases.
215 The jurisprudential development envisioned herein thus occurs in both fora. Rather
than the internalization of international norms or the externalization of domestic norms,
the proposed pattern of engagement predicts correlated moves toward a universal standard. In this vein, my analysis echoes Melissa Waters's "co-constitutive" conception of the
interaction of national courts. See Waters, supra note 100, at 5, 25. In her vision of transnational judicial dialogue, national courts both internalize and shape international norms.
See id. at 4-5, 25.
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position. Subsequent Chapter 11 tribunals may respond in turn, cre216
ating the desired pattern of exchange.

Beyond this broad pattern, the innovation arising from the international review of national courts might be expected to occur in two
phases. 217 At the outset, such review may spark change by way of
some initial shock to the judicial system under review. One might
think of the attention attracted by the Chapter 11 review in
Loewen. 218 But the greater impact of Chapter 11 and similar review
of national courts can be expected to come through a pattern of recurrent engagement between relevant international tribunals and
national courts. The institutional design of Chapter 11, as I will sug-

gest below, produces just the pattern of balanced judicial power that
Cover and Aleinikoff observed in federal habeas jurisdiction. 2 19 To
navigate this balance, relevant judicial institutions must inevitably

engage one another over a succession of cases. Such recurrent interaction can be expected to facilitate a progressive-and perhaps more
sustainable-pattern of legal transition. 220 The balanced power
216 See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 82-83 (2001). In this pattern, one can see
not only dimensions of Slaughter's "enforcement network" characterization of Chapter 11
review of national courts, see SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 100, but also aspects of both a
"harmonization network" designed to facilitate convergence and an "information network" designed to collect and disseminate otherwise dispersed information, see
SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 21-22 (describing potential for given international regime to
function as both enforcement network and harmonization or information network). In this
perspective, the pattern of dialectical engagement among international tribunals and
national courts can be seen as part of a broader growth in transgovernmentalism--complex
interactions among subnational state actors operating in related substantive realms. See
Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-11 (2002).
217 See Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement:
The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 410 (1998).
One commentator suggests a gradual implementation of broad international review:
[IInternational tribunals should move cautiously in their early years, striking a
delicate balance between independence and deference that permits states to
develop a level of comfort with international review and to be become habituated to complying with unfavorable outcomes in specific cases. Only later will
a more assertive approach be feasible ....
Id.
218 See supra Part I.
219 See infra Parts IV.A.1 & B.la.
220 Chapter 11 review may strike an appropriate balance in this vein, with Loewen's
introduction of a requirement of finality. See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case

No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 675, 723-24,

215-217 (NAFTA Ch. 11

Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://www.naftalaw.org. This requirement conserves
resources by resolving disputes in the national courts and thereby minimizing international
intervention. Cf Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause:
Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 332 (1988) (noting that
exhaustion requirement in takings claims against states reduces need for federal interven-
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dynamic of international review of national courts thus may enhance
the internalization of international norms, as national courts participate jointly in their articulation and elaboration. 221 The interaction of
international and national courts may thus facilitate the domestication

of international norms, through both their evolution and their
222
internalization.
2.

Conflict and Innovation

As described to this point, Chapter 11 review of national courts
must be understood to serve a different set of goals than conventional
judicial review, at least in the short term. Ordinary appellate review
can be conceived to seek the minimization of conflict through episodic

appellate decision; hence the notion of review as correcting error and
encouraging consistency. 223 International review of national courts,
by contrast, does not operate to eliminate conflict or inconsistency,
tion, with result that states retain greater control of state law). It allows local courts to
develop much of their own law, with only intermittent intervention by external tribunals,
and even that in expressive rather than directive forms. The proposed pattern of review
thus seeks the benefits of international norm development while limiting the risks of overcentralization. See id. at 335 n.228. The proposed pattern may also help to strengthen
national courts, particularly in developing countries such as Mexico. A requirement of
finality is therefore well-warranted. Mexico's decision to give direct effect to NAFTA's
protections would likewise appear to be a wise course. See Dodge, supra note 6, at 161
n.56; see also NAFITA, supra note 12, annex 1120.1(a), at 648. Through the latter provision, the points of potential intersection between national courts and international tribunals grow exponentially.
221 See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1998). As to the execution of any international
review of national courts, it arguably should take a shape suited to its "dialectical" nature.
Specifically, what Heifer and Slaughter describe as a casuist style of reasoning might be
especially appropriate for such review. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 321-22.
This pattern, by which arguments systematically are posed, critiqued, and resurrected or
rejected, may be well-suited to a model that is rhetorical or expressive in nature. Cf.Carl
Baudenbacher, Judicial Globalization: New Development or Old Wine in New Bottles?, 38
TEX. INT'L. L.J. 505, 523-24 (2003); Stein, supra note 188, at 34 n.167. Such an approach
acknowledges the reliance of such review on the effective advocacy of any given position,
rather than on hierarchy alone. See supra note 214.
222 Mark Rosen has outlined a gradation of Native American tribal court approaches to
federal case law, ranging from complete disregard to wholesale incorporation. See Mark
D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-ConstitutionalFederal Law: Of
TribalCourts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORD. L. REV. 479 (2000). Between these
extremes, he suggests the prospect of deviation as to broad goals (re-targeting), as to more
particularized standards (re-standardizing), or as to the specific rule selected (tailoring).
See id. at 492-98. Review of the sort described herein might be most closely analogized to
the intermediate approach of re-standardizing, in which the goals of the competing judicial
system are preserved but the standards utilized in their implementation are altered. See id.
at 496.
223 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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but uses them as a trigger for innovation. 224 International review of

national courts thus is best understood to encourage the negotiation
of conflict and indeterminacy rather than their avoidance-whether
through sharp jurisdictional delimitations or assertions of strong
appellate power.2 25 In this proposed scheme, the distinct perspectives
of the participating judicial institutions provoke legal innovation both
226
within each system and as a common enterprise.
224 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1065-67 (suggesting as much in context of
habeas review). See generally Juarrero-Roqud, supra note 138; Schapiro, supra note 136,
at 1447. Slaughter echoes this notion in the context of transnational governmental networks more generally. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 27 ("[G]overnment networks
constituted in this way could harness the positive power of conflict as the foundation of
lasting political and social relationships.... Among disaggregated government institutions,
national and supranational, conflict should be resolved, but not necessarily avoided. It is
likely to be the long-term engine of trust."); see also id. at 68; William W. Burke-White, A
Community of Courts: Towards a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24
MICH. J.INT'L L. 1, 84 (2002) ("Conflict, deliberation, argument, and contention can lead
to better outcomes.").
225 See Catherine Powell, DialogicFederalism: ConstitutionalPossibilitiesfor Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 249 (2001) (citing
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1048); see also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at
1048-50. In Cover and Aleinikoff's habeas dialogue, indeterminacy is created when the
Supreme Court either has not spoken on an issue or has defined a constitutional norm so
broadly that its specific applications are left open. See id. at 1049 (describing how federal
review can encourage dialogue by bringing together different viewpoints). Such indeterminacy creates the opportunity for the dialectical exchange that ensues. See id. at 1048, 1050.
Conflict, meanwhile, arises when the participating court systems interpret the values identified by the Supreme Court differently. See id. at 1050. Such conflict perpetuates a dialogue and results in each court system expounding its views and concerns regarding
relevant issues, see id. at 1065, outlining its perspective and informing both the competing
court system and the Supreme Court of the distinct perspectives on any given issue, see id.
at 1053-54.
Of course, an approach to legal development grounded in conflict and indeterminacy
has its shortcomings. It is an inevitably gradual process, see Kloppenberg, supra note 66, at
315-18 (describing long-term nature of dialogic interactions among political institutions),
with the result that attendant legal uncertainty persists for a longer period of time. Besides
the prospect of delay, an indeterminate approach to legal change also produces law that "is
less precise but more communal." See Harding, supra note 79, at 438 (quoting H. Patrick
Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGILL L.J. 261, 297 (1987)). As this suggests, uncertainty and indeterminacy undoubtedly have costs which may, in any given case, outweigh
the benefits of the evolutionary interaction of courts outlined herein. At least in some
cases, however, and as to some questions of law, the costs of uncertainty may pale in comparison with the benefits of progressive legal innovation through intersystemic judicial
interaction. Moreover, indeterminacy may be inevitable in the absence of some centralized international authority. In this sense, one might conceive of the proposed engagement
of international tribunals and national courts as a necessary attempt to coordinate around
the absence of any central international authority.
226 In this way, the proposed pattern of engagement may help to facilitate each step of
Harold Koh's transnational legal process: interaction, interpretation, and internalization.
See Koh, supra note 221, at 626. Yet, it is important not to exaggerate the role of such
review; it will not be adequate to all issues. Cf.Steven D. Smith, The Pursuitof Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 434-35 (1990) (arguing that dialogue is not panacea for all ills).
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To be sure, as I will elaborate below, international review ulti-

mately may serve to move the distinct norms of the relevant jurisdictions toward a more harmonized law. 22 7 In this sense, Chapter 11
review of national courts, like appellate review, identifies convergence
as its ultimate goal. 228 However, the convergence of Chapter 11

review emerges through a progressive evolution of thought rather
than being dictated by way of judicial hierarchy. Institutions of international review do not "give" law, in this sense, but instead create a
process for its refinement. 22 9 Across literal and figurative borders,

international review of national courts might thus be conceived as a
230
form of progressive translation.
3.

Norm Internalizationor Mere Error Correction?

Before turning to the characteristics of a regime of international
review of national courts that is hybrid in nature and directed to innoSometimes urgency will dictate prompt resolution of legal issues. Likewise, a sufficiently
high degree of conflict in any given situation may act as a barrier to efficient interchange.
In such cases, where the benefits of coordination do not outweigh the benefits of the individually preferred norms, Chapter 11 review could produce ddtente rather than productive
engagement. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66
S. CAL. L. REv. 2507, 2520 n.82 (1992) (arguing that limitations on power of state and
federal courts to force other court to accept its views may not result in dialogue).
227 See infra Part V.
228 See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political
Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INr'L ORG. 41, 41-42 (1993); see also Georges Abi-Saab,
Fragmentationor Unification, 31 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 919, 926-27 (1999) (suggesting
that international adjudication can spur cumulative process that "progressively condense[s]
and crystallize[s]" law). On this point, the pattern of interaction I describe diverges from
that of Cover and Aleinikoff, which is oriented more toward exposing the diversity of
perspectives on relevant issues and permitting the Supreme Court ultimately to resolve any
persistent conflict. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1053. In the absence of the
escape valve of a high court in the interaction of international tribunals and national
courts, I would argue that the exchange itself becomes the source of harmonization and not
simply a contributor to such harmonization. See supra note 225. Of course, even Cover
and Aleinikoff predict some convergence from the dialectic engagement of federal habeas
review, but of a more limited variety. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1053
(describing cooperation born of "mutual ability to frustrate").
229 See Harding, supra note 79, at 438-39. Harding explores the value of judicial dialogue with foreign courts and of comparative reasoning more generally. To analogous
effect, Alan Watson has written of "legal transplants," arguing that an understanding of
legal change is necessarily grounded in a study of historical borrowing (i.e., transplanting)
of foreign law. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATiVE LAW 95-97 (2d ed. 1993). Watson terms this the study of historical relationships in
law. Such borrowing, he argues, is the mechanism of legal change and evolution. See id.
The model of review I offer herein sits well with this notion. The proposed pattern might
thus be understood as a sharing of "foreign" law, through which Watson's transplantation,
and resulting legal evolution, may occur.
230 See Powell, supra note 225, at 251. International law has been a component of U.S.
law since the adoption of the Constitution. Yet it remains "foreign" to most Americans.
Id. Chapter 11 and its analogues may help to remedy this anomaly.
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vation, a final point regarding the nature of the relevant innovation
should be noted. In the simplest terms, Chapter 11 and similar international review might be understood as no more than a mechanism to

spotlight particular judicial failures in the national courts and thereby

23 1
prompt beneficial, but relatively conventional, error correction.
23 2
This is innovation of a sort, but only of the most limited variety.
With the emergence of some pattern of cases and resulting engagement, however, international review may go further to encourage gen233
uine learning.
U.S. courts appear to be increasingly receptive to a role for foreign and international jurisprudence in domestic adjudication. The
most recent, and rather dramatic, manifestation of this trend came in
the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas.2 34 In
Lawrence, the Court invoked as persuasive authority the ECHR's
rejection of Northern Ireland's sodomy laws in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom. 235 Further, the Court approvingly cited the amicus brief
filed by former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary
Robinson, 236 highlighting the brief's discussion of a U.N. Human
Rights Committee report criticizing U.S. sodomy statutes. Lastly, the
Court noted Australia's repeal of its own sodomy laws in response to
the Human Rights Committee's analysis.237 In its citation to international and foreign authority, moreover, Lawrence is far from
unique. 2 38

231 Cf. supra note 65 and accompanying text.
232 Analogously, Koh distinguishes "conformity" and "compliance" from "obedience."
See Koh, supra note 221, at 628.
233 Hopeful examples of intersystemic judicial learning abound, from the habeas cases
highlighted by Cover and Aleinikoff, see supra notes 163-84 and accompanying text, to the
analogous interactions of European supranational and national courts, see infra Part VI.B,
and perhaps even to the recent Chapter 11 tribunal-national court exchanges on a potential requirement of transparency under Chapter 11, see infra notes 438-45 and accompanying text.
234 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas, 44 VA. J.INT'L
L. 913, 915 (2004) (majority of Supreme Court "relied on an international tribunal decision
to interpret individual liberties embodied in the U.S. Constitution").
235 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
236 See id. at 576-77.
237 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 n.41 (2004) (describing discussion of Human Rights Committee in section of amicus brief cited by Supreme Court in Lawrence); see also Harold
Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 54 (2004)
(describing benefits of comparative and international analysis in judicial construction of
constitutional norms).
238 Other recent U.S. Supreme Court citations to foreign authority include Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-18 n.21 (2002); see also id. at 312 ("The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
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Anne-Marie Slaughter has framed the U.S. courts' growing
acknowledgment of foreign and international tribunals as suggestive
of the emergence of a "community of courts. '23 9 Slaughter observes
judges coming together in any number of ways, from meeting at
training programs and through judicial organizations to citing one
another's decisions and negotiating over complex multinational
cases.2 40 Given this interaction, judges increasingly see themselves as
24 1
fellow professionals, joined in a common international endeavor.
Some have challenged Slaughter's hypothesis. 242 Regardless, the
increased rate of citation and other patterns of interaction that she

identifies make clear that U.S. courts increasingly are amenable to
2 43
some dialogue of the conventional, horizontal variety.
From such horizontal dialogue, there is only a limited further leap

to the pattern of recurrent engagement necessary for meaningful
learning, rather than mere error correction, to occur. No less dramatic, if somewhat less heralded, than the Lawrence decision has been

numerous U.S. courts' receptivity to the teachings of the ICJ
regarding the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and application of the procedural default rule to violations of it.244 If such cases

are any indication, a recurrent pattern of interaction with international tribunals, analysis of and close reliance on the jurisprudence of
those tribunals, and the genuine learning that may be expected to
follow from this pattern, may not be anathema to U.S. courts. 245 In

fact, one might even construct an analysis in which national courts
encourage active engagement with international courts in order to
society." (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958))), and Knight v. Florida, 528
U.S. 990, 995-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("A growing number of courts outside the
United States . . . have held that lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty
renders ultimate execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel.").
239 See Slaughter, Community of Courts, supra note 87; see also Burke-White, supra
note 224, at 75-76; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary
Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 377 n.70 (1998) (noting "epistemic communities" of
courts).
240 See Slaughter, Community of Courts, supra note 87, at 192.
241 See id.
242 See, e.g., Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 521 (2000) (questioning "the role that differences in power
and resources may play in the dissemination of law through judicial networks, and the
function of these networks' informality and flexbility in promoting dialogue as opposed to
domination").
243 See supra note 90.
244 See infra notes 556-58 and accompanying text.
245 Of course, this result also will depend on the approach taken by international tribunals in the future, see infra Part VIA, and on the continued tolerance of state parties
toward such engagement, see id.
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advance their own institutional-and even doctrinal-agendas. 246

Ultimately, then, there is potential for genuine learning to displace
mere error correction as the end result of international review.

Even if a pattern of genuine learning is to emerge, however, the
essential nature of that process still might be questioned. At the simplest level, the learning of Chapter 11 and similar international review

of national courts arise from the offer of new ideas and frameworks
for the analysis of national courts. In this view, international review
facilitates learning through the provision of new information to
national courts. This is essentially the premise behind the encouragement of U.S. courts' study, appreciation, and even invocation of for-

eign jurisprudence in their analysis of domestic legal questions.
Foreign court decisions may offer alternative possibilities and

247
approaches, and thereby encourage beneficial innovation.
The interaction of Chapter 11 and similar international tribunals
with national courts goes beyond such dialogic consideration of extrajurisdictional precedent. 248 As such, the relevant learning process is

also distinct. The learning (or innovation) of Chapter 11 and similar
review has some grounding in the obligation imposed on the national
courts to grapple with the new information offered by the international tribunal. International review as described herein thus refuses
to leave the relevant learning to chance. Recall that in Chapter 11

and similar institutional regimes, neither court can ignore its counter246 Cf Commerce Official Sees U.S. Courts Leaning on WTO Panels for Precedent,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 12, 2004, at 9 (noting U.S. courts' assertion of "Charming Betsy"
doctrine to permit reliance on WTO precedent). But see Timken Co. v. United States, 354
F.3d 1344, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (declining to apply WTO decision, under Charming Betsy
doctrine, to strike down U.S. Department of Commerce's "zeroing" practice). In the
European context, Karen Alter has theorized that lower national courts embraced the
ECJ's preliminary reference procedure, see infra notes 581-90 and accompanying text, as a
way to pursue their goals of social reform and extend their institutional authority. By
assisting in the expansion of the universe of European law binding on member states, and
thereby enhancing the range of substantive rules and rights that demanded adjudication
and protection by the courts, the lower national courts were able to extend their jurisdiction. Further, lower court preliminary references offered a mechanism by which the latter
might resist the will of appellate courts superior to them in their national judicial hierarchy.
See ALTER, supra note 102, at 47-50.
The mildly coercive nature of the Chapter 11 pattern of learning I suggest below, see
infra Parts IV.A.1 & B.l.a, is not inconsistent with the potential receptivity of U.S. courts
to such review. Such learning is somewhat coercive for national courts, in its imposition of
an obligation to engage with the international lesson being offered. It is also voluntary,
however, as to the extent and the nature of any internalization of that lesson.
247 See Note, The InternationalJudicial Dialogue: When Domestic ConstitutionalCourts
Join the Conversation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2052 (2001) ("[D]omestic courts engage in
the dialogue because they view outside jurisprudence as a helpful resource that indicates
how other courts have dealt with similar legal issues.").
248 See supra Part II.B.
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part systematically. 249 While a court may do so in any given case, over
time the costs of such a strategy undermine its viability. Learning may
be voluntary under the scheme I propose, then, but attendance is not.
The learning characteristic of the pattern of interaction outlined
herein, then, is neither a voluntary borrowing of international
approaches and views by domestic courts nor a direct imposition of
international views on domestic courts. Rather, consistent with the
structural design of such review, the resulting learning is a product of
the relevant courts' recurrent interaction and of the institutional need
for each court to listen and respond to the other. The particular efficacy of international review as a mode of judicial innovation consequently rests on its careful balance of hierarchy and comity.
IV
TOWARD A HYBRID MODEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The international review of national courts under Chapter 11 and
analogous international regimes would appear to be minimally characterized by a mix of retrospective review of the national court decision
and some prospective orientation toward legal innovation and reform.
International review of national courts, as outlined herein, also
exhibits some limited pattern of bidirectionality, in that each tribunal
speaks within a given case and over a series of cases to the legal norms
or questions of interest. Most importantly, the pattern of review
explored herein is distinguished from most international legal process
by the presence of some degree of international judicial power. Such
power amounts to something less than the power of appeal, but something more than conventional judicial dialogue.
As such, the international review of national courts under
Chapter 11 and similar regimes constitutes a hybrid pattern of judicial
interaction, combining elements of both dialogue and appellate
review. I label this pattern "dialectical review," acknowledging both
the judicial dialogue at its heart and its dynamic of review. 250 Collectively, these elements suggest a dialectic of recurrent engagement
among international tribunals and national courts, in which thesis and
antithesis ultimately yield-in the crucible of effective judicial innovation-a synthesis of harmonized legal norms. In its hybrid character,
249 See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
250 Cf. Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a TransnationalConstitution, 75

AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1981) (describing interaction of ECJ with European national courts as
"complex dialectic process"). Such a pattern of interaction is somewhat akin to Slaughter's
characterization of vertical governmental networks, in which supranational and national
authorities act in coordination to pursue a variety of regulatory ends. See SLAUGHTER,
supra note 57, at 21.
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such review is analogous both to federal habeas review of state court
criminal convictions and to the various forms of judicial dicta discussed above-analogies which point to judicial innovation as a critical function of dialectical review.
Given these broad characteristics, three features can be identified
as central to the creation and operation of an effective regime of dialectical review. The incorporation of these features into regimes of
international review of national courts can help to ensure the emergence of a pattern of dialectical review and resulting judicial innovation. Existing regimes such as Chapter 11 might therefore be
enhanced to better exhibit these features, while new regimes of inter-

national adjudication are constructed with them in mind.
A.

The Elements of Dialectical Review

If there is to be some occasion for international review of
national courts-some transnational judicial engagement with some
dimension of both review and power-what should be its precise character? How should it be designed to best facilitate the ends of innovation identified above? How might those ends be achieved without

unnecessarily challenging values of national sovereignty, and thereby
risking a backlash against relevant international regimes?
To address these questions, we can look to both Chapter 11 and
beyond for counsel.2 5 1 We have seen that Chapter 11 and similar
international regimes constitute a hybrid pattern of judicial interaction that lies between appellate review and dialogue. Domestic interactions which are similarly hybrid in nature may thus offer guidance

on the form of an idealized pattern of international review of national
courts or, as I term it, dialectical review. 252 We therefore can again
look to Warren Court-era federal habeas corpus review of state court
criminal convictions 253 and appellate courts' affirmative use of dicta to
251 Such inference from structure might be credited to constitutional law scholar Charles
Black. See Martinez, supra note 3, at 456 (citing CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1985)). Black suggests that, in addition to

textual analysis and reliance on judicial precedent, inference from structure represents a
third method of constitutional interpretation. See BLACK, supra, at 23-32.
252 Certain other international judicial interactions also have hybrid qualities, as I will
suggest in Part VI.B, and might further contribute to an understanding of the ideal nature
of a pattern of dialectical review. That analysis, however, is largely beyond the scope of
this Article.
253 It bears reiterating that Cover's model of jurisdictional redundancy and his and
Aleinikoff's model of dialectical federalism were derived from a habeas regime that no
longer exists. Given its parallels to that regime, however, one might venture to characterize Chapter 11 as a building block of a "new habeas." See Kathleen Patchel, The New
Habeas, 42 HAST. L.J. 939, 943 (1991). It should also be noted that the analogy to federal
habeas review of state courts emphasized herein is not meant to diminish the lessons one
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communicate with lower courts, to further define the operation of a
regime of dialectical review between international and national courts.
These patterns are not identical to the international review of national
courts, but as analogies, they offer useful lessons.
Drawing on these twin analogies, as well as Chapter 11 itself, one
can identify three essential features of an effective pattern of international engagement with national courts: (1) the operation of a bipolar
power dynamic, in which both judicial participants possess some
capacity for control, and hence power, but neither can assert complete
authority over the other; (2) the presence of alternative, and perhaps
competing, legal and institutional perspectives; and (3) the existence
of structures designed to encourage and facilitate adjudicatory continuity. With these in place, Chapter 11 and similar international
review can be expected to persist and to produce the benefits of efficient innovation. As we will see, Chapter 11 exhibits these features to
a significant-yet incomplete-degree, as revealed by its institutional
254
design and judicial decisions surrounding Chapter 11 to date.
1.

An Equipoise of Power

Perhaps the most essential characteristic of a pattern of dialectical review, or at least its most significant distinguishing trait, is its
incorporation of an element of international judicial power. It is thus
unique in its inclusion of some international capacity to effectuate
judgments without regard to the consent or cooperation of the
national judicial institution. 255 In essence, dialectical review takes
might derive from other opportunities for federal and state court interaction under modern
jurisdictional rules in the United States. This includes U.S. Supreme Court review of state
supreme court decisions. Other forms of collateral review might also be analogized to the
pattern of engagement explored herein.
254 In important respects, the model of dialectical review I describe herein echoes Koh's
model of "transnational legal process." See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1996). Most importantly, the dynamic and normative
characteristics of Koh's model are in line with the reliance of dialectical review on a
dynamic balance of judicial power, as well as the primary orientation of such review to
legal innovation. See id. at 184.
255 As we turn to the elements of dialectical review as a potential paradigm of intersystemic judicial interaction, given the institutional design of Chapter 11, it is useful to
acknowledge other possible trajectories of such interaction within the construct of Chapter
11. To begin with, the relevant national and international judicial systems might simply
ignore one another. While the presence of some degree of judicial power on each side
increases the cost of such a strategy, it does not preclude it. A prime example of such
disregard is the interaction-or non-interaction-of federal and state courts with tribal
courts in the United States. See supra note 186. Notwithstanding the apparent capacity of
each to interfere with the efficacy of the other, these courts have largely avoided meaningful engagement with one another. See Carl H. Johnson, A Comity of Errors: Why John
v. Baker is Only a Tentative First Step in the Right Direction, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2001).
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from the pole of appellate review some element of power in the inter-

national tribunal's approach to the relevant national court. 256 In
Chapter 11, this is manifested in the tribunals' non-trivial capacity to
effectuate the ends articulated in their judgment, a power ordinarily
absent in international adjudication. 257 Yet such power is far from
unalloyed. It is not solely appellate in nature, but includes a dimension of dialogue-of cooperative exchange-as well.2 58 Dialectical
review involves a dynamic distribution of power between internaIt is often easier for state courts to ignore tribal court decisions than to undertake the difficult task of interpreting and applying unfamiliar tribal law. It may
also be easier for state courts to ignore tribal court decisions out of some
underlying, yet mistaken, belief that tribal courts are inherently illegitimate.
Id. at 38; see B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts Into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging
Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-FederalCourt Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457,
461-63 (1998) (describing inconsistent federal court standards for deference to tribal court
interpretations); see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional Determinations: Towards Co-existence, Understanding and Respect Between Different Culturaland JudicialNorms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191, 208-211 (1994) (advocating reexamination of extent of deference of federal courts to tribal court jurisdictional determinations); Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403,
405-06 (2004) ("[Uinlike state courts, whose convictions and sentences are given due
respect by the United States Sentencing Commission . . .in sentencing for subsequent
federal offenses, past offenses adjudicated by tribal courts are ignored in the federal sentencing process.").
Besides the prospect of disregard, the institutional design of Chapter 11-driven interaction between national and international tribunals also might trigger greater polarization
of the paired systems. Rather than irrelevant, as in the latter approach, the opposing judicial system might come to be seen as just that, in every sense of the word. Each system, in
this case, would mark the other as its counterpoint, or competitor, producing further
entrenchment of positions and views, rather than cooperation or convergence. These alternatives, however, exhibit both descriptive and normative shortcomings. They either cut
against (if not contradict) the design of Chapter 11 or they fail to maximize the potential
returns of Chapter 11 review of national courts, whether as a source of innovation or
otherwise.
256 Of course, even appellate review need not mean absolute hierarchical authority. See
Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a
Negative Picture, 3 JUST. Sys. J. 208, 212-14 (1978) (suggesting that while lower courts
generally accept obligation to adopt Supreme Court decisions, when Court undertakes significant new direction in policy, as in Southern desegregation cases, lower court judges are
most likely to resist Court decisions); Songer et al., supra note 66, at 692-93 (suggesting
ability of circuit courts to find outlets to express policy preferences).
257 See supra Part II.B; infra Part IV.B.1.a.
258 This constraint is suggested by the extent to which Chapter 11 tribunals, as well as
federal habeas courts, bespeak caution about their limited jurisdiction, intervening based
not on mere error, but only subject to a higher standard of review. See, e.g., Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990) (upholding "reasonable, good-faith interpretations of
existing precedents made by state courts"); Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 675, 705, [ 132 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
2003) (applying "manifest injustice" standard), available at http://www.naftalaw.org. A
related constraint, also evident in both Chapter 11 and habeas, is an emphasis on finality.
See Butler, 494 U.S. at 431 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'This Court has never held... that
finality, standing alone, provides a sufficient reason for federal courts to compromise their
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tional and national courts, in which each can exercise some authority
vis-A-vis its counterpart but is simultaneously constrained by the
59
latter.2
Within this scheme, neither court can impose its will on the
other,2 60 producing a degree of incident autonomy within an overall
pattern of systemic dependence. Thus, within the Warren Court's
26 1
approach to federal habeas review of state criminal convictions
from which Cover and Aleinikoff drew their model of beneficial jurisdictional redundancy, state courts could impose the substantial costs
of conviction, and the attendant costs of appeal and habeas review, on
individual defendants and the federal courts. 262 Federal courts, however, could direct the release or retrial of any given criminal defendant on habeas review. 263 Each institution thus enjoyed some element

protection of constitutional rights under § 2254.' Until today." (internal citation omitted));
infra note 501 and accompanying text.
259 See REISMAN, supra note 66, at 2 ("Controls effected by balances may dispense with
hierarchies; they depend, for their effectiveness, on power parities."). It bears noting that
Reisman's analysis is directed at the narrower task of "control," while the present analysis
speaks to the broader form of review he would characterize as "appeal." See id. at 8-9.
260 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1049, 1052-53 (describing interplay of
federal and state courts); see also Wright & Miller, supra note 14, at 660-61, 697. It bears
emphasis that the model of habeas described by Cover and Aleinikoff is largely a historical
curiosity. It was already disappearing as they wrote amidst a series of Burger Court habeas
rulings. The final nail in the coffin came with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989),
and its retroactivity rules.
261 See Cover, supra note 14, at 648. Cover and Aleinikoff's theory was grounded in a
defense of redundant litigation in the federal and state courts. See id. at 1043-44. As a
concept, "redundancy" originated in the technology literature. See Matthew Tuchband,
The Systematic Environmental Externalities of Free Trade: A Call for Wiser Trade Decisionmaking, 83 GEO. L.J. 2099, 2111 (1995) (suggesting that "theory of redundancy
originated in the fields of information science and neural networks (cybernetics)"). At
heart, the notion of redundancy is directed to the goal of achieving the identical results
even where some component of a given system fails. See id. at 2110-11 (applying redundancy ideal to international trade flows with multiple global producers, thereby challenging
preference for comparative advantage-driven specialization); see also Juarrero-Roqud,
supra note 138, at 1765 (noting that "context-free" redundancy-in which message is
repeated to improve accuracy of transmission-produces stability at cost of limiting message variety). Cover essentially suggested the benefit of this concept in seeking to understand institutional redundancy generally, and particularly in the context of federal habeas
review of state criminal convictions. See Cover, supra note 14, at 642, 648. See generally
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 30-31 (1991) (describing application of
mechanisms of redundancy in various areas).
262 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1052-53. Thus, "[w]hile the state court
pays a price in released prisoners, it can exact a price from the federal court by frustrating
the court's objectives in the majority of cases which will never eventuate in a petition for
federal habeas corpus." Id. at 1053.
263 See id. at 1052 (pointing out that no decision may stand unless both federal and state
courts concur).
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of incident autonomy.2 64 On the other hand, each institution also
faced a systemic dependence on its counterpart. For state courts,
effectuation of the policy choices of its criminal law depended on fed-

eral courts' willingness not to undo systematically the convictions
achieved at some cost in trial and appeal. 265 Even with the opportunity for retrial, such costs would often prove prohibitive. Yet because
such an aggressive pattern of habeas review would consume substantial federal court resources and was therefore unattractive to the federal judiciary as well, 266 the federal goal of institutional reform was
similarly hostage to some degree of state court cooperation with the
267
federal courts' constitutional constructions.
What is the utility of a dimension of power in an international
regime of dialectical review? Several benefits might be suggested
264 The Warren Court-era federal court, by dint of its later temporal position in the
habeas process, arguably enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in any individual case than
the state court. Nonetheless, state prosecutors' ability to retry criminal defendants produced some rough equilibrium of incident autonomy.
265 See id. at 1052 (explaining state courts' incentive to take federal decisions seriously);
cf. Caminker, supra note 66, at 80 (describing systemic dependence of Supreme Court and
lower courts on one another).
266 Federal courts would thus have been buried under a tidal wave of time-consuming
habeas litigation if state courts had elected a strategy of consistent resistance to federal
court interpretations of constitutional guarantees. Even if the federal courts had found this
unobjectionable, they still would be constrained by the fact that most state criminal convictions are never challenged in the federal courts. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at
1053.
267 See id. at 1052-53 (observing that lower federal courts' lack of supervisory power
over state courts meant that reform strategies of federal courts could be blocked by state
court non-acquiescence to federally articulated constitutional rules in later state prosecutions). This result arises from the fact that lower federal courts' decisions, however directly
relevant they might be, are not binding on state courts. Id. The federal courts are further
constrained by the sequential character of state and federal review, as it binds them to state
court findings of fact. See id. Notably, a similar balance might be posited in the interaction
between the ECJ, the ECHR, and the national courts of Europe. See SLAUGHTER, supra

note 57, at 68, 82 ("Here is a system of vertical checks and balances."); see also id. at 84
(suggesting that in interaction of ECJ with national courts, "each court is a check on the
other, but not a decisive one"); King, supra note 191, at 720-22. Joseph Weiler has
referred to this balance of power as a mechanism of "autointerpretation," given the continued autonomy of national courts, even in the face of the genuine power of the ECJ. See
J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 299-308 (1999).
It bears noting that among the most important variations between the internationaldomestic dialectic I develop and the habeas dialectic of Cover and Aleinikoff is the
absence of any ultimate referee within the present model. Cover and Aleinikoff's pattern
of engagement relies on an initial intervention by the Supreme Court and on the Court's
ultimate willingness to step in to bring the dialogue to a close. See Cover & Aleinikoff,
supra note 14, at 1048-49. The international-domestic dialectic is even more essential, in
this sense, given the lack of any alternative judicial avenue by which collective norms might
be developed. In the international-domestic case of dialectical review, there are neither
"foreordained answers," nor foregone conclusions.
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using Chapter 11 as an operative example. At the most basic level,
placement of meaningful power in the hands of Chapter 11 and similar
international tribunals is consistent with the rule of law. Non-judicial
domestic authorities increasingly have faced the constraints of international judicial review by the WTO, a growing number of human
rights tribunals, and even international criminal tribunals. The pattern of more assertive review proposed herein simply extends that
trend to national judiciaries as well. It appreciates that just as the
domestic rule of law is advanced by intra-judicial mechanisms of control (i.e., appellate review), the international rule of law can also be
enhanced by such controls (e.g., dialectical review).
But the importance of power in Chapter 11 review of national
courts can also be understood in more mundane terms. The minimal
efficacy of Chapter 11 and similar mechanisms of intersystemic adjudication may depend on such power. Recall that the judicial engagement of which we speak is one in which the subject judicial system is
placed under a microscope of close review, from which sharp criticism
may potentially emerge. Such review, it seems safe to predict, is
unlikely to be well-received, at least in most instances. In the conventional terms, national courts are unlikely to welcome a dialogue with
international critics on Chapter 11 and similar tribunals. Less voluntary mechanisms of international intervention may therefore be necessary if there is to be any interaction at all.
The power of the Chapter 11 tribunal, in essence, allows it to
command the attention of a national court. It permits issues to be put
on the table even without the voluntary-let alone enthusiastic-participation of the relevant national court. Even after forcing an issue
into debate, moreover, the power of dialectical review may remain
essential to the emergence of a recurrent pattern of interaction and
the resulting prospect of gradual domestic reform. 268 The power of
Chapter 11 review may undermine the avoidance mechanisms of the
passive virtues, 269 but with good reason.
If the rule of law and the functionality of a system of international review require power, why institute the bilateral power scheme
268 In operational terms, the power of Chapter 11 tribunals to bring an issue back for
consideration in subsequent cases allows it to employ Sunstein's "minimalism," see Cass R.
Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1996) (defining
"minimalism" as pervasive practice of "doing and saying as little as necessary to justify an
outcome"), a pattern appropriate to intersystemic adjudication, especially across national
borders. In slightly different terms, some degree of international judicial power may also
help to address the need for adjudicatory continuity identified below. See infra Part
IV.A.3.
269 See BICKEL, supra note 15, at 111-13 (praising restraint by Supreme Court in face of
contested constitutional questions).
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described above, in which we observe a balance of power between the
participating judicial institutions? Why, in the terms of the present
analysis, introduce an element of dialogue into a regime of appellate
review, and thus arrive at the proposed system of dialectical review,
rather than simply accepting a regime of international appeal? In
light of the goals that I assume, would a system of appellate review
not be even better?
Review across jurisdictional systems, rather than within a single
legal system, may preclude a hierarchical pattern of direct review, of
"appeal" to an external institution.2 7 0 Such intersystemic review may
depend for its legitimacy-and consequently its functionality-on
some affirmation of the independence, autonomy, and power of the
system under review. 27' Just as a commitment to the rule of law and
the functionality of a system of extrinsic review require that the international or other external tribunal enjoy meaningful power-i.e.,
something more than dialogue-necessary acceptance of a system of
extrinsic review may require that the courts subject to review not be
272
rendered powerless, as through a system of ordinary appeal.
270 In habeas, for example, one might note the multifarious constitutional limitations
that have been asserted to preclude more aggressive review of state criminal trials. See
Jordan Steiker, Habeas Exceptionalism, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1703, 1704-05 (2000) (discussing
Congress's constriction of federal court authority to adjudicate federal rights in habeas).
In Cover and Aleinikoff's historical analysis, state criminal law was not susceptible to the
equitable approach utilized by the Warren Court in reapportionment and civil rights cases.
"Direct action" against the relevant state actor in the administration of criminal law, as
opposed to those responsible for the maintenance of segregation, simply was not feasible.
See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1039, 1041 (citing constraints imposed by narrow
construction of civil rights removal statute and equitable restraint, among other factors).
271 Cf. Martinez, supra note 3, at 466-67. In this vein, it is important to appreciate that
the most important party-in-interest in Chapter 11 review-the national court-is absent
from the proceedings. See supra note 188. Of course, courts ordinarily do not have a voice
in subsequent judicial proceedings, beyond the conventional mechanism of judicial communication-the initial court's decision. Yet, if the Chapter 11 system of review is correctly understood to be oriented as much to jurisprudential evolution as to individual case
decision, see supra Part III, then a constrained role for the court reviewed appears problematic. More interactive and ongoing involvement by the national court therefore might
warrant consideration. One might imagine, for example, some mechanism of referral or
reference, by which the views and participation of the national court might be solicited.
See, e.g., infra note 608. Even more dramatically, one might imagine a place for the
national court as an adjunct to the reviewing court-a special master of sorts.
272 The incorporation of an element of dialogue can thus be expected to soften the hierarchical appearance of a system of collateral review. See Althouse, supra note 136, at 938.
Concerns with such review are unlikely to disappear completely, nor should they. Under
Chapter 11, for example, given the necessary chronology of the pattern of review, some
implied hierarchy favoring the international tribunal survives. Cf. id. at 941-42 (noting
that federal judges "speak second" in habeas dialogue). But this remaining pattern of hierarchy is mitigated by the very keen sense of restraint that follows from a dialectical, versus
an error correction, model of review. This is readily apparent in Chapter 11 arbitral decisions themselves, which make clear the tribunals' sense of their status as courts of limited
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The preservation of an element of dialogue in Chapter 11 and

similar regimes, notwithstanding the introduction of some dimension
of power, also may be preferable to pure hierarchy, given the strategic
dynamic among the relevant judicial interlocutors. Thus, where

neither judicial system can dictate ultimate outcomes, as in Chapter
the paired systems may, at least sometimes, face a coordinationgame dynamic. 274 In the classical paradigm of the Battle of the Sexes,
11,273

each court may prefer its own policy position (whether on process or
substance), but prefer coordination on a common policy (even if it is
the other system's position) over an even more inefficient divergence
of policies. 2 75 In such a coordination-driven strategic environment,
dialectical review may be adequate to achieve desired ends without
276
need for more costly and invasive direct review.
Preservation of the reviewed court's judicial power may therefore

be both necessary to overcome resistance to intersystemic judicial
review and consistent with a potential coordination dynamic across
judicial systems. More broadly, the balance of power that I outline
and a concomitant preference for dialectical over direct review comports with the nature of intersystemic judicial review. By definition,
such review involves distinct realms of expertise and experience. This
is essential to the goal of innovation highlighted above as the desirable
ends of the type of judicial interaction explored herein. 277 Given this
diversity of expertise, a distribution of power designed to force each
side to actively consider and draw on the wisdom of the other is necesjurisdiction. The best evidence of this conception may be Loewen, in which the tribunal
called sharp attention to its unwillingness to go as far as it wished, given its limited
authority under Chapter 11. See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD INvEsTMENT 675, 731 242 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003),
available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
273 See generally infra Part IV.B.1.a.
274 See John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, A PrudentialTheory for Providinga Forum
for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 488-90 (2001) (describing
coordination-game dynamic in litigation of federal just compensation claims).
275 See Ahdieh, Law's Signal, supra note 141, at 240 n.102. In the Battle of the Sexes,
husband and wife are eager to spend an evening together, but one would like to go to the
ballet, while the other would like to see a boxing match. See id.
276 See id. But see id. at 239-45 (discussing limitations of several potential mechanisms
for resolving coordination games). One might also favor the restrained power of dialectical review over the broader power of appeal, given some analogy to the nature of
domestic constitutional review. Cf Katyal, supra note 15, at 1711. The same concerns of
sovereignty and democracy that favor a more advisory approach to the constitutional
review of the U.S. Supreme Court may encourage a similar approach in the dialectical
review of Chapter 11. See id.
277 See supra Part III; see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 147-48 (describing need to
maintain balance of power between supranational and national authorities).
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sarily to be preferred. In such a system, each institution can best con27 8
tribute its piece.
2. Alternative Legal and Institutional Perspectives
If dialectical review takes an element of international judicial
power from its vertical/hierarchical/appellate character, what does it
take from the horizontal dialogue that constitutes the other half of its
hybrid character? I would highlight the centrality of alternative-if
not competing-judicial perspectives. Here, again, one might speak
of balance: The functionality of dialectical judicial engagement rests
on the existence of some diversity of perspective across the relevant
judicial systems. 279 As we will see, dialectic review also requires some
degree of commonality around which borrowing and learning may
occur. 280 To begin with, however, we might identify two sources of the
diverse perspectives necessary for effective dialectical review: diversity of law and diversity of institutional context.
Perhaps most importantly, an effective pattern of dialectical
review in the interaction of international and domestic tribunals relies
on distinct legal perspectives. More specifically, judicial dialogue is
most commonly grounded in some diversity in sources of law. In the
transnational borrowing among constitutional courts, for example, the
potential for beneficial innovation arises from differences in the legal
authorities upon which each court relies. Similarly, in habeas review,
federal courts' orientation to federal rather than state law and to constitutional rather than criminal law might be cited.
Yet the relevant sources of law cannot be entirely divergent.
They must instead be at least partially overlapping if they are to pro278 Each of these arguments for a dialectical rather than direct (or appellate) pattern of
review-to enhance legitimacy, to align the system more closely with the strategic dynamic
at work, and to build on distinct expertise-is enhanced where the relevant pattern of

review occurs not merely across systems (as in federal review of state courts), but across
national borders as well. The need for sensitivity is yet greater in the transnational interaction of federal states, such as the United States, Canada, and Mexico. See Perez, supra

note 202, at 406-07 (describing need for ICJ to be conscious of federal character of states
subject to court judgments).
279 Cover and Aleinikoff have spoken, in more general terms, of the need for "two distinct voices" in the habeas dialogue. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1049

("[D]ialogue requires ... that there be two distinct voices."); cf Schapiro, supra note 136,
at 1416.
280 See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human
Rights Law, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 38, 53 (2003) (describing European fundamental rights

jurisprudence as playing off tension between "the commonality of Europe and the particularity of national and local identity"). For a general discussion of the relationship between
commonality and effective discourse, see ROBERT C. STALNAKER, CONTEXT AND CONTENT 48-49 (1999).
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vide a common ground for discourse. 28 1 Again, this is evident in
habeas, where both judicial systems ultimately are oriented to federal
constitutional requirements and where even state constitutional provisions may be interpreted with reference to parallel federal norms.
The same also is true in the dissemination of human rights norms,
282
which often draw on the same ultimate sources of law.
Distinct institutional contexts are a further important source of

283
the diverse perspectives that underlie effective dialectical review.

The framework within which any given court adjudicates is likely to
be important to the perspective it brings to its judicial interactions.
Even judges at home in both systems-retired U.S. judges who sit on
Chapter 11 tribunals or state court judges who are appointed to the
federal bench, for example-are likely to come to any given issue with
a distinct perspective depending on where they sit.284
In describing the distinct perspectives of federal and state courts,

Cover and Aleinikoff have spoken of "utopian" versus "pragmatic"
perspectives respectively. 28 5 In slightly different terms, Ann Althouse
speaks of adjudication grounded in an ideology of neutrality, which
she identifies in federal habeas review, as opposed to an ideology of

28 6
context, which is more characteristic of the state criminal trial.

Ultimately, such perspectives are a product of the surrounding judicial
culture, the composition of the given bench, and the nature of the
281 In the comparative law literature, Alan Watson has highlighted the need for some
degree of identity in order for comparison to be useful. See WATSON, supra note 229, at 5.
282 Cf. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 290-91.
283 See Schapiro, supra note 136, at 1451 ("Federal courts could help guarantee that
state constitutional provisions do not languish unenforced. Federal courts could not reject
state constitutional precedent, but they could provide a valuable alternative perspective,
rooted in a different institutional context."); cf Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 675, 727-28, TT 231-233 (NAFTA Ch.
11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
284 Judith Resnick has sought to apply a dialogic concept of review to the interaction of
federal and state systems in the area of family law:
To the extent that two court systems are populated by judges empowered by
differing institutional arrangements (life tenure, appointment, and election)
and working in contexts with different ideologies, their simultaneous and, to
some extent, redundant exploration of issues of family life provide opportunities for confirmation of shared norms, as well as for dialogue about the disjunctions that emerge.
Judith Resnick, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,and the Federal Courts,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1758 (1991).
285 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1051. The federal courts' utopian perspective
is oriented to the protection of constitutional rights and notions of fair and limited government. Id. at 1051-52. The state courts' pragmatic perspective, by contrast, is focused on
the day-to-day administration of justice. Id.
286 See Althouse, supra note 136, at 939. Ultimately, Althouse questions the actual
extent of difference between these ideologies. See id. at 941.
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cases at bar, among other factors. 287 Brought into contact with one
another, such varied perspectives might be credited with helping to

produce the constitutional jurisprudence of U.S. criminal procedure
and may yet encourage development of the international norms of
288
due process to which I would target Chapter 11 review.
The composition of the relevant bench, finally, also can be

expected to contribute to distinct institutional contexts and a resulting
range in perspective. In the case of Chapter 11 review, by way of
example, the different nationalities of the relevant adjudicators on the

tribunals and in the national courts, as well as their distinct training
and background, can be expected to contribute to distinct perspectives
289
on the questions presented.
Importantly for our purposes, the need for distinct perspectives
does not rely on any notion of "superior" court review. It is not, as
such, a question of parity or the lack thereof.290 Nor does it turn on

any preference for non-ideological adjudication versus ideological
adjudication. Rather, both perspectives are valued in a pattern of dialectical review, and are, in fact, likely to be rebalanced in different
1
ways across different cases. 29
3.

Continuity of Adjudication

The final characteristic of dialectical review-adjudicatory continuity-draws on aspects of both vertical appeal and horizontal dialogue. 292 To begin with, the hierarchical dimension of international287 Distinct perspectives also may be created by distinct procedural and access rules in
different judicial systems, which give rise to particular types of claims, litigants, and the
like. See Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural
Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 552 (1984) (suggesting as much in context of federal
standing limitations). Diversity in procedural rules therefore may facilitate a dialectic pattern of exchange.
288 See infra Part V. Competing perspectives are likewise at the heart of several of
Katyal's advicegiving forms, including exemplification, demarcation, and prescription. See
Katyal, supra note 15, at 1718-19.
289 Cover speaks of jurisdictional redundancy's efficacy being dependant on judges in
the alternative systems coming from different social groups. See Cover, supra note 14, at
665. Further, he identifies federal versus state court judges as being drawn from national
versus local elites respectively, with resulting educational and referential experiences. See
id. The two groups may, he suggests, vary in their "[l]evels of education, bonds of loyalty,
status, and even economic class." Id.
290 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593,
593 (1991) (describing debate of parity, or lack thereof, between federal and state courts).
291 See Althouse, supra note 136, at 939 (describing value of dual perspectives, without
regard to relative superiority).
292 While Cover and Aleinikoff identify elements of power and perspective analogous to
those described above, they do not explicitly highlight issues of continuity. See Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 14 (describing process by which state and federal courts struggle for
dominance).
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domestic judicial interaction favors an assessment of the same underlying case, or common nucleus of facts. 293 Such is the essence of
"review." Identity of the relevant case, or at least its essential factual

predicate, is likely to maximize the functionality of any pattern of dialectical review.2 94 In Cover and Aleinikoff's model of habeas review,
litigation of the relevant constitutional norm with reference to the
same criminal defendant helps to ensure that the dialogue is at its
sharpest. 295 By eliminating ambiguities arising from the distinguishing

traits of different cases, the force of the dialectical exchange in any
given case, and ultimately across cases, is likely to increase. Treatment of the same case also encourages a stronger dynamic of

exchange, given the second court's access to the decision of the initial
court. 296 With greater case continuity, a more effective engagement
can be predicted.
The dialogic element of dialectical review, meanwhile, requires

some continuity of litigation across cases. For a dialogue to be effective, it must involve a series of opportunities for engagement across a
pattern of cases and a period of time.2 97 No single case, or even limited quantity of cases, can suffice to provide the evolutionary infrastructure of a functional pattern of dialectical review. 298 The
progressively developmental nature of both dialogue itself, and the

product (i.e., subject) of that dialogue, depends on the existence of a
293 This is the "diachronic or sequential redundancy" described by Cover, in which
review occurs seriatim. See Cover, supra note 14, at 648. It is distinguished from "synchronic redundancy," where review is simultaneous. See id. at 646-47.
294 Cf Beermann, supra note 220, at 335 n.232 (suggesting potential for both federal and
state courts to learn from study of each other's treatment of related cases).
295 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1048 ("The dialogue becomes most intense
when state and federal court systems both have input into the resolution of a single dispute."); see also King, supra note 191, at 731-32 (suggesting quality of ECJ advice results
partially from presentation of facts in concrete context).
296 See Cover, supra note 14, at 678.
297 See id. at 681. Additionally, Slaughter posits that an increased quantity of transnational interactions among courts facilitates the conception of an integrated system of courts
across the globe. This conception reduces the degree of "deference" among courts, but
enhances the extent of dialogue. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 85-86, 94; see also id. at
92 (suggesting that courts' sense of identity with foreign tribunals diminishes deference).
298 Katyal's judicial-advisory mechanisms of exemplification and demarcation likewise
assume some succession of cases. See Katyal, supra note 15, at 1718-19. Exemplification,
for example, involves the coupling of the decision to strike down a given legal act with
advice as to what provisions the court will uphold in future litigation. See id. In even more
basic terms, a succession of cases is essential to the success of dialectical review, given the
need for each court in that relationship to reason progressively with the other court.
Unlike direct review, dialectical review depends on effective argumentation. See supra
note 214. A single presentation of any given argument is relatively unlikely to be effective.
Rather, effective articulation can be expected to require some succession of argument,
counterargument, and response.
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sufficient pattern of cases to allow gradual evolution rather than
abrupt breaks with prior precedent. 2 99 This is evident in habeas jurisprudence, in which most constitutional norms progressively emerged
over an array of cases and a number of years. 30 0 An even better
example may be the extended interaction of the ECJ and the German
3 01
Constitutional Court over a period of more than twenty years.
A third and final element of continuity in dialectical review is the
need for a degree of what I would term "institutional" continuity. In
some sense, this final element arises from both the appellate and the
dialogic dimensions of dialectical review. An effective pattern of dialectical review necessarily requires the presence of repeat players to
participate in a process of legal innovation. 30 2 Through such repeat
participation, institutional participants can be expected to develop a
growing appreciation of the dynamic within which they are operating
and an expertise in its subject matter. This emerged in the habeas
context because of the substantial number of relevant cases and their
ultimate concentration in state high courts and federal courts of
appeals. In the Chapter 11 context, on the other hand, as I will suggest below, this is arguably the weakest element of the institutional
design and one that warrants significant adjustment and enhancement.
Institutional continuity is essential to the functionality of dialectical review. Such review inevitably will involve the prospect of
review, as in the certiorari review of the U.S. Supreme Court, but limited incidence of it. Hence, it relies on the combination of both a convincing dialogue and the threat of review in order to produce desired
outcomes. 30 3 This pattern requires the expectation of a persistent
299 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 301 ("A court that is scarcely used, for
whatever reason, cannot hope to make much of a mark.").
300 Continuity can operate across cases, of course, only so long as the same core issues
are presented in the various cases. See Steinglass, supra note 287, at 551-52.

301 See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 310-11; see also infra note 583. Over a line
of cases, extended over several decades, the ECJ progressively convinced the German
court of its commitment to the fundamental rights of German citizens and the democratic
values of the German state. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 310-11; see also infra
note 583.
302 See REISMAN, supra note 66, at 7-8 (noting detrimental impact of randomness of
arbitrator combinations on international control systems).
303 See Songer et al., supra note 66, at 693. The authors note that:
The extreme rarity of reversals may at first appear to pose a challenge to a
principal-agent analysis of the judicial hierarchy. But the 'paradox' of (relatively) effective control and rare reversals is more apparent than real. If an
appeals court anticipates that it will be sanctioned in the form of a reversal, the
anticipated response will keep the court in check.

Id.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

2100

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2029

fidelity to the rules in place and their predictable application by the
30 4
relevant tribunal upon review.

Institutional continuity is also important to the legitimacy of dialectical review. This can be understood with reference to the function
of precedent. 30 5 In Chapter 11, as in international law generally, there
is no provision for binding precedent. 306 The function of precedent as
a mechanism of control, however, is essential to the legitimacy of any
legal system.30 7 Given the lack of provision for binding precedent in

the Chapter 11 context, some institutional substitute is necessary. In
Chapter 11 and other cases of dialectical review, that substitute is a
30 8 If
continuity of participation in the judicial exchange of interest.
the relevant international adjudicator and the relevant national court
consistently reappear, a species of 'precedent'-the capacity to
develop reliable expectations of applicable norms-can be expected
to emerge. Dialectical review therefore requires repeat players, and
repeat plays. Through such repeat interactions, legitimacy may be
30 9
assured, and the opportunity for learning created.
Institutional continuity thus also serves the ultimate goal of dialectical review, as outlined above: effective innovation. A pattern of
repeat participation in the relevant dialogue can be expected to build
trust and confidence among the judicial parties to the exchange. In
this way, receptivity to alternative perspectives, and even external
304 In Reisman's terms, these are mechanisms of international "control." See REISMAN,
supra note 66, at 7.
305 "'Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution

requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable."' Michael S. Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove
the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1543 (2000) (quoting
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)).
306 See MOHAMED

SHAHABUDDEEN,

PRECEDENT

IN THE WORLD

COURT

2 (1996)

(noting absence of doctrine of stare decisis in international law).
307 See id. at 9 (suggesting "clear necessity for legal issues arising within the international community to be resolved by recourse to general propositions of law if the solutions
reached are to command some critical minimum level of supporting respect"); Earl Maltz,
The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 367 (1988) ("An important tenet of our
political/moral culture, however, is that judges should feel strongly constrained by prior
case law."); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 752 (1988) ("A general judicial adherence to constitutional precedent supports a consensus about the rule of law, specifically the belief that all organs of government, including the Court, are bound by the law.").
308 In some regards, mechanisms of institutional continuity actually may be preferable to
formal precedent, given the relative inflexibility of the latter. See Katyal, supra note 15, at
1714.
309 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 30-31 (1984) (describing

role of repeat plays in resolving strategic games); cf. Ken Binmore, Game Theory and the
Social Contract II: Just Playing 29-32 (1998) (discussing importance of learning over
repeat iterations of Ultimatum Game).
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pressures, may grow. 3 10 Innovation along any given legal dimension,
furthermore, may be more likely to take root within a framework generally characterized by stability. Mechanisms of institutional con311
tinuity offer just such stability.
B.

Chapter 11 as DialecticalReview

Having defined a balanced power dynamic, competing legal and
institutional perspectives, and mechanisms of adjudicatory continuity
as the core characteristics of dialectical review, it is useful to lend
these elements greater specificity by considering their manifestation in
Chapter 11. Successive analysis of the elements of dialectical review
in the structure of Chapter 11 review and in Chapter 11-related adjudication to date thus offers an opportunity to lend concrete form to
the abstract model of dialectical review. Ultimately, I will conclude,
the institutional design of Chapter 11 is conducive, if only imperfectly
so, to a pattern of judicial engagement characterized by dialectical
review. In the national and international litigation surrounding
312
Chapter 11 to date, hints of this-pattern can already be observed.
1.

The DialecticalStructure of Chapter 11 Review

The institutional design of Chapter 11 offers a fertile ground for
the implementation of a dialectical approach to intersystemic judicial
review. Consequently, Chapter 11 is also suggestive of more particularized elements in the design of a dialectical pattern of judicial interaction. This is evident in a consideration of the three core
characteristics of dialectical review outlined above.
a.

The Distribution of Power in Chapter 11 Review

Chapter 11 review of national courts manifests both the enhanced
power of the reviewing court and the resulting balance of power that
characterize dialectical review. National courts subject to Chapter 11
310 See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 310-11 (discussing dialogue between
German Constitutional Court and ECJ which resulted in ECJ's development of system of
human rights protection).
311 Katyal's advicegiving mechanisms have some repeat-player dimensions, as they rely
on the premise that the relevant advice will still be good when the next case arrives. See
Katyal, supra note 15, at 1714.
312 Notwithstanding the emphasis on Chapter 11 review of national courts herein, it
bears noting that most Chapter 11 claims to date have been directed to alleged misconduct
of executive and legislative branch officials. Denial of justice claims thus represent a limited subset of Chapter 11 petitions to date. The model of dialectical review, needless to
say, is not intended to speak directly to these inter-branch interactions. Some application
of the theory of dialectical review, however, might be made to the transnational interaction
of state institutions generally.
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review face precisely the pattern of incident autonomy and systemic
dependence described above. 313 National courts are independent of
the Chapter 11 arbitral process. Decisions emanating from Chapter
11 tribunals do not constitute binding precedent for national courts. 314
Nor do Chapter 11 arbitral decisions reverse or undo, in any formal
sense, the judgment of the relevant national institution. Instead,
Chapter 11 remedies are limited to monetary damages. 315 Further,
Chapter 11 awards run not against the claimant's adversary in the
domestic proceeding, but against the federal authorities of the host
state. 316 National courts consequently enjoy significant incident
autonomy with reference to Chapter 11 review.
On the other hand, that autonomy is not unbounded. Chapter 11
tribunals can exert significant pressure on executive and legislative
authorities. As described above, this arises particularly from the
ability of individual claimants to invoke Chapter 11.317 The potential
influence of Chapter 11 tribunals is further enhanced by Chapter l1's
reliance on monetary damage awards readily subject to domestic
enforcement. 318 It is clear, then, that Chapter 11 review may place
meaningful constraints on non-judicial domestic authorities.
Yet Chapter l's constraints ultimately extend to domestic courts
as well, whether directly or indirectly. 31 9 In certain cases, one can
observe direct mechanisms of national court dependence on the
Chapter 11 arbitral process. This is perhaps most apparent with reference to domestic awards of punitive damages. Such damages are
intended to serve a deterrent and retributive function. 320 Any such
effect is subject to undoing, however, by Chapter 11 review. Had the
Loewen Group been compensated at the close of the Chapter 11 proceedings in an amount equivalent to the punitive damages award
imposed by the Mississippi jury (or greater amount), the deterrent and
313 See supra Part IV.A.1.

314 See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1136(1), at 646 ("An award made by a Tribunal shall
have no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular
case.").
315 See Hansen, supra note 17, at 497; see also NAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 1134-1135,
at 646.
316 See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1136(4), at 646.
317 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
318 See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
319 Anne-Marie Slaughter has identified vertical arrangements such as Chapter 11 as a
form of "enforcement network" operating between Chapter 11 tribunals and national
courts. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 100.
320 See John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 391, 434-35 (2004) (discussing function of punitive damages).
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retributive functions of the award, by definition, would have been
321
undone.
In any case in which the defendant in the national proceeding is a
federal government entity, Chapter 11 review also might be said to
undo some part of the impact of the underlying judgment. Thus, a
holding denying the liability of a federal defendant in U.S. district
court would be directly undermined by a Chapter 11 finding of liability and resulting award of damages against the federal
322
government.
Across a pattern of cases, the systemic dependence of national
courts on the Chapter 11 process-following indirectly from Chapter
11's impact on executive and legislative authorities-may be greater
still. Over time, recurrent Chapter 11 liability might be expected to

trigger some intervention against the relevant federal or state court
and/or its rules and procedures. 323 Even absent a pattern of liability, a
single, large Chapter 11 award against the federal government-such

as the $750 million award sought by Loewen-would almost inevitably create pressure to restrain or otherwise regulate the relevant
324
judicial body, whether state or federal.
With particular reference to the state courts-arguably both the
most sensitive nexus in the effectuation of NAFTA awards and the
more objectionable occasion for Chapter 11-driven federal pressures-several potential mechanisms of such pressure might be
imagined. 32 5 These include: (1) direct enforcement of NAFTA
321 See Chief Justice Taney's Memorandum for Opinion in Gordon v. United States 2
Wall. 561, 117 U.S. app. I at 697, 698-702 (1864) (recognizing impact of undoing effects of
judgment, even if formal judgment is preserved).
322 For example, a denial of just compensation from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
for the limited impact of a water project on adjoining land owned by a Canadian citizen
might be "reviewed" under NAFTA Article 1110 and an award of damages (equivalent to
the compensation denied in U.S. district court) imposed against the Judgment Fund of the
U.S. government.
323 Political pressure to modify state procedural rules, as well as relevant substantive law
and even aspects of institutional design, such as the use of judicial elections, might emerge
in the face of such awards. Adjustments to the rules of complete diversity to minimize the
possibility of continued federal liability also might be provoked by successful Chapter 11
claims. See infra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
324 Cf. Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 675, 717, J 187 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003) (noting change in Mississippi
appeal-bond requirement), available at http://www.naftalaw.org. A distinct response to the
imposition of Chapter 11 liability might be a "backlash" not against state or federal courts,
but against Chapter 11, international investment protections, or perhaps even international
arbitration generally. This prospect has been considered widely. See, e.g., Been &
Beauvais, supra note 21, at 132 n.459; Matiation, supra note 7, at 462.
325 I do not mean to suggest that pressure would be absent were Chapter 11 liability to
arise from the federal courts. To the contrary, such pressure might be even more acute. I
simply give the restraint of state courts priority of place because of the broader concerns
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against state or local authorities, as authorized by federal statute; (2)
federal efforts to secure state or local indemnification of Chapter 11
awards; (3) legislative or judicial alteration of the rules of diversity or
removal; (4) expanded use of federal preemption; (5) spending power

restraints on state or local authorities; and (6) U.S. Supreme Court
pressure to encourage state and local judicial conformity. These
various avenues can be described in turn, with some subsequent consideration of their actual likelihood.

To begin with, the federal government might take enforcement
action against state or local authorities proximate to the relevant
courts, or even the courts themselves, as authorized by NAFTA's
implementing legislation. 32 6 19 U.S.C. § 3312 grants federal authorities exclusive power to challenge state laws for asserted incompatibility with NAFTA obligations. 327 Short of actual enforcement, but
itself a source of potential pressure, § 3312 mandates federal consulta-

tion with state authorities regarding any potentially non-compliant
measure, including court rules and other judicial regulations, if they
are the relevant "measure" asserted to violate the Agreement. 328
Somewhat analogously, Vicki Been has suggested the possibility
of some federal effort to seek state or local contribution or indemnification in the face of any Chapter 11 award. 329 Such claims would
require legislative grounding, but would be likely to survive constitutional muster. 330 Broader legislative change also might be imagined.

Most commonly referenced has been the possibility of changes in
the diversity rules for removal to federal court.33 1 Given the rule of
complete diversity, claims against foreign corporations or investors

brought in the state courts are likely to remain there, so long as some
local defendant can be identified. 332 This is precisely what occurred in
likely to arise from any case of federal pressure on the state courts, versus the federal
courts. As to the latter, however, several of the same mechanisms described above, or
analogues, might be used to bring them in line with the demands of Chapter 11.
326 See 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (2000) (authorizing United States to challenge action of state
entity on grounds of inconsistency with NAFTA).
327 See id. § 3312(b)(2) ("No State law, or the application thereof, may be declared
invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or application is
inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action brought by the United States for the
purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.").
328 See id. § 3312(b)(1)(B) (describing opportunity of states to voice opinions on
NAFTA-related matters that will directly impact them).
329 See Vicki Been, NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Division of Authority for
Land Use and Environmental Controls, 32 ENV. L. REP. 11001, 11012-14 (2002).
330 See id. at 11012-14.
331 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 33, at 297-302.
332 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (holding that each
defendant must be citizen of different state from each plaintiff in order to support federal
diversity jurisdiction).
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Loewen, where the plaintiff named a Mississippi corporation purchased by the Loewen Group as a co-defendant. 333 The requirement
of complete diversity might be abandoned in the case of aliens, however, either by judicial action (or inaction, as the case may be) or by
legislative mandate. 334 The possibility of such a jurisdiction grab from
the state courts might alone serve as a source of potential pressure on
those courts.
Another legislative avenue of pressure on state courts might be
the threat of selective preemption of certain issues likely to pertain to
335
the litigation of claims against foreign corporations and investors.
Such a tool might actually be even more effective than the possibilities
already mentioned, with Congress's selective preemption subject to
progressive extension in the face of continued state court non-compliance. Similar ends might be achieved even more directly by Congress
through the spending power. 336 Federal funding to the states might be
conditioned on certain forms of access to state or local courts, certain
treatment of foreign-investor defendants, certain rules for supersedeas
bonds, or other measures to bring the courts in compliance with
Chapter 11.
Finally, assuming some relatively greater sensitivity of the U.S.
Supreme Court (than lower courts) to the policy concerns that would
emanate from substantial and recurrent federal liability for asserted
violations of Chapter 11, the Court also might be expected to contribute to the pressure on state courts (as well as federal courts, for
that matter) to draw their decisions into greater alignment with
NAFTA's apparent demands. 337 Liability in Loewen, for example,
might well have played into future Supreme Court certiorari determinations on an array of issues. These include the application of complete diversity requirements to aliens, the constitutionality of
supersedeas bond requirements, the constitutionality of punitive
damage awards of a certain magnitude, and the procedural rules for
jury determinations on damages, among other possibilities. 338
333 See Lerner, supra note 33, at 297.
334 See id. at 299 (noting potential for courts to abolish complete diversity rule for aliens,
or for Congress to amend removal statute to allow aliens to remove cases to federal courts
regardless of diversity); Stephan, supra note 41, at 795, 822, 872-73, 874-75.
335 See Been, supra note 329, at 11015. It bears noting that restraints on the federal
courts in the face of Chapter 11 liability can be accomplished more directly by federal
legislation.
336 See id. at 11014-15.
337 Cf. Stephan, supra note 41, at 872 ("When the Court believed that the state courts
would discriminate against out-of-state investors, it adopted interpretations of diversity
jurisdiction that made it easier for these investors to assert their claims in federal court.").
338 See supra Part I.
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As this enumeration suggests, avenues surely exist for federal
pressure on the state courts, in the face of Chapter 11 liability. Pressure on the federal courts to come into line is likely even easier to
accomplish. A separate question, of course, is the likelihood that any
of these mechanisms of control over state courts might actually be
implemented. It might be doubted that an executive-branch agency,
the Congress, or the Court would actually pursue any of the enumerated approaches. On the other hand, given the limited extent of
Chapter 11 litigation to date and the narrow avoidance of U.S. liability
in the cases against it, it is at least difficult to predict how things may
ultimately play out. It cannot be stated with confidence that any of
the foregoing means are likely to be invoked. Nor is there reason to
33 9
decisively conclude that they will not be invoked.
Beginning with the possibility of an enforcement action under 19
U.S.C. § 3317, the prospects would seemingly depend on the particulars of the case presented. Given the explicit congressional authorization of federal enforcement of NAFTA, 340 it is at least plausible that
intervention might occur in a sufficiently egregious case. It is notable,
moreover, that Congress recently declined to eviscerate this authorization, by way of a denial of relevant appropriations, even when given
the opportunity to do S0.341 As for indemnification or contribution,
meanwhile, it is of interest that both Canada and Mexico have had
some recent occasion to deal with the prospect that Chapter 11 lia342
bility might be transferred to subnational entities.
Adjustment of the rules of complete diversity is not implausible
either. Both Congress and the federal courts have generally been
sympathetic to the protection of foreign defendants from local bias.
Given the recurrent attention to this possibility, it cannot be discounted. 343 The same might be said of the prospects of federal pre339 See Young, supra note 115 (describing advent of global constitutionalism and how
supranational lawmaking, as embodied in NAFTA and WTO, threatens disruption of
domestic constitutional order).
340 See 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (2004).
341 See Alvarez & Park, supra note 41, at 385 n.101 (describing unsuccessful attempt by
Congressman Dennis Kucinich to amend U.S. Department of Justice appropriations bill to
prohibit use of funds to challenge state laws under § 3312).
342 See Been, supra note 329, at 11012 (exploring potential imposition of Chapter 11
liability on subnational entities).
343 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 33, at 572 n.54 (suggesting Congress should consider
making state suits by or against potential Chapter 11 claimants removable to federal
court); Lerner, supra note 33, at 300-03 (noting congressional attempts to alter diversity
requirements in other areas, including class action litigation); Stephan, supra note 41, at
874-76 (discussing potential issues attendant to congressional legislation authorizing
removal in cases implicating foreign relations of United States); cf. Krauss, supra note 7, at
98 (criticizing plaintiff's tactics in Loewen and anticipating modifications to rules of
removal); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., And All That: Recodifying Federal Supplemental Jurisdic-
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emption or conditional spending restraints. While both would likely
require a significant trigger for their invocation, the Loewen Group's
$750 million claim may well have been in the ballpark. Given the
importance and growing volume of foreign direct investment, the federal government could readily offer a compelling rationale for such
intervention.
Finally, the Supreme Court might be unlikely to join in any direct
pressure on state, or even federal, courts to accommodate the
restraints of NAIFTA or similar international agreements. By analogy,
in Barclays Bank v. FranchiseTax Board, the Court declined to interfere with California's corporate-tax regime, notwithstanding its
seeming international reach. 344 Rather, it concluded that it was for
Congress-not the Court-to determine the appropriate balance of
uniformity and diversity of tax law necessary to advance the national
interest.345
As suggested above, however, the relevant question is not one of
direct Supreme Court intervention. Rather, the issue is whether the
Supreme Court's assessment of rules of alienage jurisdiction, determination of the constitutionality of supersedeas bonds, or consideration
of other issues of court procedure, jurisdiction, or substance might be
influenced by a pattern of (potentially significant) federal government
liability for the legal standards the Court adopts or even simply con346
dones. This, it would seem, is at least a possibility.
Each of the potential mechanisms of pressure suggested above
naturally operates against a backdrop of concern with preserving judicial independence and, as applied to the state courts, federalism.
There can be little doubt that these values are likely to militate heavily
against the invocation of any of the enumerated mechanisms of federal pressure on the courts. Yet neither judicial independence nor
federalism are absolutes, for either Congress or the courts. 347 Given
tion, 74 IND. L.J. 53, 61 (1998) (discussing desirability of minimal rather than complete
diversity in alienage cases).
344 512 U.S. 298, 328-31 (1994) (deferring to legislative and executive authorities' failure
to restrict application of California's corporate-franchise tax to foreign and multinational
corporations).
345 Id. at 331.

346 See Stephan, supra note 41, at 872.
During both the nineteenth and twentieth centur[ies], the Supreme Court not
only engaged in substantive review of state court decisions that it regarded as
hostile to federal interests, but tweaked the rules governing federal court jurisdiction to make it easier for persons likely to suffer at the hands of state judges
to obtain a federal hearing.
Id.
347 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (stating
that, in most cases, "comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to the decisions

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

2168

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2029

as much, it is difficult to deny at least the possibility that one among
the foregoing measures might be undertaken. That prospect alone is
enough to create some indirect mechanisms of power in the hands of
Chapter 11 tribunals. These mechanisms support the existence of a
systemic dependence of national courts on Chapter 11 review, notwithstanding the formal insulation of national courts from the Chapter
348
11 process.
b.

Competing and Complementary Perspectives in Chapter 11

Beyond the shared power of dialectical review, Chapter 11 review
of national courts also exhibits the second characteristic of dialectical
review enumerated above-a diversity of judicial perspectives. 349 To
begin with, Chapter 11 tribunals and national courts draw on distinct
sources of law. 350 Chapter 11 tribunals look to the terms of Chapter
11, other provisions of NAFTA, and the norms of customary international law. 35 1 National courts, by contrast, are relatively unlikely to
draw on any of these sources of law. This is particularly true in the
United States. 35 2 International law is occasionally referenced in U.S.
of state courts on issues of state law.... But there are a few exceptional cases in which the
Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a State's government"); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
InstitutionalizingJudicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964, 976-95 (2002) (describing
balance between protections for individual judges and systemic dependence of judiciary on
other branches of government).
348 Cf.Young, supra note 115, at 535-36 (suggesting ways that decisions of international
trade bodies impact national policymaking). Of course, the dependence of Chapter 11
tribunals on domestic courts follows from the converse of the above circumstances.
Chapter 11 judgments are limited to damage awards against the federal government.
Enforcement of such awards lies with the domestic courts of the respondent state.
349 See supra Part IV.A.2.
350 See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
351 See NAFrA, supra note 12, arts, 102(2), 1131(1), at 297, 645; Todd Weiler, The Treatment of SPS Measures UnderNAFTA Chapter11: PreliminaryAnswers to an Open-Ended
Question, 26 B.C. Ir'L & COMP. L. REV. 229, 233-34 (2003).
352 U.S. courts have cited Chapter 11, for example, only in suits challenging the constitutionality of NAFTA. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1238 (N.D. Ala. 1999). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J.Fischer,
All the World's a Courtroom: Judging in the New Millenium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 276

(1997) ("The fact is that as the century draws to a close, the American bench and bar are
rarely reaching beyond our national borders when seeking guidance in resolving domestic
legal issues."); James A.R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States Law of
Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 46 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 421, 422 (Supp. 1998) (explaining limited legal effect of U.N. Charter in domestic
courts, given "dualist" approach of U.S. courts to international law, common presumption
against self-executing status of international agreements, and "later-in-time" principle).
On the citation of customary international law in national courts, see Gordon A.
Christenson, Customary InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Court Decisions, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225, 225, 234 (1995), who suggests that U.S. courts actively resist
customary international law, and Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and
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court opinions, but will not be invoked simply because one of the par-

ties to the relevant disputes is a foreign investor.
As required for a functional pattern of dialectical review, however, the law invoked by Chapter 11 tribunals and by national courts is
also overlapping. 353 Customary international law is shaped in part by

U.S. law and norms. 354 This is particularly true with reference to
claims of denial of justice, given their origin in the demands of the
United States, Great Britain, and other developed countries regarding
the treatment of their citizens abroad. 355 Chapter 11 itself, mean-

while, is a product of negotiations in which the United States played
the dominant role and in which it specifically sought to ensure U.S.356
style legal protections for American investors abroad.
Chapter 11 review of national courts also manifests the second
source of perspective suggested above-diversity of institutional con-

text. 357 The diversity of institutional perspectives in Chapter 11
review may, in fact, be even greater than in domestic analogues, such
as federal habeas review of state criminal convictions. 358 Chapter 11

panels include arbitrators from different countries, with expertise in
international law and international trade; areas in which most
domestic judges lack training. 359 These panels engage in forms of liti-

gation distinct from those of national courts, with different forms of
hearings, briefs, and sources of authority. 360 They apply distinct standards of review and have different conceptions of review. Chapter 11
adjudications are held before a panel of judges from the outset, rather

than being decided by a single judge. Questions of fact are therefore
InternationalLaw, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (1988), who notes that the Supreme Court
rarely relies on customary international law.
353 See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
354 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 46,
§ 102(2).
355 See generally LILLICH, supra note 53, at 5.
356 See, e.g., David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 651, 671
(2001) (noting U.S. need for strong investor protection in Mexico); Cherie O'Neal Taylor,
Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for Deepening
Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 850, 885 n.172
(1996-97) (noting that United States was dominant party in NAFTA negotiations).
357 See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
358 See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
359 See Brower, supra note 216, at 78; cf. Cover, supra note 14, at 665 (describing
American federal and state court judges as distinct elites with distinct educational backgrounds and constituencies). On the other hand, the extent of diversity should not be
exaggerated. The Loewen panel, for example, was composed of three appellate judges
from common law jurisdictions. See Dodge, supra note 33, at 564 n.7.
360 Cf. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1050-51 (describing different patterns of
adjudication in federal and state courts).
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subject to collegial review. Neither questions of fact nor the tribunal's
conclusions of law, however, face any form of appellate review. Such
differences are to be expected, given that Chapter 11 tribunals are
created and financed in a manner entirely different from national
courts. Collectively, however, they suggest the potential for significant diversity of institutional perspective in Chapter 11 review of
national courts.
c. Continuity in Chapter 11
Finally, turning to the last structural characteristic of dialectic
review, we can also identify elements of continuity in Chapter 11
review of national courts, although to a lesser extent than one might
seek in an idealized case of dialectical review. 361 With respect to the
first requirement of continuity enumerated above-consideration of
the same essential "case" in the paired judicial systems-Chapter 11
provides for the assessment of a common nucleus of facts. 362 While
the broad pattern of dialectical review in Chapter 11 extends across
cases, any given occasion for review under Chapter 11 entails review
of a particular national court decision involving related parties and
facts. Such sequential redundancy

363

results in review that is more

precise and of a higher quality. 364
This leads to the second facet of continuity outlined above-existence of a pattern of relevant claims across an array of cases. Such
recurrence, it can be recalled, is essential to the progressive doctrinal
development sought through dialectical review. As to this feature,
Chapter 11 review to date has not achieved the necessary volume of
cases to generate patterns of relevant claims. 365 Yet it is not especially
surprising that there are still relatively few Chapter 11 cases alleging a
"judicial violation of international law. ' '366 Chapter 11 remains in its
relative infancy, especially with respect to claims of denial of justice,
which have only begun to emerge as a viable cause of action in recent
years. 367 Even today, the standard for such claims remains relatively
361 See supra Part IV.A.3.
362 Cf United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that "state and
federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" in order to warrant
pendent jurisdiction for state claim).
363 See Cover, supra note 14, at 648.
364 Cf. Beermann, supra note 220, at 335 n.232. This alone is important, given how
much interaction among courts outside the appellate relationship is across, rather than
within, cases.
365 See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
366 See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 675, 712, 161 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), availableat http://www.nafta
law.org.

367 See supra Part 1.
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unclear. As suggested above, however, a variety of factors favors
368
growth in the number of such cases in the years ahead.
Similar growth might be predicted with respect to the third
requirement of continuity suggested above-institutional continuity. 369 While such continuity has been lacking in Chapter 11 adjudication because of the ad hoc composition of Chapter 11 arbitral
panels and the absence of any exhaustion of local remedies requirement, 370 recent developments-namely, the prospect of appellate
review in investment-protection regimes 37 1 and the requirement of
finality introduced in Loewen-suggest the potential for greater continuity to develop. With time, a more efficient degree of continuity
and resulting greater capacity for dialectical review might thus be
372
expected to emerge in Chapter 11 and similar regimes.
2.

Chapter 11 and the Operation of a Dialectical Pattern of Review

If the institutional design and nature of Chapter 11 review of
national courts is largely consistent with a pattern of dialectical
review, is that pattern likewise evident on the ground, in the litigation
surrounding Chapter 11 to date? Are the arbitrations in which there
has been some claim of denial of justice by a national court consistent
with a dialectical conception of review? Does the role of national
courts in the process to date also comport with the pattern of
exchange characteristic of dialectical review? This Part considers
these questions.
a.

The Dialectical Dimension of Chapter 11 Arbitration

Although only a limited number of Chapter 11 claims have
presented an explicit opportunity for NAFTA tribunals to review a
national court, those decided to date manifest both a generalized pattern of dialectical review and the three characteristics of dialectical
review enumerated above. Such congruence begins with the jurisdic368 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 302-11 and accompanying text.
370 See NAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 1123-1124, 1126, at 644-45 (describing composition
of tribunals). Article 1121 imposes no requirement to exhaust local remedies. Rather, it
requires investors, under subsection (1)(b), to waive their right to initiate or continue proceedings before any tribunal or court under the law of any party. See id., art. 1121, at 643.
371 See infra Part VI.A.1.
372 It bears noting that some dimension of institutional continuity is introduced by
Chapter 11 panels' citation to one another, notwithstanding the absence of any formal
precedential effect. This also flags a further dimension of dialogue-a horizontal pattern

of interaction among Chapter 11 panels. Such cross-panel analysis and jurisprudential
development represents an important trend in Chapter 11 adjudication, but is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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tional and final awards in Loewen, but is true of other Chapter 11
decisions as well. A survey of these cases supports the generalized use
of a dialectical approach in Chapter 11 review of national courts.
Equally important, such a survey may help to lend greater precision to

our understanding of the implementation and operation of dialectical
review in actual practice.
In the Loewen Final Award, the tribunal went to great lengths to
determine whether there had been a denial of justice during the

Mississippi trial or in the ensuing determination of damages and rulings on the Loewen Group's petition for waiver of the required appeal
bond. 373 Yet the tribunal already had resolved the case on not one,

but two, independent grounds. 374 Many have questioned the inclusion
of a lengthy disquisition on the facts and law applicable to Loewen's

claim of denial of justice-an analysis that consumed much of the
Final Award-given the tribunal's strong assertion of hesitation to do
any more than it was permitted to do. 375 Why include what has been
widely characterized as dicta of a rather extensive and strongly

worded variety given such supposed caution? Why, given an asserted
unwillingness to stray beyond the permissible bounds of authority and

jurisdiction, directly challenge the standard of due process applied
in-of all places-the courts of the United States?
A model of dialectical review finds this dicta eminently understandable. 3 76 Given the need to elaborate the vague standard of

denial of justice and the prominence of the Loewen case as a vehicle
for that purpose, dialectical review would favor just such a treatment
373 See Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 702-26, $1 119-227.
374 First, the claim failed because of Loewen's corporate restructuring and resulting loss
of continuous Canadian nationality. See id. at 728, 232. Chapter 11 only permits an
investor of one NAFTA party to bring a claim against another NAFTA party. An
American investor-which the Loewen Group had become-could not sue the U.S. government under Chapter 11. Second, by failing to pursue an appeal to the Mississippi
Supreme Court or to petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Loewen claimants had failed to meet the requirement of "finality." As argued to the tribunal by the
United States, the obligation to avoid a denial of justice requires that the judicial system as
a whole be fair and accessible. The question is not whether the national courts make
errors, but whether they have the capacity to correct such errors. See Counter-Memorial
of the United States of America (Loewen v. United States), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/
3, at 124-30 (Mar. 30, 2001) (holding that international law requires "fundamentally adequate system of justice as a whole"), at http://www.naftalaw.org; see also Loewen, 4
J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 724,
217.; Loewen v. United States, Op. of Christopher
Greenwood,
23, 30, at http://www.naftalaw.org.
375 See Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 731, 242.
376 Likewise Katyal's advicegiving approach: "[Tjhose jurists who want to avoid interference with legislative power announce narrow holdings, but superimpose broad advice (a
form of dicta) by fully explicating the rationale and assumptions behind a decision."
Katyal, supra note 15, at 1711.
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of the due process obligations of national courts under international
norms of denial of justice.3 77 The Final Award in Loewen might thus
be conceived as an outline of the proposed parameters of a denial of
justice standard, specifically designed to provoke reaction and
response from-and hence a dialogue with-the national courts of the
United States, as well as Canada and Mexico. Further elaboration in
subsequent Chapter 11 litigation might be expected to follow. Initiation of the dialectical exchange, however, necessitated some preliminary elaboration of the relevant standard, as was accomplished in the
"dicta" of the Final Award.
Both awards in Loewen also manifest the casuist pattern of reasoning described above.378 In its analysis of the appropriate definition
of "measure," the Jurisdictional Award proceeds through a dialectical
treatment of the arguments on either side of each successive proposition before reaching its ultimate conclusion. In seeking to determine
whether actionable measures under Chapter 11 include domestic judgments in civil litigation, for example, the tribunal outlines and actually
acknowledges the arguments against inclusion, but then sets out the
contrary arguments favoring inclusion. In doing so, the tribunal
acknowledges the limitations of its argument, notwithstanding its ultimate adoption of the broader conception of actionable measures
favored by the claimants. 379 As described by Helfer and Slaughter,
this pattern of reasoning "fosters a dialogue between judges, lawyers,
politicians, and even lay people, as the court's response to each argument can be responded to in turn"-a distinctly dialectical pattern of
engagement. 3 0 In the Final Award, a similar pattern is evident in the
tribunal's analysis of both the law and facts of finality, which moves
dialectically from the apparent absence of an exhaustion of local remedies requirement under Chapter 11 to the seemingly contrary conclusion that a requirement of finality nonetheless exists. 381
Finally, both Loewen opinions include elements suggestive of the
structural characteristics of dialectical review-a dynamic of bilateral
power, alternative legal and judicial perspectives, and continuity of
adjudication. In its Jurisdictional Award, the panel explicitly high377 See infra Part V.

See supra note 221.
See, e.g., Loewen Group v. United States, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's
Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
40-42,
52-53, 55. (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org; see also id. at
$% 61-74 (treating finality argument).
380 See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 321-22.
381 See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 675, 708-09, 711-12, 721-23, 729-30,
143-148, 158-164, 208-214, 237-239
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
378
379
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lighted Chapter l's distribution of power, holding that it was authorized to review national courts, 382 but noting its lack of plenary
jurisdiction 3 83 and the critical need to preserve the role of national
38 4 Sugcourts in resolving objections to domestic judicial process.
gesting a dimension of continuity in Chapter 11, the Jurisdictional
Award in Loewen looks back to the Chapter 11 decision in Azinian v.
Mexico, citing it not as binding precedent, but instead as part of a line
of developing Chapter 11 jurisprudence on the standards of denial of
38 5
justice.
The Final Award is even clearer in its manifestation of these
structural elements of dialectical review. As for the dynamic of
power, it too emphasizes that it is not a court of appeal, 386 highlighting
the important limitations of arbitration. 387 It does so particularly with
reference to the importance of the exhaustion of local remedies and
the requirement of finality. 388 In the absence of some such requirement, the tribunal suggests, the balance of judicial power under
Chapter 11 would be difficult to reconcile with the efficacy and prestige of the NAFTA parties' national courts. 389 Dialectical review's
careful allocation of power is most evident, however, in the tribunal's
repeated assertions of its unwillingness to act on its differences with
the Mississippi courts on the merits, 390 and especially in its concluding
emphasis on the unhappy realization that it could offer no relief to
Loewen. 39 1 The Final Award also exhibits an appreciation of the distinct perspectives that characterize dialectical review, suggesting the
tribunal's inability to judge asserted violations of municipal lawwhich must necessarily be considered with a distinct mindset and
approach. 392 Finally, some suggestion of institutional continuity is evident in the Loewen tribunal's reliance on yet another recent Chapter
11 decision, Mondev. 393
382 See Loewen, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
40-60.
383 See id. at
48.
384 See id. at
67.
385 See id. at
49.
386 See Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 686, 705, IT 51, 134.
387 See id. at 702, 718, 91120, 189; cf id. at 711, 156 (noting NAFTA and international
law constraints on arbitrator's review of national courts).
388 See id. at 712-14,
162, 167.
389 See id.
390 See id. at 717, 719, [1 184-185, 197; see also id. at 728, 91232.
391 See id. at 731, 1 242.
392 See id. at 705, 728,
134, 233; cf. id. at 686, 9151 (describing distinct body of law
applicable in Chapter 11 adjudication).
393 See id. at 726,
227. The Final Award also manifests some spirit of Katyal's
advicegiving. In fact, the tribunal is occasionally quite explicit with its counsel. See id. at
677, 1 2; cf. id. at 731,
241-242. It even cites U.S. jurisprudence in its critique of the

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 20041

BETWEEN DIALOGUE AND DECREE

2115

Besides Loewen, other Chapter 11 cases involving alleged judicial
wrongdoing also support a dialectical conception of Chapter 11
review. Two of these have proceeded to decision-Mondev 394 and
3 96
Azinian 395-while others remain unresolved.
discriminatory character of the Loewen trial, impliedly counseling the U.S courts to better
police their own rules. See id. at 703, 123. The Jurisdictional Award also manifests some
tendency toward such advicegiving. See Loewen Group v. United States, Decision on
Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, 74 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
394 Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M. 85
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
395 Azinian v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/972, 14 ICSID Rav. 538 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 1999), available at http://www.naftalaw.org. Azinian was the first Chapter 11
case decided on the merits. See Alejandro A. Escobar, Introductory Note to Robert
Azinian and Others v. United Mexican States, 8 WILLAMETrE J.INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL.
125, 125 (2000) (noting that Azinian was "first arbitral decision on the merits to be given
by a tribunal established under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade
Agreement").
396 See Notice of Claim and Demand for Arbitration, Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. Canada,
13 (1999) (alleging that "through a series of perverse judgments Sun Belt was denied due
process and access to justice in the British Columbia domestic court system"), at
http://www.naftalaw.org. In Sun Belt, which seems to have been settled out of court, as it
never proceeded to arbitration, the petitioner claimed that several justices of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia acted to deny the company's due process rights. See id. at $ 8,
10 (k-m); see also Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, Sun Belt Water, Inc.
v. Canada, $1 32-33 (1998), at http://www.naftalaw.org. Although also settled or otherwise dropped, the Frank case included even stronger accusations of malfeasance against
the Mexican judiciary. See Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim, Frank v. Mexico,
18 (Aug. 5, 2002) ("In subsequent judicial and administrative proceedings, Respondent
and Mexican Nationals were given highly preferential treatment, evidenced by, among
other things, the disappearance of many of the Disputing Investor's filed, official documents."), at http://www.naftalaw.org; see also id. 28 (claiming Mexican courts failed to
"provide .. .basic procedural fairness and due process rights, such as legitimate and
unmolested access to effective dispute settlement mechanisms"). Even in the infamous
Metalclad case, at least the implication of a denial of justice arose. Although never pressed
by the investor, the Metalclad panel raised the possibility of a denial of justice during its
hearing on the merits. See Submission of the Government of the United States of
America, Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,

15 (1999), at

http://www.naftalaw.org; see also United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C.
664, 15 (noting dismissal of writ of amparo to Mexican judiciary without hearing on
merits); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 5 ICSID Rep. 209, 222, %56 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. 2000), available at http://www.naftalaw.org. To similar effect is the Thunderbird case,
in which issuance of an injunction in the investor's favor was overruled on appeal, but the
investor has not, to date, specifically asserted a claim of denial of justice. See Notice of
Arbitration and Statement of Claim, Thunderbird v. Mexico,
16 (Aug. 1, 2002), at
http://www.naftalaw.org. Although dealing with administrative rather than independent
court adjudications, the related cases of Canfor and Doman involve challenges by
Canadian lumber producers to longstanding U.S. administrative procedures for the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties. See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration, Canfor v. United States, 1$ 8-12 (Nov. 5, 2001), at http://www.naftalaw.org;
Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, Doman v. United States,
5-13 (May
1, 2002), at http://www.naftalaw.org. In these cases, the claim is specifically one of a denial
of justice. An analogous situation is presented in the widely discussed Glamis case. See
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The claim in Mondev arose out of a Canadian real estate company's contract with the Boston Redevelopment Authority. 397 While
the alleged misconduct was that of the Redevelopment Authority, that
conduct preceded NAFTA's entry into force. 398 As such, Mondev's
Chapter 11 claims instead were based on the way the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts handled the appeal of Mondev's civil suit
against the City of Boston and the Redevelopment Authority. 399 Like
the Final Award in Loewen, the Mondev tribunal's decision is suggestive of a dialectical pattern of engagement. This begins with the tribunal's exploration of a number of issues not directly presented, but
potentially relevant to future domestic cases. 40 0 Most significantly,
this included a lengthy discussion of the permissible scope of a judicial
definition of sovereign immunity. 40 1 The Mondev tribunal's seeming
willingness to police, albeit at the margins, the lawmaking of common
law courts; 40 2 its close review of the legislative rationale behind
Massachusetts's rules of official immunity; and its suggestion that a
grant of generalized sovereign immunity, as opposed to the relatively
narrow immunity identified by the Supreme Judicial Court, might
trigger Chapter 11 liability 40 3 all suggest a dialectical dynamic. The
tribunal's employment of a decidedly casuistic mode of reasoning also
suggests a dialectic pattern, as particularly evident in the tribunal's
Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, Glamis Gold v. United States, IT 13-15
(July 21, 2003), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
397 See Mondev, 42 I.L.M. at 86, 1 1.
398 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 437 (2003).
399 See id. at 438. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court was asserted to have
manifested "flagrant procedural deficiencies" and "gross defects in the substance of the
judgment itself." See Hearing Transcript Volume III, Mondev v. United States, at 736
(May 22, 2002), at http://www.naftalaw.org. Specifically, Mondev objected to the Supreme
Judicial Court's (1) dismissal of its contract claims against the city itself, (2) failure to
remand the contract claim, (3) failure to consider whether it was retrospectively applying a

new rule for government contracts, and (4) finding of statutory immunity for the Redevelopment Authority. See Murphy, supra note 398, at 439.
400 See id. at 114, 1 148 (criticizing, but not condemning, "the sometimes artificial ways
in which [exceptions to official immunity] have been circumvented"). This pattern in
Mondev might be classified to fall within Katyal's "clarification" form of advicegiving. See

Katyal, supra note 15, at 1716.
401 See Mondev, 42 I.L.M. at 112-15, T 139-156. The Supreme Judicial Court had
offered a somewhat novel theory of sovereign immunity. See Stephan, supra note 51, at
642.
402 See Mondev, 42 I.L.M. at 111, 113, I 133, 146 (suggesting deference to common law
rules, insofar as they do not "shock or surprise ... [a] judicial sensibility" and cannot "be
regarded as exceptional or eccentric in international terms").
403 See id. at 114, 91151 (noting that some judicial grants of sovereign immunity might
violate Chapter 11); see also id. at 113, 1 148. The Mondev tribunal also suggested limits
on the ability of appellate courts to determine issues of fact without remand or a hearing.
See id. at 111, 136.
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treatment of the scope of sovereign immunity, in which it invokes but
40 4
then rejects various potential arguments for a finding of liability.
The final award in Mondev also hints at the balanced power
dynamic, the competing perspectives, and the continuity dimension of
dialectical review. Evidencing dialectical review's characteristic equipoise of power, the tribunal emphasizes that it is not a court of
appeals. 40 5 Further, it makes clear that its treatment of a national high
40 6
court necessarily must differ from its approach to a local magistrate
and that it will not interfere in the procedural determinations of
national courts. 40 7 In this light, it suggests that its willingness to
engage in review of national courts is tempered by some deference to
them. 40 8 As for the diversity of perspectives of dialectical review, the
Mondev tribunal looked to domestic legal norms-including the
exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act's abrogation of immunityfor guidance on the questions of interstitial lawmaking and sovereign
immunity that were presented. 40 9 Further, the panel suggested the
wisdom of some deference to the assessment of the jury, given its
direct access to the evidence. 410 Finally, some indication of continuity
can also be identified in the Mondev tribunal's reliance on norms
emerging from the pre-NAFTA bilateral investment treaties; 4 11 in its
close analysis of prior Chapter 11 decisions; 412 and, to slightly dif413
ferent effect, in its implicit advice to future Chapter 11 litigants.
Perhaps the most notable suggestion of a pattern of dialectical
review in Chapter 11 review of national courts was the distinctly dialogic decision in Azinian, in which a claim of denial of justice essentially was not even presented. 4 14 Rather, it was simply implied as a

404 See id. at 98, 107-08, 113, 1 70-71, 113-118, 143. Mondev also includes additional
references of an advicegiving nature. See id. at 114,
152 (suggesting requirements of
Chapter 11 should not be interpreted as coextensive with requirements of domestic tort or
contracts law); cf. id. at 101,
86 (advising claimants in future NAFTA litigation to be
more cautious about invocation of Article 1116 versus 1117).
405 See id. at 111,
136.
406 See id. at 109,
126.
407 See id. at 111,
136.
408 See id. at 111,
133.
409 See, e.g., id. at 113,
146.
410 See id. at 93,
40 ("[T]he jury did have the advantage of seeing the witnesses and
reviewing the evidence at length on the particular issues it was asked to address.").
411 See id. at 100,
79.
412 See id. at 94, 1 44.
413 See id. at 101, 114, IT 86, 152.
414 See Azinian v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 14 ICSID REV. 538, 565,
92
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1999), available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
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possibility, given the underlying posture of the claim. 415 Notwithstanding the lack of an overt claim, the Azinian court considered, at
some length, the historical and modern standards of denial of justice
and the appropriate application of those standards under Chapter
11.416 In doing so, it helped to lay the foundation for the claims
advanced in Mondev and Loewen, as well as for the decisions in those
cases.
Azinian, in which American investors challenged a Mexican
municipality's decision to cancel a waste-disposal contract with their
company, 417 also exhibits some dialectical pattern of review.
Although a possible claim of denial of justice was not advanced by the
claimant, 418 as noted, the tribunal highlighted the legitimacy of such
claims under Chapter 11 and took pains to outline their general
parameters. 4 19 Specifically, the tribunal opined that it was "not paralyzed by the fact that the national courts [had] approved the relevant
conduct of public officials. ' 420 If a claimant could show "that the
court decision itself constitute[d] a violation of the treaty," damages
4 21
would be available in the future.
Beyond laying the foundation for the denial of justice claims subsequently advanced in Mondev and Loewen, the Azinian decision also
articulated a clear set of limitations on such claims, especially in the
context of a claim preliminarily directed to executive and legislative
officials. 422 In addition, the tribunal reviewed the evidence considered
by the Mexican courts, notwithstanding its having already dismissed
any claim of denial of justice. 42 3 In doing so, it helped to outline further the scope of a domestic judgment consistent with the minimum
standard of treatment under international law and the denial of justice
requirement encompassed thereunder. 424 Such a prospective analysis,
415 The claimant, before submitting its Chapter 11 claim, had unsuccessfully challenged
the relevant executive and legislative actions before the Mexican courts. See id. at 566,

96.
See id. at 566-69, % 96-105.
417 Azinian, 14 ICSID REV. at 540, 544; see Coe, supra note 122, at 1424 (describing
Chapter 11 decision in Azinian); Escobar, supra note 395, at 126-27 (same); see also
Charles H. Brower, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 79-80 (2001) (noting Azinian tribunal's refusal to exercise
appellate power to set aside Mexican court's judgment).
418 See Azinian, 14 ICSID REV. at 565,
92.
419 See id. at 566-69; see also Escobar, supra note 395, at 127.
420 Azinian, 14 ICSID REV. at 566-67,
96-98.
421 Id. at 568,
99.
422 See id. at 566, 568-69,
[ 96, 99-105.
423 See id. at 568,
100.
424 See id. at 569-72, % 104-120. As in the earlier examples, Azinian also was suggestive of dialectical review's power dynamic, alternative perspectives, and adjudicatory con416
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with its invitation to future jurisprudential development, looks to be
very much in the nature of dialectical review.

Other Chapter 11 cases with some dialectic dimension also should
be noted. Feldman v. Mexico, for example, included a striking

example of dialogue in the tribunal's suggestion of the apparent error
in a national court decision that was still pending before the Mexican
courts. 425 Feldman also hinted at the balanced power of dialectical

review, with its successive notation of the authority of and the constraints on both NAFTA tribunals and the Mexican courts. 426 In its
heavy reliance on Azinian and other prior cases, Feldman likewise
revealed some appreciation of institutional continuity. 427 Finally,
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico also included some suggestion of dialectical
review, notwithstanding limited emphasis by the claimant on its denial
of justice dimension. The Metalclad panel, despite the claimant's

failure to raise the issue, thus questioned the parties at oral argument
as to why the claimant's writ of amparo before the Mexican courts
had been dismissed without a hearing on the merits. 428 One might

infer that the tribunal was eager to engage the attention of its counterparts in the Mexican judiciary. 429
tinuity. See id. at 566, 568-69, $$ 96, 99-105. As to the latter, most notably, the panel
appeared to be speaking quite clearly to future Chapter 11 litigants. See id. at 568, $ 104.
425 See Feldman v. Mexico, Award, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, $ 138 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2002), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
426 See id.
140.
This is a standard [of denial of justice] that the nullity and assessment decisions
almost certainly do not meet. Given as noted earlier that Mexican courts and
administrative procedures at all relevant times have been open to the
Claimant, the Claimant's victory in the 1993 Amparo decision, and the availability of court review in the nullity and assessment decisions filed by the
Claimant in 1998, there appears to have been no denial of due process or
denial of justice there as would rise to the level of a violation of international
law. As the Respondent concedes, this Tribunal could find a NAFTA violation
even if Mexican courts uphold Mexican law (counter-memorial, para. 364); this
Tribunal is not bound by a decision of a local court if that decision violates
international law. Also, as discussed in Section G2, NAFTA does not require a
claimant to exhaust local court remedies before submitting a claim to arbitration. The Claimant is limited only by the requirements of Article 1121(2)(b).
Id. 1 140 (citation omitted); see also id. 140 n.27 ("Moreover, the Mexican courts have
been deciding issues of national law which it is inappropriate for the Tribunal to review,
except and unless those determinations (or of Mexican administrative agencies such as
SHCP) are themselves denials of justice or otherwise in violation of NAFTA or international law.").
427 See id. $ 139; see also id. $$ 137, 140, 144.
428 See Submission of the Government of the United States of America, Metalclad
Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 15 (1999), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
429 In Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, finally, a Canadian dispute settlement panel convened under Canada's Agreement on Internal Trade struck down a piece of challenged
legislation after submission of a parallel Chapter 11 claim, and immediately before
announcement of the Chapter 11 panel's jurisdictional award. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada,
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Toward a Domestic Party to the Chapter 11 Dialectic

Given the relative youth of the Chapter 11 process, it should
come as little surprise that the domestic side of the dialectical
exchange that I propose-the reaction and response of the national
courts-has not yet fully materialized. This can be expected to change
as the number of Chapter 11 arbitrations following upon national
court decisions grows, the prospect of Chapter 11 review gains prominence, and national courts begin to grapple with it.430
Already today, the domestic courts have begun to join in the dialectical engagement of Chapter 11. In Loewen itself an example of
such interplay might be noted. Among the central issues in the case
was the substantial supersedeas bond requirement, which both the
Mississippi trial court and Supreme Court declined to waive or
reduce. 43 1 On April 24, 2001, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court
amended Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 to cap the size of
the bond, based both on the net worth of the liable party and a sum
certain. 432 While not the developed pattern of dialectical interaction
envisioned herein, the Mississippi court's decision to adjust its rules in
the face of Chapter 11 review suggests the type of interplay that might
ultimately be expected to emerge.
Closer to the pattern of dialectical review, if still somewhat distinct, has been the review of several Chapter 11 awards in national
courts. The Chapter 11 awards in Metalclad, S.D. Myers v. Canada,
and Feldman were each challenged by the respondent state party in
the Canadian national courts. 433 In essence, Mexico and Canada
Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998), availableat http://
www.naftalaw.org; see Alan C. Swan, Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction,
94 Am. J. INT'L L. 159, 159-60 (2000).
430 It bears noting that numerous Chapter 11 cases include some nexus with domestic
litigation. In most such cases, however, the relevant Chapter 11 claim alleges misconduct
by executive or legislative branch officials and only incidentally references the subsequent
review of that conduct in the national courts. Even in such cases, an element of beneficial
dialogue may ensue and contribute to the pattern of engagement I describe herein. Any
such interaction, however, lacks a strong dimension of review.
431 See supra Part I. As it stood at the time of the Mississippi litigation, Mississippi Rule
of Appellate Procedure 8 required a 125% supersedeas bond to stay a monetary judgment
pending appeal. See Miss. R. App. P. 8(a).
432 See David W. Clark, Life in Lawsuit Central: An Over-View of the Unique Aspects of
Mississippi's Civil Justice System, 71 Miss. L.J. 359, 380 (2001). The Loewen tribunal's
Jurisdictional Award, in which it rejected or put off the United States's various jurisdictional and other preliminary defenses, was issued on January 5, 2001.
433 Article 1136 of NAFTA provides for the judicial enforcement of Chapter 11 awards.
See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1136(4), at 646. In doing so, however, it also envisions the
possibility of annulment proceedings, such as those brought in Metalclad, S.D. Myers, and
Feldman, at the situs of the arbitration. See id., art. 1136(3); see also Coe, supra note 122,
at 1411-12 (describing review of Metalclad award). In those three cases, Mexico and
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turned to the national courts of Canada (the designated situs of the
relevant arbitrations) to set aside the relevant Chapter 11 awards,
based primarily on claims that the tribunals had exceeded their jurisdiction. 434 Perhaps most notable was Metalclad, in which the relevant
435
challenge was upheld, at least in part.
Metalclad, S.D. Myers, and Feldman, however, did not involve
436
any significant degree of Chapter 11 review of national courts.
Rather, the relevant international and national tribunals considered
different sets of questions in those cases. In Metalclad and Feldman,
moreover, the national courts reviewing the Chapter 11 awards were
from a different jurisdiction than the government institutions originally reviewed by the relevant tribunals, because Mexico was challenging the awards against it in the Canadian courts. As such, the
pattern of post-Chapter 11 review in the national courts does not
manifest the precise pattern of dialectical review described herein.
Such a dialectic would instead arise where a national court takes up
the concerns raised by a Chapter 11 tribunal, such as the Loewen
panel. A future Chapter 11 panel would then have the opportunity to
respond further, continuing a productive pattern of exchange that

Canada took advantage of this provision, bringing their claims in the Canadian courts,
given the parties' identification of Canada as the seat of the arbitration.
434 See, e.g., United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 664,
55-56,
availableat http://www.naftalaw.org. In S.D. Myers and Feldman, there was also the additional question of whether the award violated Canadian public policy. See United Mexican
States v. Karpa (Feldman II), No. 03-CV-23500, 1$ 10-11, 21-38, 87-97 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 3, 2003) available at http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2003/2003onsc1l923.html;
Canada v. S.D. Myers, No. A-252-01, 1 4-5 (Fed. Ct. Jan. 28, 2002), available at http://
www.naftalaw.org. Finally, Feldman II also involved several procedural challenges to the
conduct of the arbitration. See id. 3.
435 See Metalclad, 2001 B.C.S.C.
66-76. These cases present some challenge for the
paradigm of dialectical review. Charles Brower has criticized the substantive review of the
Metalclad award by the Canadian court. See Brower, supra note 216, at 65-68. Yet some
degree of such review is essential to the dialectical engagement envisioned herein. If the
national court avoids any meaningful inquiry into the arbitral award, the scope for dialogue
becomes a null set. On the other hand, if national court review is unduly invasive, the
equipoise of power is distorted and dialectical review undermined. The Canadian decision
in Metalclad might be construed, in this light, to have sought an appropriate balance of
deference and review. See id. at 66, 68.
436 In Feldman, the plaintiff directed his denial of justice claim primarily at Mexican
executive-branch agencies. Feldman also suggested, in passing, that a Mexican circuit
court's decision requiring him to present invoices to the Mexican tax authority, as a precondition to receiving tax rebates, conflicted with prior case law. The Chapter 11 Tribunal
responded by noting both that the plaintiff had inadequately presented his claim of denial
of justice, and that the alleged offense would not meet the standard for denial of justice set
out in Azinian, even if adequately presented. See Feldman v. Mexico, Award, Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/1, 1$ 138-140 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
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might be expected to encourage the development of common legal
437
norms.
This trio of cases, however, offers some sense of how a pattern of
dialectical review might one day play out. A potential requirement of

"transparency" in government procedures under Chapter 11 was the
subject of some exchange in the international and national decisions
in Metalclad, which may be the clearest example of a dialectical pattern of engagement to date. Specifically, the Metalclad tribunal drew

438
on references to transparency in NAFTA's statement of objectives

and in Chapter 18 of the Agreement 439 to conclude that Article 1105's

"fair and equitable treatment" requirement encompassed a mandate
of transparency in government procedures involving foreign investors. 440 On Mexico's petition, the British Columbia Supreme Court
considered, critiqued, and rejected this analysis. 441 In particular, it
rejected the application of Article 102's general objectives to Chapter
11, suggesting that NAFTA's transparency goal was not operational-

437 While this fully developed pattern of dialectical engagement has yet to emerge under
Chapter 11, besides the national review of Chapter 11 awards upon petition for enforcement, annulment, or revision, other opportunities for international tribunal interaction
with domestic courts also have arisen. In March 2004, for example, the Chapter 11 petitioners in Methanex v. United States asked the tribunal to issue an order in support of their
petition, asking a U.S. federal court to issue subpoenas for the production of evidence, to
the California state government and a U.S. corporation. See Methanex Submission on Its
Application for Reconsideration of the First Partial Award, Methanex v. United States
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2004), at http://www.naftalaw.org. Kenex Ltd. v. United States is
another case pairing Chapter 11 and domestic litigation. Claimants in this Chapter 11 case
challenged the relevant U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency final rule in U.S. federal court as
well, ultimately securing an injunction against its enforcement from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Hemp Indust. Ass'n v. DEA, 357 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.
2004). One might also note a pair of challenges to the constitutionality of Chapter 11, filed
in Canadian courts several years ago. See Notice of Application, Democracy Watch v.
Attorney Gen. of Canada, No. 01-CV-211576 (Ont. Sup. Ct. May 28, 2001), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/CUPE28.pdf; Notice of Application,
Council of Canadians v. Attorney Gen. of Can., No. 01-CV-208141 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28,
2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/CUP.pdf. Finally, the
Ethyl claim against Canada might suggest the capacity of Chapter 11 claims to impact
domestic litigation. In Ethyl, again, an administrative tribunal convened under Canada's
Agreement on Internal Trade struck down the challenged provision after submission of the
Chapter 11 claim, and immediately before the Chapter 11 tribunal issued its preliminary
award. See Swan, supra note 429, at 160.
438 See NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 102(1), at 297.
439 See id., art. 1802, at 681.
440 See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, T 70 (NAFTA Ch.
11 Arb. Trib. 2000), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
441 See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 664, 9$ 66-76, available at http://www.naftalaw.org.
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ized through Chapter 11 but could only be the basis of a claim under

Chapter 18.442
Notably, the Feldman Chapter 11 tribunal later took up this
exchange. Considering the apparent lack of transparency in Mexican
tax law-and perhaps tax law generally-the tribunal invoked the
British Columbia Supreme Court's analysis of transparency under
NAFTA. 443 Explicitly flagging its lack of obligation to "reach the

same result as the British Columbia Supreme Court," it nonetheless
found the latter's analysis to be instructive as to the question before
it.444

Notwithstanding its deviation from a true pattern of dialectical
review, then, the Metalclad exchange may be suggestive of the dialectical model of international interaction with national courts offered
herein. Through such interaction, some groundwork has been laid for
future analysis and development of a doctrine of transparency,
whether through domestic or international litigation. 445 The exchange
from Metalclad to Feldman, moreover, reaffirms what I have identified as the core function of Chapter 11 and similar international
review of national courts-a fertile source of judicial innovation. In
particular, I would argue, dialectical review among international and
national tribunals may be expected to contribute to the development
of common international standards of due process.
V
DIALECTICAL INNOVATION AND INTERNATIONAL

DUE PROCESS

If dialectical review-with its elements of balanced judicial
power, varied perspective, and adjudicatory continuity-can serve as a
442 See id. The British Columbia Supreme Court's decision actually suggests a pattern of
broader dialectical engagement with the Chapter 11 process. The court thus did not limit
its focus to the Metalclad award under review, but considered a number of Chapter 11
awards in reaching its conclusions. See id. at 9161-65, 68-69, 74; see also Canada v. S.D.
Myers, 2002 F.C.A. 39, T 50 (citing Chapter 11 award in Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on
Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998)), availableat http://www.nafta
law.org.
443 See Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, [ 107, 133, 147 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
444 See id.; see also id. 91147 ("The Metalclad Tribunal's finding of an expropriation
based on transparency... was effectively vacated by the British Columbia Supreme Court
(British Columbia was the 'seat' of the arbitration), responding to a challenge by the
Government of Mexico."). The reviewing national courts' reference to other Chapter 11
cases is further evidence of a broader pattern of engagement.
445 The Metalclad tribunal's notion of a transparency requirement in Chapter 11 thus
may continue to offer a viable claim for future litigants. See Todd Weiler, Metalclad v.
Mexico: A Play in Three Parts, 2 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 685, 700-01 (2001) (suggesting

flaws in Canadian court's analysis of potential transparency requirement).
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potential mechanism of innovation, and if Chapter 11 and similar
international dispute settlement regimes are at least rough models of
dialectical review, what are the appropriate ends of such innovation in
Chapter 11 and its analogues? Various possibilities might be offered,
including clearer international norms of non-discrimination 446 and
more universal standards for regulatory expropriations. 447 I would
identify the development of international norms of due process as the
ideal focus for the dialectical review of Chapter 11 and similar interna4 48
tional regimes.
In the habeas context, the dialectical structure of review identified by Cover and Aleinikoff has facilitated the development of constitutional due process norms.449 The Supreme Court's open-ended
decision in Mempa, for example, triggered an exchange between federal and state courts from which emerged a fuller articulation of the
constitutional right to counsel at probation-revocation hearings. 450 To
similar effect, the dialectical review of Chapter 11 and other mechanisms of international review of national courts can help to construct
international norms of due process, with application not only to international adjudication, but also in national court proceedings across
the globe.

45 1

446 Non-discrimination standards likely are relevant to any due process/denial of justice
claim, as evident in Loewen, where the claimants brought discrimination claims alongside
their various due process claims. Ultimately, however, due process claims sounding in
international denial of justice norms do not depend on any discriminatory state act.
Rather, even if due process is denied to all comers, a denial of justice occurs. This is just
how the Loewen litigation played out, as suggested by the tribunal's disregard of the claimants' discrimination claims. See Weiler, supra note 43, at 5-7.
447 Recent works by Vicki Been and Joel Beauvais and by Paul Stephan have focused on
Chapter 1l's implications for international expropriation standards. See Been & Beauvais,
supra note 21, at 59-60; Stephan, supra note 41 (describing how courts and international
bodies have used international and domestic law governing expropriation to constrain governmental action).
448 I do not intend to suggest that procedural standards of international law (e.g., denial
of justice or international norms of due process) are of greater significance than substantive ones (e.g., definition of standards for expropriation or non-discrimination). Substantive standards, however, may require more precise (i.e., less dialectic) mechanisms of
articulation than procedural standards, given their potentially greater sensitivity. See infra
note 452. Even if dialectical review can further the development of substantive norms
effectively, the development of such review may benefit from initial application to procedural norms, before its application to substantive matters such as the permisibility of punitive damages, arguably the major substantive question at stake in Loewen. It also bears
noting that I do not mean to suggest any rigid demarcation of procedural and substantive
review. These categories necessarily overlap. Nonetheless, review of an asserted denial of
justice can be meaningfully distinguished from consideration of a claim of expropriation.
449 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
450 See supra notes 163-84 and accompanying text.
451 I emphasize herein the development of international norms of due process, as distinct from what might be termed international due process norms. The latter encompasses
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The development of international norms of due process is a good
place for Chapter 11 tribunals to focus their energies at the outset.
Procedural critiques are relatively less likely to trigger sensitivities

than more merits-oriented review. 452 International tribunals also can
make much stronger claims of competence as to procedure than as to
substance. 4 53 The development of common standards of due process,
the due process standards in international proceedings, while my focus is on common
norms of due process, applicable not only in international, but also in national, proceedings. See KENNETH S. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 36-61
(1946) (describing need for certain fundamental procedural guarantees to maintain validity
of international adjudication); V. S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 12-54 (1980) (describing norms of international procedure); Cristian
Defrancia, Due Processin InternationalCriminal Courts: Why ProcedureMatters, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1381, 1393-97 (2001) (describing need for strong procedural due process norms in
international adjudication, as in domestic context, in order to maintain integrity of international tribunals); John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need
for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1173
(1999) (describing general principles of procedural due process in international litigation).
452 See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407,
1485-86, 1488 (2002) ("In the international sphere, the issue of what constitutes fair procedures may be the easiest place to find agreement."). An emphasis on developing international norms of due process may therefore be preferable, because there may be "no
universal principle of substantive justice." See id. at 1486.
Of course, it will not always be the case that international review of process will be
less invasive than review of substance. Thus, in the international review of national judicial
process, one observes an institutional conflict, while in the review of substantive decisions
for error there is a mere conflict of law. It is with this in mind that Ann Althouse has
argued that the shift in federal habeas review from the substantive inquiry of Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), to the Burger Court's emphasis on state court adequacy ultimately made for an even greater invasion of state sovereignty, since the subject matter of
the paired state and federal cases is no longer the same. Rather, federal habeas review
becomes a second proceeding about what was wrong with the first proceeding. See
Althouse, supra note 136, at 943.
Some procedural standards, moreover, manifest particular normative values of a given
national polity. Their review and critique by international adjudicators therefore may
trigger no less adverse a response than review of any substantive legal choice. Yet we do
best not to overestimate such resistance, at least at the outset. Rather, a pattern of caution
on the part of international tribunals engaged in dialectical review may well produce a
greater receptivity of national courts to innovation and reform than one might suspect. To
this effect, I describe below the willingness of national courts to acknowledge the ICJ's
concerns with a strict application of procedural default rules to asserted violations of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. See infra notes 556-58 and accompanying
text. If some pattern of exchange might emerge in so sensitive an area as habeas review,
dialectical review may offer greater promise than conventional assumptions might predict.
It is consequently difficult to predict the extent of procedural convergence that might
ultimately emerge across legal systems. Rather, this issue is itself one for analysis and
resolution in the course of an extended dialectical exchange. The final results of the process of dialectical review for the convergence of norms of due process thus remain to be
seen.
453 See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 564. An emphasis on due process
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finally, may serve as a foundation for the identification and emergence
454
of substantive areas of legal and institutional harmony.
Common international norms of due process as developed
through dialectical exchange also would offer significant benefits in
the realm of international economics. In an increasingly globalized
world, with trade and investment flows moving in greater volumes and
at greater speeds than could have been imagined even a generation
ago, a stable framework for global commerce is essential. 455 Central
to that framework are broadly applicable institutional norms,
including common standards of due process within which the disputes
and claims that arise from a global economy can be consistently, reliably, and expeditiously resolved. As of now, standards of due process
vary widely, based on an array of political, cultural, and economic
norms is also consistent with the United States's "procedural liberalism." See CARRESE,
supra note 213, at 4.
454 See Young, supra note 115, at 531 (describing foundational character of procedural
norms). One might imagine such a shift from procedural to substantive review under
Chapter 11. With growing occasion for Chapter 11 review of national courts, and the
emergence of a pattern of such cases, such review is likely to gain increased legitimacy. A
body of precedent developed with reference to questions of procedure, further, can serve
as a framework for the articulation and development of more substantive standards. Subjects of review under a regime of substantive Chapter 11 review might be broad-ranging.
Among the most significant possibilities, however, would be challenges to punitive damage
awards, a long-standing source of criticism of U.S. litigation practices, and even to the use
of assertedly unreliable jury trials. See Lerner, supra note 33, at 242-44, 279-81. Following from the Loewen case, a further possibility might be challenges to the requirement
of a supersedeas bond as a condition for any stay pending appeal.
Review of these familiar practices for conformity with substantive norms of international law-whether by Chapter 11 or other international tribunals-would undoubtedly
be controversial. On the foundation of a developed jurisprudence of procedural review,
and an attendant reputation for deference, fairness, and rigor, however, it might not be
rejected out of hand. This might be especially true of a dialectical pattern of substantive
review, with its indirect and limited nature. Such review might enjoy the essential virtue of
offering the national systems subject to review significant flexibility in the nature and pace
of any resulting reforms.
On the other hand, it is at least possible that substantive review is inherently less
suited to dialectical review than the questions of due process that I prioritize herein. To be
effective, dialectical review requires meaningful overlap in perspectives. See supra notes
281-82 and accompanying text. It also requires room for negotiation and compromise.
The substantive subjects of review suggested immediately above, however, may have more
of a black-and-white character than questions of due process. An effective regime of substantive international review of national courts might therefore be expected to take at least
a slightly, if not significantly, different form than the dialectical pattern of review proposed
herein.
455 In this vein, a dialectic discourse of international norms of due process is also
favored by the need to build a common set of values across jurisdictions. See Slaughter,
Typology, supra note 85, at 126. Such commonality may be more readily identified with
reference to process. The development of commonality in the realm of due process, however, may be a foundation for connections in other areas as well. See id.
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influences. 456 This is true of international norms of due process generally, including even the relatively more developed natural-person

claims of criminal procedure. 457 Yet the norms applicable to the international economic claims emphasized herein-commonly arising in
activitythe context of foreign investment or other 4 commercial
58

remain particularly unsettled and inconsistent.
These norms, including the minimum standard of treatment, the
requirements of fair and equitable treatment and of full protection
and security, and the prohibition against the denial of justice, 45 9 have

been subject to only limited elucidation since the end of World War
11.460

The heyday of these due process norms thus dates back to their

recurrent invocation and progressive articulation by the international
claims commissions formed from the late nineteenth century through
46 1
the inter-war period.
456

See Gaffney, supra note 451, at 1178.

These include the right to counsel, questions of unfair or arbitrary detention, and
issues of trial procedure.
457

458

See

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW

524-28 (4th ed.

1990) (describing procedural differences based on debate between (mostly) wealthy countries espousing international standard for treatment of aliens and (mostly) non-wealthy
countries espousing national standard for treatment of aliens).
459 Cf Jose E. Alvarez, CollateralProtectionism and United States InternationalInvestment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 137 (1989)
(describing U.S. claims that investors had been denied effective legal recourse and due
process following expropriation of private property); Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v.
Greene, 23 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 94 (1999) (reviewing claim that U.S. courts

failed to meet international requirements of due process in human rights case); Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 201, 233-34 (1988) (reviewing BIT requirements); 3 U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & THE ENV'T,

Fairand Equitable Treatment, in UNITED

NATIONS CONFERENCE ON

TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREE-

UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (1999).
Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M.
127 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.naftalaw.org;
85, 110,
BROWNLIE, supra note 458, at 525.
461 See LILLICH, supra note 53, at 5, 25 (suggesting that developments in law of state
responsibility for injuries to aliens was spurred in early post-World War I period through
dozens of international tribunals); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MENTS, U.N. Doc.
460 See Mondev

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:

TIHE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN

749-58 (1980) (describing early transnational attempts to define rights of resident
aliens); Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protectionof the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1982) (describing substantive law applied by
international arbitral tribunals and claims commissions over past two centuries); see also
Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD INVEST151 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003) (reviewing decisions of United
MENT 675, 710,
States-Mexico Claims Tribunal), available at http://www.naftalaw.org; Mondev, 42 I.L.M.
at 107, 114 ("It has been suggested ... that the meaning of those provisions in customary
international law is that laid down by the Claims Commissions of the inter-war years,
notably that of the Mexican Claims Commission in the Neer case."); cf. Anthony D'Amato
DIGNITY
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Beginning with the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the
1906 and 1929 Geneva Conventions, 462 and progressing through the
post-World War II codifications of international law, natural-person

claims of denial of justice-issues of detention, access to counsel, and
trial procedure 463-were progressively drawn out of the then-vibrant
claims commission process. 464 Moving from the realm of customary
international law, 465 such claims were gradually codified in an
independent body of "human rights law."' 466 With the extraction of
& Kirsten Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation of Nuclear Power Technology, 74
VA. L. REV. 1011, 1031 & n.79 (1988) (describing contribution of claims commissions to
substantive norms of international law). The relevant commissions included, perhaps most
prominently, the several Venezuelan and Mexican claims commissions, which were formed
following early moves toward the confiscation and nationalization of foreign-held property
in each country, and decisions of which continue to be widely cited. See, e.g., North Am.
Dredging Co. of Tex. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS

26 (1926) (addressing contract under which U.S. party signed away rights to access U.S.
courts in cross-border deal).
462 See Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 293 (1999) (outlining establishment and
development of humanitarian law); NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 18

(2002) (describing early agreements to provide healthcare to sick and wounded soldiers
irrespective of nationality).
463 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 46, § 711 cmt. a; see
also Lerner, supra note 33, at 233-34.
464 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 46, § 711 cmt.
a ("As regards natural persons, most injuries that in the past would have been characterized as "denials of justice" are now subsumed as human rights violations ....");Jorge

Cicero, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 as a Remedy for Injuries to Aliens, 23 COLUM. HUM.
RTS L. REV. 315, 403 (1991) (commenting on Restatement's characterization of change in
definition of denial of justice from failure to provide alien due process to human right with
effective remedy); Stephen D. Ramsey, State Responsibility Under the Restatement, 83 AM.
SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 224, 235 (1989) (commenting on Restatement and on whether
human rights law has eclipsed or modified provisions available to aliens under state
responsibility law); see also Robert Rosenstock & Benjamin K. Grimes, The Fifty-fourth

Session of the International Law Commission, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 162, 164-65 (2003) ("It
was decided not to include specific provisions on denial of justice; the reasoning was that
the concept has been replaced by specific standards contained in international human
rights instruments."); cf Mondev, 42 I.L.M. at 107, 115. Frederick Sherwood Dunn categorized, according to the actual practice of governments in the past, the international min-

imum standard of treatment of aliens to encompass two parts: "the security of the person
from injury or restraint, and the preservation of private property rights, not only against
the actions of other individuals but against the government as well." Frederick S. Dunn,
International Law and Private Property Rights, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 166, 176 (1928).
465 See Vagts, supra note 51, at 382.
466 See BROWNLIE, supra note 458, at 527-28; Lerner, supra note 33, at 233-34. Ulti-

mately, the body of human rights law would come to include the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the respective
human rights conventions (and resulting institutions) of Europe and the Americas. See

Derek Jinks, InternationalHuman Rights Law and the War on Terrorism, 31 DENY. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 58, 60-62 (2002) (noting due process rights in ICCPR, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and regional human rights agreements); see also

HENKIN,

supra note 462,

at 331, 491 (listing U.N. conventions on specified human rights subjects and detailing influ-
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these claims, the development of denial of justice and other investment and commercial rules of due process lost its jurisprudential
momentum. 467 Human rights law embarked on a still-ongoing pattern
of aggressive growth and development, 468 but norms of denial of jusence of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note
462, at 71, 76 (describing ECHR and American Convention on Human Rights); Kitty
Arambulo, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: AN APPRAISAL OF CURRENT EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-

57, 58 (Peter Van der Auweraert et al. eds., 2002) (noting early U.N. intention to
create single legally binding human rights instrument); Matthew Craven, The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 101 (Raija Hanski & Markku Suksi eds., 2nd
ed. 1999) (stating that International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
"was created as one of the central pillars of the international human rights system ...
developed by the United Nations after 1945" and "[a]s such, it stands alongside its sister
covenant, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"); F.V. Garcfa-Amador, International Responsibility:
Second Report, reprinted in [1957] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/106, at
17-18 (discussing denial of justice in international case law and codifications); J.G.
Merrills, The Council of Europe (I): The European Convention on Human Rights, in AN
MENTS

INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

supra, at 287

(discussing origins of European Convention on Human Rights); J.G. Merrills, Promotion
and Protectionof Human Rights Within the EuropeanArrangements, in AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

supra, at 275 (describing patch-

work of human rights regimes in Europe); Manfred Nowak, The InternationalCovenant on
Civil and Political Rights, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 83 ("Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
...

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ...

constitute[s]

the core of United Nations human rights law...."); Martin Scheinin, InternationalHuman
Rights in National Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 417, 421 (describing success of European Convention on
Human Rights); Harmen van der Wilt & Viviana Krsticevic, The OAS System for the
Protection of Human Rights, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 371 ("[T]he inter-American system for the protection of
human rights has developed within the framework of the Organization of American States
(OAS) in ways that mirror the European system of human rights protection."); Shirley
Williams, Human Rights in Europe, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM
INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 77-109 (Samantha Power and Graham Allison eds., 2000)
(describing development of human rights institutions in Europe).
467 See LILLICH, supra note 53, at 16-25; see also id. at 224-25; F.V. GARCfA-AMADOR,
DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE FOR INJURIES CAUSED
TERRITORY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF ALIENS,

reprintedin

OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS

IN ITS

RECENT CODIFICATION

17-18 (1974).

Over the course of the last century, in essence, universally applicable norms of treatment, versus the particularlized treatment of aliens-the context in which most civil and
wealth-related denial of justice claims had arisen-came to be prioritized. See Vagts, supra
note 51, at 383-84. A hundred years later, human rights standards of due process are far
more developed than the denial of justice, fair and equitable treatment, and other wealthoriented due process norms emphasized herein. See Ralph Ruebner & Lisa Carroll, The
Finality of Judgment and Sentence Prerequisitein the United States-Peru Bilateral Prisoner
Transfer Treaty: Calling Congressand the Presidentto Reform and Justifying Jurisdictionof
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1071,
468
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tice as applied to civil claims, particularly investment and commercial
claims, fell into desuetude. 469 Denial of justice and related claims of

fair and equitable treatment, and the minimum standard of treatment
470
generally, became static and increasingly dated.
1090-92 (2000) (detailing high degree of uniformity and clarity that has developed within
U.N. and regional human rights standards of due process).
469

See

LILLICH,

supra note 53, at 19-21 (describing decision of International Law Com-

mission to drop subject of state responsibility for injuries to aliens in favor of international
responsibility of states in general). Thus, most of the substantive development of denial of
justice norms in the claims commissions had come in the criminal context.
470 See Rosenstock & Grimes, supra note 464, at 164-65. With the rise of human rights
law, the centrality of denial of justice and the minimum standard of treatment in international law diminished and, with notable exceptions, claims commissions ceased to be a
central feature in the development of international law. See LILLICH, supra note 53, at 8.
Perhaps related, the claims commissions also fell into disuse on account of Latin American
objections to denial of justice claims and minimum-standard claims generally, see Vagts,
supra note 51, at 383, in line with the Calvo Doctrine's rejection of a higher standard of
treatment for aliens, versus simply national treatment. As decolonization occurred and
more developing country parties joined the international community, this opposition grew
stronger and came to prevail. See id. Consequently, the volume of international arbitration declined. See id. The recent wave of BITs mandating provision of a minimum standard of treatment-the context out of which Chapter 11 arose-represents a sharp reversal
of this trend, with the attendant growth in opportunities for international review of
national courts explored herein. Given the broader pattern of the last century, however,
denial of justice-the core international claim of judicial wrongdoing-remains "one of the
worst elucidated [concepts] in international law." See Lerner, supra note 33, at 248
(quoting Charles de Visscher, Le Deni de Justice en Droit International, 52 RECUEIL DES
COURs 369, 369 (1935)).
A persistent inability to codify the law of state responsibility, especially in its earlier
emphasis on injuries to aliens, likely also contributed to the decline of denial of justice as a
normative claim-or at least sacrificed a potential source of stability for the doctrine. See
Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, The ILC's State Responsibility Articles, Introduction
and Overview, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773, 777 (2002) (describing early series of failed attempts
to codify rules of state responsibility for injuries to aliens); see also id. (dating shift in
emphasis of International Law Commission's efforts to extend state responsibility beyond
treatment of aliens to chairman Robert Ago's subcommittee report of 1963). Efforts at the
codification of state responsibility thus increasingly focused attention on "secondary"
rules, such as imputation, rather than the substantive rules of treatment of aliens, such as
denial of justice. See Bodansky & Crook, supra, at 776-77; Robert Rosenstock, The ILC
and State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 792-93 (2002) (describing post-World War
II hostility toward codification of state responsibility, including decades of obstacles arising
within International Law Commission); see also James Crawford, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fiftieth Session, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (1998) (discussing distinction between primary and secondary rules of state responsibility), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1998/
98repfra.htm. State responsibility doctrine thus remains a product of customary international law and various dispersed sources, rather than any single codified enactment. See
MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (4th ed. 2000) (associating state
responsibility with customary law, judicial pronouncements, treaties, and U.N. resolutions). The League of Nations's attempt at codification of the Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens at the Hague Codification Conference of 1930 likewise fell short. Three
subsequent efforts at codification also failed. See Roberto Ago, Second Report on State
Responsibility, [1970] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 177, 178, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233/SER.A/
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In the last fifty years, little has occurred to alter this state of

affairs in any meaningful respect. Non-criminal international norms
of due process-including investment and commercial norms-have
continued to lack the dynamic mechanism of development and innovation they once enjoyed in the claims commission process. 471 This is
not to suggest that relevant international norms of due process are
completely stagnant. Rather, such standards have continued to
develop in at least two ways.

First, the active development of international human rights norms
has had incidental implications for the development of due process in
civil and commercial law proceedings. 472 This has occurred where the
relevant human rights norm, even if developed in the context of criminal litigation, speaks to judicial process generally. 473 Second, the

long-negotiated rules of state responsibility, a work in progress for
most of the last century, also incorporate some dimension of international due process. 474 Treatment of the absence of adequate local

remedies in state responsibility doctrine might be noted in this regard.
State responsibility is also triggered when states fail to provide due
process in the form of access to unbiased and legally constituted
courts. 4 75 More generally, the emphasis of modern state responsibility
1970 (describing disagreement on components constituting "illicit act"); Garcia-Amador,
supra note 466, at 17-18; Willem Riphagen, Second Report on the Content, Forms and
Degrees of InternationalResponsibility, [1981] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 1, 79, 82, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/344/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (discussing previous drafts submitted to International Law Commission). On the long string of efforts to codify norms of state responsibility, see LILLICH, supra note 53, at 16-25; Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the
Unmaking of InternationalLaw, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1988).
471 See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
472 See LILLICH, supra note 53, at 27-29. International human rights law, of course,
encompasses an array of due process obligations. See Jinks, supra note 466, at 59-62.
473 On the array of international norms of due process, such as the prohibition against
arbitrary arrest and the right to prompt appearance before a judge-which are largely
oriented to criminal prosecution and were primarily developed and articulated in human
rights instruments, see LILLICH, supra note 53, at 27-29; William J. Aceves, The Right to
Information on ConsularAssistance in the Framework of the Guaranteesof the Due Process
of Law, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 555, 559 (2000); Dickinson, supra note 452, at 1421-22, 1429;
Ruebner & Carroll, supra note 468, at 1090-92. Article 14 of the ICCPR, establishing
minimum due process guarantees, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176-77, is an especially important source of due
process rights. See Aceves, supra, at 559; Defrancia, supra note 451, at 1393.
474 Cf Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 675, 709-10, 1 150 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://
www.naftalaw.org.
475 See C. F. AMERASINoHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 97-99
(1967) (discussing lack of access to fair courts as breach of international law); A.F.M.
Maniruzzaman, InternationalDevelopment Law as Applicable Law to Economic Development Agreements: A Prognostic View, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 26 (2001) (positing that state
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doctrine on secondary obligations-those that follow from breach of a
476
primary obligation-suggests some quasi-procedural mandate.

It is not clear, however, that either of these mechanisms offers as
dynamic a tool of due process development-especially outside the

criminal context-as a recurent pattern of dialectical review. At least
to date,477 in neither case do we have the actively responsive pattern
of judicial engagement, which-in the form of habeas litigation-contributed to the emergence and evolution of due process in the United
States. 478 As to human rights doctrine, there are indisputably impor-

tant mechanisms of judicial development of norms.479 Much of the
evolution and expansion of human rights law since World War II
might, in fact, be credited to these institutions. 480 Until recently, however, human rights adjudication has not exhibited any strong pattern
of intersystemic adjudication between international and national

tribunals. Consequently, the potential returns in innovation offered
by dialectical review have not been fully capitalized upon. 481 Human
can incur international responsibility for breach of agreement and additionally for denial of
justice if it then closes its courts to aliens litigating against state).
476 See James Crawford, The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 874, 876 (2002) (noting analogy of modern
state responsibility rules to "common law rules of civil procedure-a distinctive set of rules
that apply across the various substantive areas of law") (citation omitted); see also Allott,
supra note 470, at 6-7 (noting shift of state responsibility rules away from definition of
substantive obligations).
477 Recent expansion in the ECHR's accessibility to individual claimants, among other
changes, may help to facilitate the emergence of more dynamic patterns of engagement in
the ECHR's interaction with European national courts. See infra Part VI.B.
478 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. A third, interesting source of international norms of due process has been the litigation of claims before international tribunals
themselves. But see supra note 451. This judicial framework has provided a helpful context for the development of due process norms. The relevant standards have been internal
to international adjudication, however, and do not, as such, constitute the type of norm I
emphasize herein.
479 See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 279. The extensive litigation of the due
process protections of Articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 473, arts. 9, 14, is perhaps the best example.
480 See Aceves, supra note 473, at 559 (noting "dynamic evolution" of human rights law)
(citation omitted); Defrancia, supra note 451, at 1390 ("Through their rulemaking and
interpretative jurisprudence, however, the Tribunals play a unique role in resolving gaps
and inconsistencies in the sources of human rights law informing the conduct of the
trials."); Ruebner & Carroll, supra note 468, at 1090-92.
481 These include access by individual petitioners and the regular use of potentially more
effective monetary damages. See supra Part II.B. This is not to suggest that there is no
dialogic dimension in international human rights adjudication. There is. See Christopher
McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights? TransnationalJudicial Conversations on
Constitutional Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL HisTORY:

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF

BRIAN SIMPSON 29, 31-40 (Katherine O'Donovan & Gerry R. Rubin eds., 2000) (dis-

cussing debates surrounding judicial application of international precedent). It is, how-
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rights tribunals are moving in this direction, I suggest below, but they

482
are not there yet.
Notwithstanding their long provenance, then, international norms
of due process could be more developed and more widely applied.

This is evident in the relevant Chapter 11 arbitrations to date, each of
which has struggled with the appropriate scope and standard of denial

of justice. Existing mechanisms of due process development cannot
be expected to provide the aggressive and sustained pattern of innovation necessary to address this need. Chapter 11 and analogous forms

of international review, however, may help to fill this void.
This prospect begins with the language of Chapter 11 itself.
Article 1105 speaks directly to the requirements of the minimum standard of treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and full protection
and security, making it a credible nexus for the elucidation, clarification, and elaboration of these doctrines. The replication of this provision in other trade and investment agreements, meanwhile, can be
expected to increase the pool of interchangeable precedent on the
several standards. 483 Such redundancy may encourage a cross-pollination among tribunals, resulting in an enhancement of the global "community of law.''484 The capacity of Chapter l's dialectical review for
4 85
innovation further suits it to this role.
ever, less active and direct than the exchange I propose herein. On the other hand, this
dynamic may already be changing. See infra notes 556-58 and accompanying text.
482 See infra notes 573-80 and accompanying text.
483 In fact, the recently completed Free Trade Agreement between the United States
and Australia may enhance dramatically the potential for a dialectical exchange directed to
due process, by defining "fair and equitable treatment" to include "the obligation not to
deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance
with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world."
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, supra note 50, art. 11.5 (emphasis added).
By referring back to domestic standards, this new language may well enhance the degree of
transnational interaction on relevant standards of due process. Cf Trade Act of 2002, 19
U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(E) (2002) (encouraging future definition of "fair and equitable treatment" in terms "consistent with United States legal principles and practice, including the
principle of due process").
484 See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 323-26.
485 See Brower, supra note 417, at 79-80; Cover, supra note 14, at 673-74. On a related
note, an approach to the development of international norms of due process grounded in
dialectical review would seem to be favored by the highly contextual nature of due process
claims. See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M.
85, 109, 126 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.naftalaw.org; cf.
Aceves, supra note 473, at 557. Particular procedures in the relevant jurisdiction, assessment of the efficacy of judicial alternatives, and evaluation of the relevant judicial system
in its entirety, are likely to shape resolution of any given claim. This is evident in the close
analysis of the denial of justice claims in Loewen. See Loewen Group v. United States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 675, 710,

151(NAFTA Ch. 11

Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://www.naftalaw.org. In the face of these highly contextual elements, bright-line rules are unlikely to be effective adjudicatory tools, even
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What might we say, then, about the actual development of international norms of due process by way of the dialectical review of

Chapter 11? At the outset, it bears noting that a pattern of dialectical
review directed to international due process does not involve any del-

egation of authority to create such norms. The latter possibility might
be objected to on several grounds, including the greater legitimacy of
positive law as the source of such norms, especially in an international,
rather than national, setting.486 The essence of such norms already
exists, however, in the minimum standard of treatment, the rules of
diplomatic protection, the bar against denials of justice, and the other
standards noted above. In fact, in the somewhat distinct context of
due process in international litigation itself, a wide array of procedural
obligations have been clearly identified and developed. 487 The rele-

vant need is not the creation of due process norms, but the refinement
of existing norms through their cooperative application in domestic
and international settings alike.
The development of international due process by way of Chapter

11 dialectical review has, in fact, already begun. In Mondev, questions
of judicial lawmaking, as well as norms of official immunity, were subassuming the emergence of a large body of relevant precedent. Rather, claims of denial of
justice and other due process challenges may be inherently suited to adjudication through
an active interchange among judicial parties. Such a dialectic will allow not only a more
nuanced treatment of context, but also the incorporation of valuable expertise from the
institutions most steeped in the relevant judicial system-domestic judges themselves.
Finally, one might also identify case-by-case adjudication as a preferred means for the
elaboration of international norms of due process, including the generalized doctrines of
the minimum standard of treatment and denial of justice particularly, as opposed to an
approach grounded in positive law rule-making of one sort or another. Cf SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (upholding SEC's ad hoc interpretations of
"fair and equitable" requirement, given number of factors favoring selection of that
approach). Essentially, the relevant "problem[s] may be so specialized and varying in
nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule." Id. at 203.
Adjudicatory flexibility may therefore be well warranted.
486 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999) ("CIL suffers additional doubts about its legitimacy
that do not burden treaties."); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 530-35 (2000) (describing greater legitimacy of treaty-based
international law); cf Reginald Ezetah, The Right to Democracy: A QualitativeInquiry, 22
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 527-28 (1997) (applying Jiirgen Habermas's theory of positive law
as instrument of integration to development of international law).
487 See CARLSTON, supra note 451, at 36-66 (discussing right to be heard, right to due
deliberation by a duly constituted tribunal, right to reasoned judgment, right to tribunal
free from corruption, and right to proceedings free from fraud in international adjudication); MANI, supra note 451, at 25-35 (same); Defrancia, supra note 451, at 1384 (outlining
right to fair trial under international law); Dickinson, supra note 452, at 1488 (noting
nature of certain procedural norms in international litigation as customary international
law).
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ject to analysis and elucidation. 488 One might imagine a U.S. national
court, perhaps even in Massachusetts, seizing on the Mondev tribunal's suggestion of a possible appellate duty to remand new factual
questions that arise on appeal. Such a court might face some such fact
pattern, yet find little in domestic law to assist its analysis. In the
extrinsic perspective of Mondev, however, the national court might
find its starting point, a point which might in turn be taken up by other
domestic courts or, in an appropriate circumstance, by another
Chapter 11 tribunal, progressively furthering the dialectic pattern.
Evidence of a dialectical exchange over international norms of
due process is even more pronounced in Loewen. There, the tribunal
considered issues ranging from judicial treatment of discriminatory
and irrelevant statements at trial to the appropriate degree of detail in
jury instructions and from the permissible level of punitive damages in
civil litigation to the discretionary determination of whether a national
489
court should agree to waive a statutory appeal-bond requirement.
Any of these questions might subsequently be taken up by a domestic
court-whether in Mississippi, Massachusetts or elsewhere-in an
appropriate case. In this analysis, the Chapter 11 award might well be
relevant.
The Metalclad decision and its progeny might be cited as a further
example. 490 As described above, the Metalclad tribunal asserted the
existence of a due process requirement of transparency under Chapter
11.49 1 Upon review, the British Columbia Supreme Court engaged in
its own analysis of NAFTA, as well as customary international law,
concluding that no such requirement could be located in either.4 92 A
subsequent Chapter 11 tribunal, while receptive to a potential transparency requirement, adopted the Canadian court's analysis for the
purposes of the case before it.493 While not exactly mirroring the patSee supra notes 397-413 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
490 Again, recall that the initial Chapter 11 review in Metalclad was not of underlying
judicial conduct. As such, Metalclad offers a slightly askew pattern of dialectical review.
See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 1 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. 2000), at http://www.naftalaw.org.
491 See supra notes 438-42 and accompanying text. Notably, the Appellate Body of the
WTO has tied the requirement of transparency to principles of due process. See Todd
Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the Principlesof International Economic Law, 42 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 78 (2003) (citing WTO Appellate Body Report: United StatesImport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R,
182-183
(1998)), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/58abr.pdf.
492 See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 664, 24-28,
66-76.
493 See Feldman v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1,
107, 133, 147 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2002); see also supra notes 443-44 and accompanying text. A further-but quite
distinct-stage in this case of dialectical exchange might be the intervention of the NAFTA
state parties in 2001, to offer their "interpretation" of Article 1105 as limited to the
488

489
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tern of dialectical review outlined herein, as noted above, this
example offers a window into the potential pattern of engagement
494
that might emerge from Chapter 11 review of national courts.
Through such a process, transparency and analogous due process doc-

trines may emerge, evolve, and take root. Rather than expressing
only international or only domestic due process values, such doctrines

are likely to manifest common norms of both systems.
In these various examples, one can readily observe the dialectical

operation of intersystemic conflict and indeterminacy. Operating
within an institutional mechanism that cannot eliminate conflict as to
the requirements of due process-in terms of access, non-discrimination, punitive damage awards, and the like-the relevant interlocutors
are forced to engage one another, and thereby arrive at greater clarity

on the questions presented. Instead of alleviating indeterminacy, as
conventional review might do in pursuit of procedural uniformity and
predictability, 495 Chapter 11 forces judicial institutions to work
496
through it, in a pattern of extended dialectical review.

Chapter 11 review might thus be conceived as a type of institutional feedback loop, in which a balance of power and perspective and

the continuity of an adequate supply of cases over time facilitate the
development of international norms of due process. Chapter 11 facili-

tates such development, appropriately, in the context of real cases, in
which relevant questions of process are presented in concrete form.
requirements of customary international law. See infra note 526-30 and accompanying
text. The most important lesson of this intervention is arguably the need for caution in
Chapter 11 jurisprudence. See infra Part VI.A. On the other hand, it is notable that even
the intervention of the NAFTA signatories has not foreclosed a now independent discourse
of transparency. See supra note 445.
494 Outside the Chapter 11 context, Molly Warner Lien describes an analogous transnational interaction. See Lien, supra note 52, at 608-09. In Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden,
233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000), Judge Richard Posner was faced with the question of whether
to enforce an English judgment in Illinois. Faced with a statutory requirement that the
judgment have been rendered in accordance with due process, Posner hinted at a pattern
of exchange and harmonization similar to that described herein:
It is a fair guess that no foreign nation has decided to incorporate our due
process doctrines into its own procedural law; and so we interpret "due process" in the Illinois statute ... to refer to a concept of fair procedure simple
and basic enough to describe the judicial processes of civilized nations, our
peers.
Id. at 476-77. The resulting test was not "whether the foreign judgment comported with
American notions of due process, but rather whether it met a second international notion
of due process." Lien, supra note 52, at 609.
495 See CARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 2-3; Frisch, supra note 153, at 76.
496 See Powell, supra note 225, at 246 n.7 (leveraging framework for analysis of federal
habeas corpus law developed by Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 1047, to discuss
allocation and fragmentation of authority between federal and subfederal systems in
implementation of international human rights law).
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Further, it relies on those institutions with the greatest comparative
advantage in evaluating claims of due process and building on them497
the courts themselves.

Two now-familiar parallels to such a dialectical role for Chapter
11 and similar tribunals in the development of international due process deserve note. 4 98 First, notwithstanding its limitations, the aforementioned development of human rights law over the last century has
undoubtedly exhibited aspects of the proposed process of dialectical

review. Some reliance of human rights law on judicial institutions
generally, and individual claim procedures particularly, should thus be
noted.

49 9

More clearly, the proposed dialectical approach to Chapter 11
review, and its expected contribution to the development of international due process, is paralleled by the role of federal habeas review in
the U.S. jurisprudence of due process. 50 0 As a structural matter,
habeas and Chapter 11 review are similar "common law"-and collateral-forms of legal transition. 50 1 As with Chapter 11, there have
always been concerns with the intersystemic nature of federal habeas
review. 502 Regardless, such review has served an indisputably central
50 3
role in U.S. constitutional development over the last half-century.
497 Cf. Defrancia, supra note 451, at 1384 (suggesting role of international criminal
courts in articulating international norms of due process). Recalling the discussion above,
an emphasis on international norms of due process as the subject of the relevant dialectical
exchange is likely more palatable given the courts' obvious expertise in issues of process.
498 Further parallels beyond the two emphasized above also might be offered, including
the interaction between national and supranational tribunals within the European Union
described below. See infra Part VI.B. Others have explored the European relationship
from a variety of dialogic perspectives. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at
298-337; J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2407 (1991)
(suggesting transformation in institutional nature of European political discourse).
499 See supra notes 462-73 and accompanying text.
500 See Alvarez & Park, supra note 41, at 394. Besides federal habeas review of state
courts, other potential analogies in the interaction of federal and state courts might also be
offered. As a category, in fact, any form of collateral review might be analogized to the
Chapter 11 review of national courts.
501 The application of distinct bodies of law in both Chapter 11 and habeas reviewinternational and federal law, respectively-is an important parallel between these two
forms of collateral review. A further parallel is the presence of some requirement of
exhaustion in both cases. See also supra note 46.
502 See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (1992) (analyzing U.S.
Supreme Court's decision whether to abandon de novo consideration of legal and mixed
legal-factual questions in habeas corpus). Concerns of federalism and subsidiarity also are
important to both Chapter 11 and habeas. This results in the jurisdictional caution that
characterizes both Chapter 11 and habeas review, and their relative deference to underlying judicial proceedings.
503 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. Related to this point, both the Chapter
11 and habeas regimes were arguably designed to address the potential for "predatory
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Among other provisions, habeas decisions have contributed significantly to the development of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and the Fifth Amendment bar against self-incrimination. 5°4 Thus, the
development of due process in the United States has been significantly influenced by the dialectical mechanism of federal habeas
review. As described by one scholar, "[t]he interpretation of the
meaning of "due process" has been the product of ongoing dialogue
' 50 5
among state and federal courts and legislatures.
This, of course, is just the dynamic that I propose herein, on an
international scale. 506 The cycle of habeas may now repeat itself in
the development of more universal norms of due process across
national borders, designed to help meet the needs of an increasingly
globalized world economy. 50 7 In this view, Chapter 11 review-like
habeas before it-should not be conceived primarily as "a method of
giving relief to individuals, but as a way to establish a dialogue about

the meaning of rights.

'50 8

Ultimately, the dialectical review of Chapter 11, with its active

incorporation of both international and domestic perspectives, may
help to facilitate the acceptance and incorporation of international
localism," by which local authorities might seek short-term advantage over external parties, to the detriment of national commerce. See Stephan, supra note 41, at 839-40 (suggesting common orientation of domestic takings law and international expropriation
doctrine to protecting outsiders from local coercion); cf Matiation, supra note 7, at 465-66
(noting issues of local bias in Loewen).
504 See supra note 187 (enumerating cases).
505 Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 799 (1992); see also
David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress's Control of FederalJurisdiction,86 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1998). Cole writes:
Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is
inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty ....
Thus there is nothing novel in the fact that today habeas corpus in the
federal courts provides a mode for the redress of denials of due process of law.
Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office.
Id. at 2502 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963)).
506 See Barry Friedman, Pas de Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2467, 2484 (1993) ("The way to obtain a new set of views and gradually
expand the body of criminal constitutional law was to draft the habeas courts as "foot
soldiers" in the due process revolution.").
507 Some might dispute, of course, the wisdom-let alone the virtue-of such convergence. See, e.g., Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct
with Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHrs: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPEC-

TIVES 4-9 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979) (contending that "universal"
norms reflect values of powerful states). This dispute is well beyond the scope of the present analysis. For present purposes, it is enough to suggest that some degree of convergence is probably inevitable. See Martinez, supra note 3, at 433. It has happened already,
is happening as we speak, and will continue to happen.
508 See Althouse, supra note 136, at 938 (discussing Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14,
at 1052-54).
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norms and standards in domestic law and culture.

For most

Americans, U.S. law is entirely disconnected from international
law. 50 9 They would likely be shocked to know that the Constitution
itself incorporates international law as an element of our national
law.5 t0 Some mechanism for the translation of seemingly foreign
511
international law into domestic discourse is therefore essential.
This is true today more than ever, given the increasingly transnational
nature of commercial enterprise and of civil society as a whole. 5 12 The
dialectical review of Chapter 11 and similar mechanisms of international review can serve as just such a translator. Paraphrasing Harold
Koh's analysis of transnational legal process, "[o]nce [courts] begin to
interact, a complex process occurs, whereby international legal norms
seep into, are internalized, and become embedded in domestic legal
' '513
and political processes.
VI
THE FUTURE OF DIALECTICAL REVIEW

The dialectical review of Chapter 11-notwithstanding its limitations-offers itself as a potentially powerful tool of legal innovation
and as a mechanism by which domestic and international legal norms
509 See Powell, supra note 225, at 260.
510 See Koh, supra note 221, at 669; Powell, supra note 225, at 251.
511 See Powell, supra note 225, at 251; see also Koh, supra note 254, at 199 (suggesting
that nations cannot insulate themselves from compliance with international law); Koh,
supra note 221, at 627 (referring to this pattern as "bringing international law home"). The
international-domestic pattern of dialectical review outlined herein might, in this regard,
be construed to parallel Cover's goal of enhancing trust in the judicial system by means of
jurisdictional redundancy. Cover suggests that jurisdictional redundancy can minimize the
actual and perceived influence of ideology on judicial determinations and thereby enhance
trust. See Cover, supra note 14, at 662, 665, 671-72. A Chapter 11 pattern of dialectical
review similarly might help to enhance trust in international judicial institutions and international law generally.
512 See Powell, supra note 225, at 268-69. Heifer and Slaughter, in a related analysis,
speak of the role of supranational adjudication in the development of a "global community
of law." See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 281, 367-68, 370-71.
513 Koh, supra note 254, at 205; see also Burke-White, supra note 224, at 84-85
(describing transnational judicial interaction as means of embedding international norms);
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 305-06; Martinez, supra note 3, at 467 (suggesting that
dialogue, rather than hierarchical enforcement, encourages national governments "to hold
onto the ultimate responsibility for their practices and thus to renew and internalize their
commitment to human rights as they implement each decision"); Stein, supra note 188, at
23 (describing importance of transnational jurisprudence in "sensitizing municipal authorities to the needs of the international system and ...enlightening other participants in the
international legal process about the needs, interests and aspirations of individual states").
From this perspective, dialectical review can be understood as a pattern of transnational
legal process, incorporating phases of "interaction, interpretation, and internalization," see
Koh, supra note 221, at 626-27, and exhibiting the distinctive features of that pattern, see
Koh, supra note 254, at 184.
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may progressively evolve toward shared standards, grounded not in
one system or the other, but both. If Chapter 11 as presently constituted and utilized represented the extent of this pattern, however, the
dialectical review of that chapter would be little more than a curious
anomaly, worthy of note, but not deserving of study or sustained
attention. Yet this could not be further from the truth.
The volume of Chapter 11 cases is growing. Shortcomings of the
existing regime are being addressed both in Chapter 11 itself and in
new investment agreements. Chapter 11 panels are acting to minimize
potential resistance to Chapter 11 and its analogues, with some signs
of success. Equally important, patterns of dialectical review are
emerging outside the investment context. A growing array of international tribunals might thus be said to have the ability to engage in
review and to exhibit the power characteristic of dialectical review.
Considering the related trends of Chapter l's evolution and the
expansion of opportunities for dialectical review, it becomes clear that
dialectical review may have an increasingly important role to play in
the world community in the years ahead.
A.

The Promise of DialecticalReview in the Protection of
Foreign Investment

The volume of Chapter 11 litigation, including claims involving
5 14
some critique of national court conduct, is undoubtedly on the rise.
On present trends alone, a busy future might be predicted for dialectical review. Yet clouds also loom in the distance. In particular, two
threats to the operation of Chapter 11 as a mechanism of dialectical
review-one we might term internal and the other external-offer
themselves.
1.

The Limits of Chapter 11 Continuity

Internal to itself, Chapter 11 review of national courts continues
to lack the continuity essential for its effectiveness. As described
above, the volume of relevant cases remains too small to support a
dynamic pattern of dialectical review. More significantly, the institutional design of Chapter 11 continues to lack the institutional continuity-the repeat-player characteristic-necessary for fruitful
dialogue. 5 15 The former difficulty can be dealt with briefly. While
some institutional obstacles to a healthy volume of cases might be
514 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
515 See supra notes 302-11 and accompanying text.
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identified, 516 the limited volume of Chapter 11 review of national
courts can largely be ascribed to the relative youth of Chapter 11 and
limited awareness of its potential application to judicial conduct. With
time, a growing pool of potential cases, and heightened incentives to
bring them, a sufficient volume of cases to sustain a pattern of dialec517
tical review is therefore quite likely to emerge.
The limited degree of institutional continuity in the existing
Chapter 11 regime is consequently a greater internal obstacle to a pattern of dialectical review. Chapter 11 tribunals are ad hoc bodies,
with limited institutional continuity. 518 From claim to claim, independent and distinct panels are formed and disbanded, with little by way
of structure, or even precedent, to link them together. 519 Meanwhile,
review by the panels extends to a near-infinite array of national judicial bodies, rather than some limited group of appellate courts into
which the domestic voice in the dialectic exchange is concentrated.
Chapter l's efficacy as a source of institutional continuity, and hence
dialectical review, is consequently constrained on both the international and domestic sides.
Yet, promising signs for a long-term pattern of dialectical review
can be cited. Specifically, institutional continuity on the domestic side
of the dialectical exchange is necessarily furthered by the finality
requirement in Loewen, while continuity on the international side is
516 These might include the cost of international commercial arbitration, see Donna M.
Bates, A Consumer's Dream or Pandora'sBox: Is Arbitration a Viable Option for CrossBorder Consumer Disputes?, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 823, 858-62 (2004), the procedural
complexity of Chapter 11, see, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 1116-1125, at 642-44, and
the prospect that the largest potential users of Chapter 11 (i.e., multinational corporations)
may pursue political avenues to protect their interests, rather than litigation under Chapter
11, see generally Weiler, supra note 43.
517 See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 301-02. But see Bhagwat, supra note 69, at
985-86 (suggesting influence of U.S. Supreme Court on lower courts, notwithstanding
rarity of review); Caminker, supra note 66, at 80 (same); Songer et al., supra note 66, at 693
("But the 'paradox' of (relatively) effective control and rare reversals is more apparent
than real. If an appeals court anticipates that it will be sanctioned in the form of a reversal,
the anticipated response will keep the court in check."); supra text accompanying note 128
(noting that lower volume of cases may be sufficient, given imposition of liability on federal authorities).
518 Cf REISMAN, supra note 66, at 8 (describing diminished capacity for control because
of ad hoc review). Even in Chapter 11, institutional continuity is not completely lacking,
given tribunals' regular reference to earlier Chapter 11 awards. This has been evident in
the denial of justice context, where the decisions have commonly relied upon the earlier
"precedent" on point. See, e.g., Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M. 85, 109-10, 1 126 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002) (citing
Azinian v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 14 ICSID REV. 538, 568, $ 99 (NAFTA Ch.
11 Arb. Trib. 1999), in explaining variants of denial of justice), available at http://www.nafta
law.org.
519 Cf NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1123, at 644.
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enhanced by the prospect of an appellate mechanism in Chapter
11-type international investment review. As to the requirement of
finality, the Loewen tribunal held that a Chapter 11 assertion of judi-

cial wrongdoing requires appeal of the asserted national court failure
through all reasonable channels of domestic review.5 20

With a

requirement of finality, national decisions subject to Chapter 11
review can be expected to have had at least some exposure to a

domestic high court.52 1 Those bodies can therefore serve as the repeat
22
players necessary for an effective dialectical exchange.5
The second potential source of enhanced institutional continuity,
on the international side of the exchange, is the introduction of appellate mechanisms to Chapter 11-style regimes. While this possibility
has been discussed for some time, the recently signed Dominican
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement

goes so far as to create a negotiating group charged with addressing it.
Ultimately, the latter calls for an amendment to the agreement to
establish a standing appellate body responsible "to provide coherence

to the interpretation of investment provisions in the Agreement.

5 23

520 See Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 675, 723-24,
215-217 (NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http:l/
www.naftalaw.org.
521 Cf. Martinez, supra note 3, at 449-50 (describing how rules requiring litigants to
exhaust remedies in state or administrative agencies promote judicial efficiency and
interjudicial dialogue). There is unlikely to be complete convergence to any single
domestic tribunal, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, of course, given a finality obligation
not to pursue all available judicial processes, but only those that are "reasonably available." See Loewen, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT at 677, T 2. In a substantial number of cases,
certiorari review is unlikely to meet this threshold. In other cases, Supreme Court jurisdiction will be lacking. Thus, even with a finality requirement, some distribution of cases
across state judiciaries is likely. Yet this remains a substantial improvement on the preLoewen degree of institutional continuity.
522 See supra notes 302-11 and accompanying text. As repeat players emerge, it is possible that relevant grants of discretionary appeals may increase. This might extend even as
far as the U.S. Supreme Court. To avoid the prospect of Chapter 11 and similar liability,
high courts may manifest some greater willingness to hear cases involving foreign investors, perhaps even in some summary fashion specific to cases involving foreign parties. The
extent of institutional continuity may therefore continue to develop over time, though at
some potential cost in lower court autonomy.
523 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug.
5, 2004, annex 10-F, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/DR-CAFTAIDRCAFTAFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html; cf Environmentalists' Letter to Congress on
CAFTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 20, 2004, at 4-5 (stating that appeals process established
in CAFrA is inadequate and would allow foreign-investor suits against environmental laws
to proceed before appeals process is established). The effort to establish the appellate
body envisioned would appear to be moving forward. Under the auspices of the interagency Trade Policy Review Group, the U.S. negotiating position on the structure and
nature of any such body is now being finalized, in advance of the interstate negotiations.
See Decision Close on CAFTA Investor-State Appellate Body Proposal, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 17, 2004, at 1, 14. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States
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Like the WTO Appellate Body, such a body might be expected to

have a permanent staff and a roster of standing judges who would
hear appellate cases over a fixed tenure.5 24 As with a requirement of
finality, introduction of an appellate body would enhance the institu-

tional continuity of Chapter 11. Again, such reform offers the hope of
some repeat player effect, with attendant gains in the capacity of
international investment review to serve as a vehicle of dialectical
52 5
engagement.
2.

Chapter 11 and Resistance to Review
Even if Chapter 11 and similar investment regimes have the

capacity to overcome shortcomings internal to their institutional
design and present-day operation, external obstacles still lurk. Specifically, the receptivity of relevant national parties to Chapter 11-style

review has come into question, as some have begun to resist the process and its further expansion.
To appreciate the state parties' concerns with process, one need
simply recall the 2001 "interpretation" of Article 1105 by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico, in their capacity as NAFTA's Free Trade
Free Trade Agreement, moreover, is not alone in its reference to the need for an appellate
mechanism. See id. at 14-15 (noting milder reference to need for appellate body in
Moroccan-United States FTA); United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, June 15,
2004, U.S.-Morocco, annex 10-D, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeAgreements/BilaterallMorocco FTA/Final_Textasset_uploadfile651 3838.pdf. In
fact, the pressure to create an appellate mechanism is even greater than these examples
suggest, given its grounding in broader congressional policy directives. Congress's recent
"fast track" legislation, the Trade Act of 2002, thus defined the creation of an appellate
body as among the "principal trade negotiating objectives" of the United States. See Trade
Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2002). The ultimate prospects for the emergence of appellate mechanisms in investment regimes may therefore be even stronger.
524 See Coe, supra note 122, at 1446-48 (analyzing potential mechanisms of appellate
review). Drafts of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas also have proposed establishing an appellate body. See Free Trade Area of the Americas Third Draft Agreement,
Nov. 21, 2003, ch. 21 art. 13, ch. 23 arts. 25-31, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/
Index-e.asp.
525 The establishment of appellate bodies also might be expected to further strengthen
the hand of the international side of the dialectical exchange. A standing appellate body's
capacity to put pressure on national courts, as outlined above, might be greater than that of
a succession of ad hoc panels. Arguably, this is precisely what has occurred with the introduction of the Appellate Body of the WTO. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional,and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. 247, 257 (2004) (arguing that permanent WTO Appellate Body is more likely to pursue
incremental development of law than ad hoc panels of GATT judiciary). On the other
hand, given the necessarily constrained nature of the power balance of dialectical review,
as evident in Chapter 11, an appellate scheme is unlikely to undermine completely that
balance. Even an appellate body would largely be limited to indirect mechanisms of pressure on domestic courts.
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Commission (FTC).526 This interpretation, offered in response to several broad panel readings of the obligations articulated in that article,
sought to redefine the applicable standard of treatment under Article
1105 in narrow terms. The FTC characterized the minimum standard
of treatment under Article 1105 as the treatment required by customary international law. 52 7 More specifically, it stated that the
article's references to "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" did not require any mandate beyond that required
by customary international law.528 Finally, the FTC indicated that "a
breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of
Article 1105(1)."529 It remains somewhat unclear whether this low
threshold is binding on Chapter 11 tribunals.5 30 To date, however,
53
several panels have construed it as such. '
There is also evidence of objections to the expansion of Chapter
11-style provisions to other agreements. Investment protections and
investor-state arbitration mechanisms have been actively resisted in
recent trade negotiations. 532 Even more notable is the inclusion of
investment protections in the recent free trade agreement reached by
the United States and Australia, but the omission of any Chapter
533
11-style investor-state dispute mechanism.
As these cases of resistance make clear, the long-term development of the pattern of dialectical review will depend on the tempered
incorporation of Chapter 1 1-style mechanisms into future international agreements and their cautious application by the international

526 See N. AM. FREE TRADE COMM'N, NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN
CHAPTER 11 PROVISIONS (July 31, 2001), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/naftainterpr-en.asp.
527 Id.

528 Id.
529 Id. While the Free Trade Commission's (FTC) other interpretations and statements
to date have been directed to Chapter 11's procedures, the recurrence of these prounouncements suggests the NAFTA parties' willingness to police the implementation of
Chapter 11. See Int'l Trade Canada, Dispute Settlement, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
tna-nac/naftacommission-en.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
530 See Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11:
Past, Present, and Future, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 301, 328 (2003) ("[Slome commentators
question whether the Notes of Interpretation are binding, because the FTC interpreted,
but did not amend Chapter 11.").

531 See Weiler, supra note 351, at 245.
532 See Bruce Stokes, Column: Looking In-The Trade Bill's "Huge Can of Worms,"
NAT'L J. CONG. DAILY, Mar. 21, 2002.
533 See supra note 52.
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tribunals charged with their implementation. 534 There is hope for suc-

cess on this front as well.
In the European context, the ECJ and ECHR both exhibited just
such gradualism in their jurisprudential development. 535 At the

outset, the courts defined their authority, but used it only sparingly
and in tandem with grants of substantial flexibility to the national
courts under review. 536 As the courts' authority came to be more
widely accepted, their decrees have progressively grown more invasive. 537 Today, the courts are able to issue rulings of a relatively insistent nature, with every expectation that they will be implemented
without need for persistent intervention.
534 In this vein, one might recall the role of aggressive international adjudication in the
decline of international human rights norms in the Caribbean. See Laurence R. Helfer,
Overlegalizing Human Rights: InternationalRelations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1836 (2002)
("[O]verlegalizing human rights can lead even liberal democracies to reconsider their commitment to international institutions that protect those rights.").
As outlined by Heifer, recent decades have seen a notable reduction in Caribbean
participation in international human rights regimes. See id. at 1881-85. This pattern was
set in motion by a series of successful challenges to the prolonged detention of capital
defendants. See id. at 1872. Given significant public support for capital punishment in the
face of rising crime rates, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana initially turned to the
Privy Council to seek greater flexibility in the implementation of the applicable human
rights norms. See id. at 1867, 1880. When this effort was rebuffed, they denounced their
obligations under several human rights instruments and replaced the Privy Council with
their own Caribbean Court of Justice. See id. at 1880-81. Karen Alter has suggested that
an analogous backlash may be underway in Europe. See Alter, supra note 116, at 512-13.
535 See, e.g., Alter, supra note 116, at 495 (noting ECJ's cautious approach); Richard S.
Kay, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Authority of Law, 8 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 217, 223-24 (1993) (tracing success of European Convention on Human Rights to
gradual expansion of its reach); Paola M. Koo, The Struggle for Democratic Legitimacy
Within the European Union, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 111, 117-18 (2001) (linking growing supranational role of European Union to ECJ's ability to progressively extend its jurisdictional
reach by imposing self-limits on expansion).
536 See Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW
321, 341 (Paul Craig & Grdinne de Btirca eds., 1999).
537 See Heifer, supra note 217, at 409-10 (suggesting ECHR's growing assertion of
power); Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European
Court of Justice, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 16 (2000) (suggesting increased strength and assertiveness of ECJ). To similar effect, Franz Mayer has suggested the possibility that the ECJ
increasingly will use the Fundamental Rights Charter to shift responsibility for protecting
fundamental rights from political bodies to the judiciary. See FRANZ C. MAYER, THE
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS: ADJUDICATING EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A MULTILEVEL SYSTEM 68-69 (Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No.

9/03, 2003), at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers03.html. The recent ECJ
cases discussed below are further evidence of the ECJ's growing willingness to challenge
national courts. A NAFTA example of this pattern might be Chapter 19's review mechanism. As suggested below, in the early days of Chapter 19's operation, the binational
panels outlined broad procedural norms for national administrative bodies. With the passage of time, they have come to enforce increasingly more stringent requirements. See
infra note 610.
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In the approach of the Loewen tribunal itself, one might also find
hope for the progressive emergence of a pattern of dialectical review.
I have described the pattern of dialectical review as a mix of invasive,
yet episodic, interventions in the work of national courts with milder,
but ongoing, interventions.5 38 Some effective calibration of these
paired approaches might be said to hold the secret to avoiding any
fatal backlash against Chapter 11-style review.
In Loewen, the tribunal arguably chose a balance of jolt and systemic intervention perfectly suited to the context in which it acted,
and to its specific audience. The Loewen award, in essence, was at
once a jolt and an invitation to recurrent engagement. It offered a
particularly sharp critique of the Mississippi trial court; 539 yet it ultimately declined to impose liability on the United States by way of a
limited reading of its jurisdiction. 540 In doing so, it effectively called
attention to its authority-and the body of rules for which it was
responsible-while both minimizing the prospect of a backlash against
the Chapter 11 regime and maximizing the opportunity for ongoing
dialogue.
This might be seen as a strategy precisely calibrated to the present-day needs of Chapter 11 dialectical review. Such review remains
relatively unfamiliar even among those most closely connected to its
operation, including American attorneys, U.S. courts, and even many
foreign investors. 54 1 In helping to break this pattern, the Loewen
award was a rather effective vehicle. The unfamiliar prospect of
Chapter 11 review, in essence, needed Loewen to lend it prominence. 542 Yet given traditional American resistance to international
review, such awareness might also have brought ill consequences were
liability imposed from the very outset. The Loewen tribunal chose to
avoid this risk, instead prioritizing the need for ongoing engagement
with the U.S. courts.
A sustainable pattern of dialectical review is therefore likely to
consist of two components: First, one can expect to see the more
538 See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
539 See, e.g., Loewen Group v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 4 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT 675, 702, 1 119 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://
www.naftalaw.org.
540 See id. at 708, 710-11, 730,
143, 151, 154, 172-174, 238. Helfer suggests a similar
pattern in the approach of the ECHR. See Heifer, supra note 217, at 410.
541 See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 8, at 20 (describing Chief Justice Marshall's surprise at
Chapter 11 review of Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Mondev).
542 Recall, however, that given the imposition of Chapter 11 awards on federal authorities, a somewhat reduced volume of cases may be sufficient to ensure the efficacy of a
pattern of dialectical review. See supra note 127.
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familiar jolt of international review and critique.5 43 There follows,
however, a recurrent and interactive pattern of engagement with
national courts. As to the second component, explored herein, dialectical review may allow international courts to more actively engage
national courts. This dynamic role may be prompted by an initial jolt,
as in Loewen. That jolt, however, may be just the beginning of an
extended-and ultimately more significant-pattern of engagement
and dialectical review.
B.

National Courts and the Rising Tide of InternationalReview

Even if the expansion in Chapter 11 and similar investment dispute settlement is stymied, the broader pattern of international review
of national courts, including U.S. courts, is likely to persist and
expand. Such review is not a new phenomenon. In the U.S. experience, it can be traced back at least to the Civil War, when an international arbitral tribunal had occasion to review and reject a number of
the Supreme Court's famous Prize Cases.544 It has been rare to find
543 Examples of the initial jolt of international review might include the ICJ's ruling
against U.S. military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, see Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment on Jurisdiction, 1984 I.C.J. 392, and, slightly further
afield, the loss of the United States's seat on the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights in 2001, see Marc Lacey, U.S. Attacks Rights Group for Ousting It as a Member,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2001, at A4.
544 See, e.g., The Sir William Peel, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 517 (1866) (granting restitution to
British claimants whose merchant ship had been captured as prize of war by Union forces
during Civil War blockade); The Circassian, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 135 (1864) (affirming British
captured ship's designation as prize of war by ruling that intent to violate blockade can be
inferred by cargo and acts of crew); The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862)
(affirming various ships as legitimately captured prizes of war by ruling that wartime constitutes justification enough for blockade's legality). The potential for such international
review of national courts actually extends even further in U.S. law, to the Jay Treaty of
1794. See supra note 54.
While the Prize Cases are known in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence for their treatment of the president's authority to initiate military action without a congressional declaration of war, few are aware that an international arbital tribunal ultimately reviewed-and
rejected-a number of those decisions. Under the Treaty of Washington of 1871, the
United States and Great Britain established a commission authorized to adjudicate claims
by British merchants whose vessels were captured, as prizes of war, by American ships
enforcing the blockade of Confederate ports during the Civil War. See Weisburd, supra
note 108, at 897 (describing creation and function of commission). Among these claims,
several had already been heard by the Supreme Court. See Martinez, supra note 3, at 473
("This commission reviewed several prize claims that had previously been decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court and in effect reversed the Supreme Court's decisions. The U.S. government acquiesced in all the Commission's rulings in all of these cases."). But see
Weisburd, supra note 108, at 898 (claiming that actual results of Supreme Court judgments
were not disturbed and legal relations created by American judgments were not altered).
The British claimants sharply challenged the adverse Supreme Court decisions in
those cases, characterizing them as "wholly unwarranted," and lacking a basis in even "one

particle of credible and admissible evidence." See HENRY HOWARD, REPORT ON THE PRO-
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review exercised in the comprehensive form outlined herein, however,
with international review backed up by international power. Rather,
international tribunals with power have commonly avoided invasive
review, while those engaged in review have tended to enjoy more limited power. Yet this may be changing. As review comes to be increasingly aligned with power, dialectical review may offer a useful
paradigm for the understanding and operation of international adjudicatory regimes besides Chapter 11.
International tribunals have become more willing to engage in
the review of national courts in recent years. There is also a growing
power to make such review stick. This is evident in a review of the
most significant international tribunals in operation today-the ICJ,
the GATTI/WTO dispute settlement process, the ECHR, and the ECJ.
While none of these tribunals perfectly manifests the pairing of
aggressive review of national courts with a balance of judicial powerthe foundational features of dialectical review-they each exhibit
some capacity to move in that direction. Recent decisions seem to
suggest a move toward more aggressive review or a more insistent
assertion of power. Across an array of international tribunals, then,
the potential for dialectical review may be on the rise.
Preliminary evidence of this prospect might be found in the ICJ's
recent decisions on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
issued with reference to the lack of consular notification in innumerable U.S. capital cases. 545 Over a series of decisions, from Paraguayv.
CEEDINGS AND AWARDS OF THE MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION ESTABLISHED UNDER THE

TREATY OF WASHINGTON 112 (1874); cf The Sir William Peel, 72 U.S' at 517 (1866); The
Circassian,69 U.S. at 135 (1864). Putting the implications of their petitions in sharp relief,
claimants urged the commission to reject the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court and
instead adopt the position espoused by Justice Nelson, in dissent from those judgments.
See HOWARD, supra, at 95, 125.
Over the objection of the sole American member of the commission, who insisted that
greater deference ought to be given "to a deliberate judgment of a court whose independence, impartiality, and learning has given it a character in Great Britain not less lofty than
it possesses at home," the commission ruled in favor of the claimants in several cases. See
MOORE, supra note 54, at 3922; see also HOWARD, supra, at 98 (The Hiawatha);id. at 130
(The Circassian);id. at 113 (The Sir William Peel). For all intents and purposes, the commission thereby reversed the judgments of the Supreme Court. Minimally, by awarding
damages to the claimants, they undid the essential effects of the U.S. decisions. See
Martinez, supra note 3, at 473.
545 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36.1(b), 21 US.T.
77, 100, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292; see also Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
43 I.L.M. 581 (Mar. 31, 2004) (determining that United States violated Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations by not informing arrested Mexican nationals of their right to contact Mexican consular staff); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) (finding
provisional measures of Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to be legally binding
and concluding that United States had violated international law by not informing arrested
German nationals of their right to consular access); Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
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United States to LaGrand and, most recently, Avena, the ICJ has
assessed the consequences of the failure of U.S. law-enforcement

authorities to inform foreign nationals charged with capital crimes of
their Vienna Convention rights to contact and seek the assistance of
consular officials of their home country. Further, the Court has considered the U.S. courts' nearly universal application of the procedural
default rule to bar claims of prejudice arising from this lack of notice,
546
where such claims were not raised at trial.
In its most recent decision, the ICJ did not shy away from what
the United States had characterized as interference in the U.S. judicial
process. 547 After finding a violation of the Vienna Convention, 548 the

ICJ explicitly rejected the application of judicial doctrines of procedural default to prevent review of a foreign national's assertion of a
violation of the Convention. 54 9 Quite to the contrary, the Court
imposed an obligation on national courts to offer supplemental hearings to defendants to present those claims regardless of any asserted
default. 550 In doing so, the ICJ rejected, though without explicit reference, the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier decision in Breard v.
tions (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (discontinuance) [hereinafter Paraguay] (ending

Paraguay's pending action alleging that United States violated Vienna Convention by not
advising arrested Paraguayan national of his right to consular access).
546 See Paraguay, 1998 I.C.J. at 5; Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 613-14, $1 111-114; LaGrand,

2001 I.C.J. at 488, 60. These claims were denial of justice claims of a sort. See Djajic,
supra note 459, at 88-94.
547 The ICJ held that:
If and so far as the Court may find that the obligations accepted by the parties
to the Vienna Convention included commitments as to the conduct of their
municipal courts in relation to the nationals of other parties, then in order to
ascertain whether there have been breaches of the Convention, the Court must
be able to examine the actions of those courts in the light of international law.
The Court is unable to uphold the contention of the United States that, as a
matter of jurisdiction, it is debarred from enquiring into the conduct of criminal proceedings in United States courts.
Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 596, 28; see also id. at 597, 598, 1 32, 37.
548 See id. at 609, T 95.
549 See id. at 613-14, $1 111-114. The ICJ's earlier LaGrand decision had, in essence,
already held as much. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 488; see Torres v. Mullin (Torres I), 124 S.
Ct. 562, 564-65 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that ICJ held Torres entitled
to remedy for violation of rights under Vienna Convention).
550 See Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 616,
121; see also Torres I, 124 S. Ct. at 565 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (expressing willingness to grant certiorari to answer question of "whether the
ICJ has been granted the authority, by means of treaties to which the United States is a
party, to interpret the rights conferred by the Vienna Convention"). On the other hand,
the ICJ sought to avoid unnecessary interference, rejecting Mexico's request for an order
directing the vacation of the relevant Mexican nationals' convictions and sentences, and
excluding the use of a substantial amount of evidence. See id. at 597. Even in doing so,
however, the Court insisted that it did so voluntarily, and not for want of authority. See id.
at 598.
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Greene.551 There, the Court had held that the Vienna Convention
permitted application of procedural default rules to asserted violations of the Convention. 552 While limited in its explicit review of the
U.S. courts, then, the ICJ's analysis included at least an indirect
553
dimension of review.
Even if this pattern of ICJ engagement were to blossom into fullfledged review of U.S. decisions-not impossible to imagine, should
the hearings mandated by Avena be widely denied or be of a cursory
nature-it would not fully mimic the pattern of Chapter 11 and similar
review. The ICJ's review in Avena continues to lack the dimension of
power at the heart of the dialectical pattern described herein. While
ICJ judgments may impose political costs for non-compliance, and
enjoy consequent reputational power, this is necessarily limited. 554 At
least as presently constituted, ICJ review represents not dialectical
review, but a peculiar case of horizontal review: It is not mere dialogue, but is more invasive review. In the absence of ready power,
however, this review remains essentially horizontal in nature, with any
impact dependent more on judicial comity or voluntary deference
than on the more coercive dynamic of dialectical review.

555

523 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1998) (per curiam).
See id. at 375-76.
553 In another example of nascent dialectical exchange, Mexico's ad hoc judge in Avena
drew on Justice Stevens's opinion in Torres v. Mullin (Torres 1), 124 S. Ct. 919 (2003)
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari), in which he objected to the Court's failure to
grant certiorari, see Avena, 43 I.L.M. at 649, 34 (Mar. 31, 2004) (separate opinion of
Judge Sepulveda). Perhaps the most trenchant example of dialogue in this line of cases,
however, was the ICJ's response to the U.S. Supreme Court's failure to grant a stay of
execution in the LaGrand litigation: "[It would have been open to the Supreme Court, as
one of its members urged, to grant a preliminary stay, which would have given it time to
consider, after briefing from all interested parties, the jurisdictional and international legal
issues involved .... " LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 508,
114 (June 27)
(citations omitted).
554 See Djajic, supra note 459, at 93-94 (using Breard to demonstrate that moral weight
of ICJ decision may not always overcome lack of domestic legal enforceability).
555 Other forms of transnational review also might be included in this category. The
enforcement of foreign judgments, for example, has a similar flavor. In essence, the secondary tribunal engages in a review of background procedures and the determination
reached, but does so without any implication that the procedural or substantive norms
"reviewed" might require reformation. The same can be said, though perhaps with a somewhat greater caveat, of adequate forum analyses, such as forum non conveniens assessments in the United States. See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 86-87. See also id.
at 92-93 (offering examples of critical judicial analyses of adequacy of alternative foreign
fora). A final, though somewhat distinct, example might be the presentation of discovery
requests to U.S. courts, where similar discovery would not be permitted at the situs of the
litigation. See Lien, supra note 52, at 595. Here, there is some prospect for horizontal
review, though still without any implication of intended or desired reform. Regardless, any
such review is likely to be minimal, given the nature of the questions presented.
551

552
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Yet the ICJ's influence should not be underestimated either. In
the aftermath of Avena, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
granted the petition of Osbaldo Torres, one of the defendants named

in Avena, for a hearing on his otherwise defaulted Vienna Convention
claims. 556 Perhaps even more significantly, the court issued an indefinite stay of execution, triggering the Oklahoma governor's nearly
immediate decision to commute his sentence. 557 Other courtsincluding state courts-also have acknowledged the ICJ's several rulings on the Vienna Convention and on the application of the proce-

dural default rule to it.558 The ICJ's Vienna Convention jurisprudence
thus may offer a promising foundation for a dilectical exchange
between international and national courts, as national court attention
to the ICJ grows more conventional and even comes to be expected.

For the moment, however, the ICJ continues to exhibit the review
component of dialectical review to a greater degree than its dimension
of power.
Arguably, just the reverse might be said of the dispute settlement

process of the WTO and its predecessor GATT regime. These
regimes, by virtue of their capacity to authorize the withdrawal of
trade concessions, possess substantial judicial power. 5 59 Yet they have
556 Torres v. Oklahoma (Torres II), No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)
(order granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing); see
Oklahoma Court Halts Execution, supra note 16. Notably, the ICJ had explicitly flagged
Torres's impending execution date. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 43 I.L.M. 581, 594, 21 (Mar. 31, 2004).
557 Torres H, No. PCD-04-442; see Oklahoma Court Halts Execution, supra note 16;
Walker, supra note 16. Notably, Torres had also been the subject of earlier opinions by
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, who objected to the Supreme Court's failure to grant
his petition for certiorari and challenged the lower federal courts on their refusal-on procedural default grounds-to consider Torres's assertion of a Vienna Convention violation.
See, e.g., Torres 1, 124 S. Ct. at 562.
558 See, e.g., Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695, 705-07 (Va. 2002) (conducting close
parsing of ICJ precedent and seeking to reconcile domestic holding with international
judgment). In Avena, in fact, the ICJ noted that a U.S. court had already found a violation
of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention in one of the cases before it. See Avena, 43 I.L.M.
581, at 604, 59. In Bieregu v. Ashcroft, 259 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347-51 (D.N.J. 2003), meanwhile, a federal district court carefully canvassed the ICJ's line of cases in assessing the
requirements of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Most notably, the district court in
U.S. ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 978-79 (N.D. Ill. 2002), concluded that
LaGrand "foreclose[s] strict reliance on procedural default rules for violations of the
Vienna Convention." In doing so, the court not only read the applicable Supreme Court
precedent narrowly, but actually challenged its precedential authority. See id. at 979. But
see Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004) (following Supreme Court's decision in Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), on application of procedural default rules to
Vienna Convention claims, notwithstanding subsequent ICJ decisions in LaGrand and
Avena).
559 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 23, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 266 [hereinafter GATT].
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had limited occasion to engage in review of a national court. In at
least two cases, however, GATT/WTO tribunals have exhibited at
least some willingness to review national courts. To begin with, in
United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, a GATT dispute
resolution panel considered the distinct adjudicatory mechanisms
available in the United States to challenge foreign versus domestic
infringing goods. 5 60 Specifically, it considered whether the ability to
assert patent violations by foreign-produced goods-but not domestic
goods-either in U.S. district court or under the administrative procedures of section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act violated GATIT's non-discrimination requirements. 5 6 1 In doing so, it was necessary for the
panel to assess, however gently, the procedural requirements, the
available remedies, and even the caliber of judges in each U.S.
forum.

562

Offering further evidence of the potential for a pattern of review
to emerge in the WTO was the decision in United States-Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act. 563 In the latter case, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body considered the U.S. federal courts' interpretation of a provision of the U.S. Copyright Act designed to permit
limited broadcast of copyrighted material without infringement of the
copyright holder's rights. Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act
offered a "homestyle exemption" restraining the rights of copyright
holders to prevent limited public transmission of their copyrighted
material, if carried out using "a single receiving apparatus of a kind
commonly used in private homes." 5 64 Challenging this provision, the
European Union objected to the ambiguity of its language, as evidenced by its divergent interpretation in the various U.S. courts of
appeal. 56 5 Further, the European Union argued that the trajectory of
the U.S. jurisprudence pointed toward a broadening of the exemption.5 66 Focusing on the range of interpretations, the United States
countered that this was "a typical feature of a common-law

560 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT B.I.S.D. (L1643936S/345) at $ 3.12 (1989), available at http://www.sice.oas.orgldispute/gatt/87tar337.asp.
561 See GATT, supra note 559, art. 3.
562 See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, at IT 2.8, 3.12, 5.19.
563 See United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act-Report of the Panel,
WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Report of the Panel], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/distabe.htm.

564 See id.

2.3.

565 See id. T 6.137.
566 See id. T 6.140.
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system. ' 567 Moreover, it pointed out that only three U.S. courts had
5 68
actually applied the exemption since its adoption.
After engaging in some analysis of the U.S. jurisprudence, the
WTO panel concluded that the U.S. case law was sufficiently cautious,
as well as consistent, in its application of the exemption so as to
comply with Article 13 of the TRIPS agreement. 569 Nevertheless, suggestive of some of the pattern of dialectical engagement outlined
herein, the panel twice flagged the ambiguity regarding the future
breadth of the U.S. jurisprudence. 570 In doing so, it referenced "the
common understanding of the parties" as militating against any need
for the panel to opine upon the possibility of future broadening.5 71 In
this way, the panel arguably offered some signal to the U.S. courts of
its expectation that the future development of the case law would
track the commitments to restraint offered by the United States in the
course of the litigation.
The WTO, then, is clearly not without capacity to review the decisions of the U.S. courts and to engage in some exchange with them as
to its consistency with international legal norms. As the WTO grows
in its authority, and perhaps particularly as it increases its reach to a
wider area of subject-matter issues through both treaty-based extensions and its own accretions of authority, 572 the occasion for such
review of national courts may be expected to increase.
The most advanced manifestations of a growing pattern of international review of national courts-and of the potential utility of a
paradigm of dialectical review-are the supranational courts of
Europe. The ECJ and the ECHR are indisputably the most developed transnational judicial systems in the world today. While a comprehensive analysis of the dimensions of dialectical review in the ECJ
and ECHR-a deserving subject of study-is beyond the scope of this
work, a few closing words regarding each court are appropriate. This
is especially true given that recent developments in both courts suggest an accelerating trend toward substantive and recurrent engagement with national courts.
Id.

6.136.
See id. 6.141.
See id. 6.144. In the ADF case, a Chapter 11 tribunal was similarly called to construe U.S. case law. See ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, 6 ICSID Rep. 470, $ 189
567
568
569

(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2000), availableat http://www.naftalaw.org.
570 See Report of the Panel, supra note 563,
6.144, 6.147.
571 See id. J 6.147.
572 See, e.g., Debra P. Steger, Afterword: "The Trade and..." Conundrum-A Com-

mentary, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 137-38, 143 (2002) (stating that WTO has evolved from
contract into international system of binding rules, and its scope has expanded beyond
matters viewed as "purely 'trade' subjects").
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The ECHR comes to its review of national courts by way of its
adjudication of claims under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 5 73 Because the

ECHR requires exhaustion of local remedies before any claim can be
brought before it,574 it has a long history of reviewing national court
decisions both on substance and process. 575 Essentially, in the case of

any member of the Council of Europe whose domestic legal regime
includes some mechanism of constitutional review, the ECHR is likely
to be presented with questions of law previously adjudicated by a

national court.
Until 1998, litigation before the ECHR was initiated by the
European Commission of Human Rights, to which individuals were
required to bring their claims for preliminary review. 576 With the
entry into force of Protocol 11 on November 1, 1998, however, the
Commission was merged with the Court, now permitting direct petition to the ECHR.577 With this shift, ECHR power has grown significantly. As suggested above, greater individual access can be expected

to enhance international court influence, both by creating a domestic
constituency for the Court's rulings and eliminating discretionary barriers to the review of sensitive cases. 578 The ECHR, moreover, has
explicitly flagged some expansion of the extent of its review. In its
decision in Selmouni v. France, the Court counseled that as the protection of human rights becomes the norm across Europe, it would

more aggressively review state action for breaches of fundamental
values. 579 The ECHR regime therefore incorporates both a willing573 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, II, art. 19, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 (creating European Commission of
Human Rights and ECHR).
574 See id. at III, art. 26.
575 See, e.g., Benthem v. Netherlands, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), §§ 41-43 (1985)
(reviewing procedure and applicable domestic law in determining that Bentham had not
been heard by independent and impartial tribunal as required by Art. 6 of Convention);
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), §§ 29, 36, 45-49 (1993) (examining
national court proceedings, relevant domestic law and practice, and history of Jehovah's
Witnesses in Greece, to find violation of Art. 9 (freedom of religion) for Kokkinakis's
conviction for proselytism); Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), §§ 33-53 (1991)
(reviewing facts, investigation proceedings, trial proceedings, applications for release, and
relevant French legislation, to determine that France's decision to hold Letellier until commencement of trial violated Art. 5 of Convention for Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms).
576 REGISTRAR OF THE EUR. CT. OF HUMAN

RIGHTS, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF

AND PROCEDURE
6
(2003), at http://www.echr.coe.int.
577 See Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 123-25 (2003).
578 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
579 See Selmouni v. France, App. No. 00025803/94, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403, 407 (1999).
HUMAN

RIGHTS:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND,

ORGANISATION,
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ness to review national courts and a growing degree of power to effectuate the results of its review.
On the other hand, the regime of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom is also limited in
important respects. The ECHR regime is relatively less domesticated
in the national legal systems of Europe than the ECJ. ECHR power
to influence domestic policy is thus more diffuse. When compared to
Chapter 11, moreover, the fact that ECHR judgments are ordinarily
580
directives to national authorities to make domestic adjustments,

rather than monetary judgments against the state found in violation of
the Convention, means that ECHR power is further constrained. The
ECHR's capacity for dialectical review therefore remains incomplete.
The ECJ represents the most elaborate intertwining of international adjudication with national judicial systems in the world today.
This judicial relationship has consequently been studied widely and is

acclaimed for its role in the transformation of Europe into a common
polity.5 8 1 Yet what is most notable about the ECJ's interaction with
national courts, I would argue, is not the extent of review of domestic
courts, but its avoidance of such review. 582 The ECJ actually engages

in little review of national courts, for the very reason of its acclaimed
583
preliminary reference procedure.

580 See Jbrg Polakiewicz, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 1950-2000, at 56-57 (Robert Blackburn & J6rg
Polakiewicz eds., 2001) (noting that states enjoy freedom of choice as to means of fulfilling
their obligations).
581 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, ConstitutionalDialogues in the European Community, in
THE EUROPEAN COURT & NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 305,
306-08 (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Sweet, ConstitutionalDialogues] (describing constitutionalisation of European Community
(EC) treaties through integration of EC law into legal systems of member states); Alec
Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, The European Courtand the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961-95, J. EUR. PUB. POL., Mar. 1998, at 66;
Weiler, supra note 498, at 2405-07. Fred Abbott has questioned the analogy of NAFTA to
the ECJ. See Abbott, supra note 116, at 520-21 (characterizing NAFTA as combining hard
law with limited institutional delegation, while European legal system consists of soft law
with high delegation). But see id. at 543 (suggesting Chapter 11 represents case of high
delegation within NAFTA).
582 Cf. ALTER, supra note 102, at 218 (describing ECJ's use of varied preliminary references to acclimatize member states to ECJ's views and to avoid direct conflicts with
national courts).
583 There is some such review, of course, or at least the capacity for it. Two lines of cases
deserve note in this vein. First, the ECJ's supremacy doctrine developed out of its interaction with, and ultimate review of, the ICC. See Sweet, ConstitutionalDialogues, supra note
581, at 312-15. After a shareholder in an Italian electrical company refused to pay what
amounted to a $3 bill, on the grounds that Italy unlawfully had expropriated the company
in violation of Article 37 of the European Economic Community treaty, the trial judge
referred the matter to both the ECJ and the ICC. See id. The ICC rejected Costa's claim
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Under Article 234584 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, the ECJ may give preliminary rulings interpreting
European law at the request of any national court. 585 In the face of
ambiguous questions of European law, references for preliminary rulings are discretionary for lower national courts, but mandatory for

on the ground that the nationalization decision postdated the EEC treaty, thereby
adopting the rule of lex posteriori. The ECJ independently rejected Costa's claim, while
simultaneously adopting the doctrine of European law's supremacy. See Costa v. ENEL,
1964 E.C.R. 585.
More than a decade later, in Societa Industrie chimiche Italia centrale, Corte cost., sez.
un., 30 oct. 1975, n.232, II Foro It. I 542, the ICC directed the lower Italian courts to
abandon lex posteriorinational rules, even in the face of contrary European law, only with
the ICC's explicit approval. See Sweet, ConstitutionalDialogues, supra note 581, at 314.
After the ECJ nonetheless authorized an Italian court to set aside national legislation
inconsistent with European law, the Italian government objected, citing Societa Industrie
chimiche. See id. The Italian lower court again submitted the case to the ECJ, leading to
the Simmenthal decision, in which the ECJ reviewed and roundly rejected the ICC's analysis. It held, rather, that the rule of lex posterioricould not trump contrary European law.
See Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978
E.C.R. 629, 645.
More familiar to students of European law, if exhibiting a weaker pattern of "review"
than Simmenthal, is the Solange line of cases. See ALTER, supra note 102, at 87-98; Koch,
supra note 69, at 14-15 (describing Solange and successor cases). The Solange case originally arose from a dispute regarding a license application by the Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft company. See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfur, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1137. The ECJ, responding to a German administrative court's
preliminary reference as to whether a particular European regulation violated German
law, replied that an EC measure could not be held invalid for running contrary to a
national constitution. See id. In response, however, the German Constitutional Court
(BVerfG) ruled that Community law could not trump Germany's Basic Law, given the
absence of analogous protections of fundamental rights within the European law regime.
See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr under Vorratsstelle fOr Getreide
und Futtermittel (Solange I), BVerfGE 37, 271, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540. Explicit negotiations ensued, to avoid any sharp rupture. See ALTER, supra note 102, at 93. Under pressure, the German Constitutional Court held its tongue for more than a decade before
returning to the negotiating table with Solange 1I. By then, the Court had softened its
stance, concluding that because the ECJ had responded to its earlier decision by expanding
its protection of fundamental rights, the BVerfG would no longer exercise authority to
regulate the constitutionality of European acts. See Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft
(Solange II), BVerfGE 73, 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225. Most recently, the BVerfG's
Maastricht decision appeared to revise its position yet further, after noting that acts by
supranational organizations could impact protected individuals under German law significantly. See Brunner and Others v. The European Union Treaty (Maastricht), BVerfGE 89,
155, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57. Nonetheless, it declined to exercise its jurisdiction to decide on
the validity of European legislation in that case and encouraged a continued spirit of cooperation between the two courts. See id. Other cases of ECJ interaction with national
courts, and ensuing judicial interchange, are noted infra note 597.
584 Article 234 previously was encompassed in Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 109.
585 CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. (C 80) 1 (2001), art. 234.
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courts of last resort. 586 While such preliminary rulings originally were
intended to address only the validity of European law, the ECJ successfully encouraged national courts to use the mechanism to review
the compatibility of national law with European law, thereby creating
a decentralized mechanism for the ECJ to monitor member state compliance with European law. 58 7 As a result, preliminary references now
588
account for more than half of the ECJ's caseload.
Given the existence of the preliminary reference mechanism,
however, the ECJ has had limited occasion to review national courts.
Instead, it engages in something more akin to judicial dialogue, as
Larry Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have described it.589 The
ECJ's interaction with the national courts of Europe thus has more in
common with national courts' interaction with one another than with
the U.S. Supreme Court's interaction with the U.S. courts of appeal.
In both the ECJ's interaction with the German Constitutional Court
and the German Constitutional Court's interaction with the French
Constitutional Council, the relevant courts are, in a sense, "borrowing" from one another. In the former case, they are borrowing an
expertise in European or domestic law, while in the latter, they are
borrowing comparative case law. They are not, in either case,
reviewing the decision of the other court. This is especially apparent
in the case of the ECJ, as there is not even any decision to review. 590
The power dimension of the ECJ's interaction with national
courts is likewise restrained. No mechanism of obligation-at least in
the preliminary reference from lower national courts-compels that
interaction. Rather, the courts' dialogue is more in the nature of a
voluntary engagement of autonomous judicial institutions. 59 1 There is
greater obligation (and potential conflict) in the interaction of the
586 See id.; see also Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, Case C-283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3415,
[1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472 (1982) (holding that court of last resort is required to bring matters
to which there is no judicial remedy before Court of Justice). Preliminary references are
mandatory for judges of lower-level courts where the national judge doubts the validity of
the relevant European law. While national courts may dismiss challenges to the validity of
European law, only the ECJ may invalidate a community law. See, e.g., Foto-Frost v.
Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost, Case C-85, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 57 (1987)
(holding that national courts cannot invalidate measures taken by Community institutions). Meanwhile, a court of last resort need not refer a case, if the proper interpretation
of European law is irrelevant to the dispute, obvious, or already provided in prior ECJ case
law. See Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. at 3431-32.
587 See ALTER, supra note 102, at 9-18.
588 See Sean Pager, Strictness and Subsidiarity: An Institutional Perspective on Affirmative Action at the European Court of Justice, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 35, 66 (2003).

589 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 323-26.
590 The preliminary reference to the ECJ thus consists of a question addressed to the
European court, raised before any national court decision.
591 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 331-35.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

2158

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2029

ECJ and the high courts of the member states.592 Given that the vast
majority of preliminary references come from lower national courts,
however, even the presence of some degree of power does not alter
the general assessment of the pattern of ECJ interaction with
593
European national courts.
For the most part, then, the preliminary reference process has
minimized the extent of ECJ review of national courts, and hence the
occasion for dialectical review. Two quite recent cases, however, may
impact the pattern of ECJ review, creating greater prospect of it in the
years ahead. The first traces back to the ECJ's 1991 decision in
Francovich v. Italy,594 in which the Court held that a member state
could be liable for damages where the state's failure to implement a
directive of European law led to private harm. 595 Absent such compensation, the ECJ held, the effectiveness of European rules would be
called into question and the protection of its recognized rights
596
undermined.
Francovich left open a number of questions, including which government institutions have the potential to trigger liability. In Brasserie
du Pcheur SA v. Germany and The Queen v. Sec'y of State for
Transport ex parte Factorame Ltd., the ECJ sought to resolve this
issue, indicating that member state liability could arise not only from
executive or legislative action, but from judicial action as well. 597 The
prospect of judicial liability remained merely speculative, however,
598
until the Court's September 2003 decision in Kobler v. Austria.
In Kobler, the ECJ considered a preliminary reference from a
lower Austrian court faced with a claim for compensation based on an
allegedly erroneous decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of
592 See, e.g., ALTER, supra note 102, at 90-98 (discussing Solange line of cases); id. at

135-78 (tracing acceptance of European supremacy by three French high courts);
SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 85-86, 147. The "turnover tax struggle" between the ECJ
and Germany's Tax Court in the late 1960s represents another case of intersystemic judicial
conflict in Europe. See ALTER, supra note 102, at 80-87; see also id. at 160-61 (describing
struggle between ECJ and French Conseil d'Etat).
593 See Weiler, supra note 498, at 2426. Lower court preliminary references, moreover,
might be expected to minimize the prospect that difficult cases and/or those which require
a preliminary reference will ever reach a high court.
594 Case C-9/90, Frankovich & Others v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
595 See id.
596 See id. at 5414,

33.

597 Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Picheur SA v. Germany and The Queen v.
Sec'y of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029. The ECJ thus
held that liability extended to "any case in which a Member State breaches Community
law, whatever be the organ of the State whose act or omission was responsible for the
breach." Id. at 1145, 1 32.
598 Case C-224/01, Gerhard K6bler v. Republik Osterreich, 41 C.M.L.R. 813 (2004).
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Austria. 599 The ECJ first affirmed the applicability of Francovich to
the courts, including a national court of last resort, 60 0 notwithstanding
concerns of res judicata raised by a number of member states in their
submissions to the ECJ.6° 1 Like the tribunal in Loewen, however, the
ECJ coupled this significant ruling, as well as its rejection of the
Supreme Administrative Court's decision on the merits, with a finding
against liability. 60 2 Notably, the ECJ specifically declined to leave this
question of liability to the Austrian court; instead, it went out of its
way to offer its own analysis. 60 3 In doing so, it might be understood to
have tracked the judgment of the Loewen tribunal, both opening, and
seeking to avoid foreclosure of, an avenue of future dialectical
engagement with national courts. While the relevant liability determinations under Frankovich and Kobler will be first and foremost questions for the national courts in the future, the prospect of liability for
national court conduct can be expected to offer occasion for ECJ
review as well.
Perhaps even more notable than the decision in Kobler has been
the recent invocation of Article 226 of the Treaty against the national
courts of Europe. Article 226 provides for enforcement of European
law by the European Commission. 60 4 Until recently, Article 226 had
never been applied to a judicial institution. Yet this, too, changed in
late 2003 with the case of Commission v. Italy, in which the ECJ
reviewed the jurisprudence of the Italian courts, particularly that of
the Italian Court of Cassation, regarding the burden of proof in
national tax cases. 60 5 After declining to protect judicial bodies completely from action under Article 226, the ECJ noted that "isolated or
numerically insignificant judicial decisions in the context of case law
taking a different direction, or still more a construction disowned by
the national supreme court, cannot be taken into account. ' 60 6 Given
the Italian high court's affirmation of the relevant body of case law,
599
600

See id.
See id.

33-36.

See id. $ 20, 39-40. The application of Francovich to the courts was, however, held
to be subject to a forgiving standard of review. See id.
51-56.
602 See id.
83-88, 123-24. In the course of its merits analysis, however, the Court
rebuked the Supreme Administrative Court of Austria for the withdrawal of its own preliminary reference to the ECJ. See id. IT 106-18. As a court of final resort, that reference
was obligatory, assuming any ambiguity as to the question of European law. See supra
note 586 and accompanying text.
603 See Kobler, 41 C.M.L.R.
60-88.
604 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 3, art. 226.
605 Case C-129/00, Commission v. Italy,
11-13 (2003), at http://europa.eu.int.
606 Id. % 32.
601
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however, the ECJ found Italy-in the form of its high court-to be in
607
violation of its treaty obligations.
In light of the institutional foundations of the ECHR and the ECJ

and the recent procedural changes and court decisions described
above, international review of national courts may be a growing trend
in Europe. Existing patterns of review-coupled with meaningful
judicial power-may be expected to increase in incidence and intensity if jurisdictional changes at the ECHR and the ECJ's recent jurisprudence are any indication. 608 In fact, this trend may be even

stronger in the ECJ than its jurisprudence alone might suggest. With
the adoption of the European Constitution, the supranational courts
60 9
of Europe may have even more to review in the years ahead.
As the foregoing examples make clear, Chapter 11 is not unique
in its review of national courts. 610 Yet Chapter l's institutional
607 See id. 11 34-35.
608 Likewise, proposals

for national courts to offer suggested interpretations along with
their preliminary references, see King, supra note 191, at 736-37, would move the
ECJ-national court interaction closer to a dialectical pattern.
609 See Signing of EU Constitution to Take Place in Rome November 29, ANSA ENG.
MEDIA SERVICE, July 9, 2004.
610 Other potential sources of such review are Chapter 19 of NAFTA and the International Criminal Court. Under Chapter 19 of NAFTA, binational panels review U.S., Canadian, and Mexican administrative-agency adjudications in antidumping and countervailing
duty cases, applying relevant national law. See Judith Goldstein, International Law and
Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American "Unfair" Trade Laws, 50 INr'L ORG.
541 (1996); see also Alford, supra note 2, at 687 n.37. Such review might be construed
essentially as a statutory regime of dialectical review, especially given the panels' reliance
on domestic legal norms. This is evident in descriptions of the Chapter 19 pattern of
engagement:
[T]he FTA boards created a reputation, through repeated remands, for being
suspicious of the manner in which the U.S. bureaucracy handled unfair trade
cases. They did this through a series of initial decisions in which they specified
procedures for the bureaucracy to follow. The bureaucracy had the choice of
accepting the panels' orders or readjudicating the case. After repeated
remands, often of the same case, the bureaucracy sent forward fewer cases.
Id. at 552. A dialectical norm in which cases pass back and forth several times has thus
become the convention under Chapter 19. See id. at 551. A ready example of this pattern
was the series of exchanges in the Canadian pork countervailing duty case. See id. at
554-55. An even more notable case may be recent proceedings in the ongoing Softwood
Lumber dispute between Canada and the United States. In that case, after a series of
remands, the Chapter 19 panel finally issued an order giving the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) ten days to issue a finding that there was no threat of injury to the U.S.
industry, without further analysis or evidentiary review. See NAFTA Lumber Panel Orders
ITC to Find No Injury Threat in 10 Days, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 3, 2004, at 1. While
explicitly challenging the Chapter 19 panel's authority to issue such an order, the ITC
nonetheless complied. See ITC Complies With NAFTA Lumber Panel, Setting Up Future
Challenge, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 17, 2004, at 3. Extending this pattern of exchange,
however, the United States announced its intention to challenge the Chapter 19 panel's
directive before NAFTA's Extraordinary Challenge Committee. See U.S. To Pursue
ExtraordinaryChallenge of NAFTA Lumber Ruling, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 15, 2004, at
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design and resulting character make it an interesting case study, and
one whose analysis may shed light on patterns of international review

of national courts generally. 611 Perhaps most notable is the fact that

Chapter 11 is not a European court, but applies in the Americas, and

to the United States in particular. Given the general aversion to international review in the United States, Chapter 11 offers a timely test of
whether dialectical review can actually work. In Europe, supranational judicial review emerged from a system commonly understood to
involve a diminution in sovereignty and designed to facilitate harmonization. 6 12 This cannot be said of Chapter 11, or of NAFTA generally. 613 Yet, few could have imagined the extent of European

integration-a process extending far beyond the initial vision of its
founders. Nor could they have predicted the integral role the ECJ
would play in that process. One wonders whether observers might
one day look back at Chapter 11 with similar surprise.
CONCLUSION

While the interaction of judicial institutions is commonly conceived to be shaped by a dynamic of either vertical hierarchy or horizontal comity, this Article outlines a hybrid pattern of interaction,
standing between these extremes. Alexander Bickel, Robert Cover,
1. As this example may suggest, however, the power of Chapter 19 panels may ultimately
be too substantial, compared to the national administrative adjudicators whom they
review, for the Chapter 19 process to operate as a true dialectic.
Yet another international opportunity for dialectical exchange may come in the interaction of national courts and the newly established International Criminal Court, under
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, art. 17, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1012, which provides for complementary jurisdiction in the
International Criminal Court if national courts fail to exercise their jurisdiction to prosecute actionable international crimes. Articulation of the detailed implications of the latter
standard should offer substantial opportunity for a dialectical pattern of engagement. See
SLAUGHTER, supra note 57, at 148-50; see also Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdictionof National Courts and InternationalCriminal Tribunals,
23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 389 (1998) (describing choice between primacy and complementarity in jurisdiction of International Criminal Court).
611 A comparative analysis of the various courts noted above, through a prism of dialectical review, is beyond the scope of this Article, but offers a fruitful avenue for future
study.
612 See Jacqueline Bhabha, European Harmonisationof Asylum Policy: A Flawed Process, 35 VA. J. IN-r'L L. 101, 102 (1994) (noting that major objective of European leaders
has been to create "increasingly connected and interdependent" Europe).
613 See Abbott, supra note 116, at 522-23; Alvarez, supra note 115, at 430 n.113; see also
Committee Statements on the NAFTA: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, Statement of the Committee on Finance on S. 1627 The North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act (NAFTA), 103rd Cong., 139 CONG. REC. 30,201, 30,203 (1993) ("If in
the future a NAFTA dispute settlement panel were to determine that a particular U.S. law
was inconsistent with the NAFTA, the Congress would retain the full authority to determine whether or not to amend or modify that law.").
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Alexander Aleinikoff, Guido Calabresi, Neal Katyal, and others have
identified an array of non-conventional forms of judicial communication. I offer "dialectical review" in a similar spirit. Judicial institutions engaged in dialectical review participate in more than dialogue,
which each can freely disregard. In dialectical review, as revealed by
Chapter 11 and its domestic analogies, both courts enjoy some
capacity to assert power, albeit not in so direct or final a form as in
appellate review. The intersystemic judicial communication of dialectical review, as a result, is not easily ignored. Besides this distinct
power dynamic, an effective regime of dialectical review rests on the
presence of diverse legal and institutional perspectives and an institutional design crafted to provide adjudicatory continuity. In tandem,
these features make dialectical review a mechanism of beneficial legal
innovation through which judicial coordination, jurisprudential harmonization, and norm internalization may arise.
This analysis offers its most immediate recommendations to the
judges who are party to these forms of interactions and the policymakers charged with the reform and replication of Chapter 11 and
analogous regimes. By only a slight extension, the analysis herein
speaks to judicial, legislative, and executive participants in other international dispute settlement regimes, including the ICJ, the WTO, and
the ECJ. It may extend further afield, yet closer to home, by its application to the interplay of federal and state courts in habeas and other
civil matters, and to the interaction of both federal and state courts
with tribal courts in the United States. To the judges who are potential parties to dialectical review, this Article commends an approach
characterized by careful but firm assertions of authority, by contextual
and casuist analysis, and by efforts to enhance their relevant judicial
system's capacity for continuity. Policymakers charged with the
reform of existing mechanisms of intersystemic adjudication and the
creation of new systems of review should focus particular attention on
maintaining an equipoise of power between participating tribunals,
thus furthering the dialectical dynamic and the prospect of efficient
innovation.
Yet, the ultimate lessons of the present analysis may extend even
further. The model of dialectical review proposed herein ultimately
speaks to an array of situations in which institutions-including legislative and executive institutions and even broader social institutionsinteract without a dominant convention of either hierarchy or comity.
Such situations may represent a far greater-and perhaps growingproportion of the interactions among institutions than the ordinary
dichotomy of mandate versus contract might suggest.
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Along horizontal dimensions of governance, the pattern of dialectical engagement may offer meaningful guidance for the complex
interaction of legislative, executive, and judicial authorities in the
modern administrative state. Vertically, dialectical review bespeaks a
conception of federal-state relations grounded not in federalism's conventional project of clear jurisdictional segregation, but in a dynamic
interaction directed to a fluid distribution of power. Exploration of
the interaction of international tribunals and national courts in the
novel setting of Chapter 11 may therefore have important implications
well beyond NAFTA and international adjudication. This study and
its paradigm of dialectical review may offer fruitful guidance for the
management of a growing dynamic of coordination among political
and social institutions, both at home and abroad.
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